

# OCF Security Specification

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## 416 **Introduction**

417 This document, and all the other parts associated with this document, were developed in response  
418 to worldwide demand for smart home focused Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as appliances,  
419 door locks, security cameras, sensors, and actuators; these to be modelled and securely controlled,  
420 locally and remotely, over an IP network.

421 While some inter-device communication existed, no universal language had been developed for  
422 the IoT. Device makers instead had to choose between disparate frameworks, limiting their market  
423 share, or developing across multiple ecosystems, increasing their costs. The burden then falls on  
424 end users to determine whether the products they want are compatible with the ecosystem they  
425 bought into, or find ways to integrate their devices into their network, and try to solve interoperability  
426 issues on their own.

427 In addition to the smart home, IoT deployments in commercial environments are hampered by a  
428 lack of security. This issue can be avoided by having a secure IoT communication framework, which  
429 this standard solves.

430 The goal of these documents is then to connect the next 25 billion devices for the IoT, providing  
431 secure and reliable device discovery and connectivity across multiple OSs and platforms. There  
432 are multiple proposals and forums driving different approaches, but no single solution addresses  
433 the majority of key requirements. This document and the associated parts enable industry  
434 consolidation around a common, secure, interoperable approach.

435 The OCF specification suite is made up of nineteen discrete documents, the documents fall into  
436 logical groupings as described herein:

- 437 – Core framework
  - 438 – Core Specification
  - 439 – Security Specification
  - 440 – Onboarding Tool Specification
- 441 – Bridging framework and bridges
  - 442 – Bridging Specification
  - 443 – Resource to Alljoyn Interface Mapping Specification
  - 444 – OCF Resource to oneM2M Resource Mapping Specification
  - 445 – OCF Resource to BLE Mapping Specification
  - 446 – OCF Resource to EnOcean Mapping Specification
  - 447 – OCF Resource to LWM2M Mapping Specification
  - 448 – OCF Resource to UPlus Mapping Specification
  - 449 – OCF Resource to Zigbee Cluster Mapping Specification
  - 450 – OCF Resource to Z-Wave Mapping Specification
- 451 – Resource and Device models
  - 452 – Resource Type Specification
  - 453 – Device Specification
- 454 – Core framework extensions
  - 455 – Easy Setup Specification
  - 456 – Core Optional Specification
- 457 – OCF Cloud
  - 458 – Cloud API for Cloud Services Specification

- 459 – Device to Cloud Services Specification
- 460 – Cloud Security Specification

461

## OCF Security Specification

### 462 1 Scope

463 This document defines security objectives, philosophy, Resources and mechanism that impacts  
464 OCF base layers of ISO/IEC 30118-1. ISO/IEC 30118-1 contains informative security content. The  
465 OCF Security Specification contains security normative content and may contain informative  
466 content related to the OCF base or other OCF documents.

### 467 2 Normative References

468 The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content  
469 constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For  
470 undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments)  
471 applies.

472 ISO/IEC 30118-1 Information technology -- Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification --  
473 Part 1: Core specification  
474 <https://www.iso.org/standard/53238.html>  
475 Latest version available at:  
476 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Core\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Core_Specification.pdf)

477 ISO/IEC 30118-3 Information technology -- Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification --  
478 Part 3: Bridging specification  
479 <https://www.iso.org/standard/74240.html>  
480 Latest version available at:  
481 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Bridging\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Bridging_Specification.pdf)

482 OCF Wi-Fi Easy Setup, Information technology – Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)  
483 Specification – Part 7: Wi-Fi Easy Setup specification  
484 Latest version available at:  
485 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Wi-Fi\\_Easy\\_Setup\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Wi-Fi_Easy_Setup_Specification.pdf)

486 OCF Cloud Specification, Information technology – Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)  
487 Specification – Part 8: Cloud Specification  
488 Latest version available at:  
489 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Cloud\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Cloud_Specification.pdf)

490 OCF Cloud Security Specification - Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification – Cloud  
491 Security Specification  
492 Latest version available at:  
493 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Cloud\\_Security\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Cloud_Security_Specification.pdf)

494 OCF Onboarding Tool Specification - Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification –  
495 Onboarding Tool Specification  
496 Latest version available at:  
497 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Onboarding\\_Tool\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Onboarding_Tool_Specification.pdf)

498 OCF Cloud API for Cloud Services Specification - Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Cloud API  
499 for Cloud Services Specification  
500 Latest version available at:  
501 [https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF\\_Cloud\\_API\\_For\\_Cloud\\_Services\\_Specification.pdf](https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Cloud_API_For_Cloud_Services_Specification.pdf)

502 JSON SCHEMA, draft version 4, <http://json-schema.org/latest/json-schema-core.html>.

503 IETF RFC 2315, *PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5*, March 1998,  
504 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315>

505 IETF RFC 2898, *PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0*, September  
506 2000, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898>

507 IETF RFC 2986, *PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7*, November  
508 2000, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986>

509 IETF RFC 4122, *A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace*, July 2005,  
510 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4122>

511 IETF RFC 4279, *Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, December  
512 2005, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4279>

513 IETF RFC 4492, *Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security  
514 (TLS)*, May 2006, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492>

515 IETF RFC 5246, *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2*, August 2008,  
516 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>

517 IETF RFC 5280, *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation  
518 List (CRL) Profile*, May 2008, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>

519 IETF RFC 5489, *ECDHE\_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, March 2009,  
520 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5489>

521 IETF RFC 5545, *Internet Calendaring and Scheduling Core Object Specification (iCalendar)*,  
522 September 2009, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5545>

523 IETF RFC 5755, *An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization*, January 2010,  
524 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5755>

525 IETF RFC 6347, *Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2*, January 2012,  
526 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>

527 IETF RFC 6655, *AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, July 2012,  
528 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655>

529 IETF RFC 7228, *Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks*, May 2014,  
530 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7228>

531 IETF RFC 7250, *Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram  
532 Transport Layer Security (DTLS)*, June 2014, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7250>

533 IETF RFC 7251, *AES-CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for TLS*, June 2014,  
534 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7251>

535 IETF RFC 7252, *The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)*, June 2014,  
536 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252>

537 IETF RFC 8152, *CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)*, July 2017,  
538 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8152>

539 IETF RFC 8520, *Manufacturer Usage Description Specification*, Mar 2019,  
540 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8520>

541 IETF RFC 8613, *Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)*, July 2019,  
542 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8613>

543 oneM2M Release 3 Specifications, <http://www.onem2m.org/technical/published-drafts>

544 OpenAPI specification, aka *Swagger RESTful API Documentation Specification*, Version 2.0  
545 <https://github.com/OAI/OpenAPI-Specification/blob/master/versions/2.0.md>

546

547 **3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms**

548 **3.1 Terms and definitions**

549 For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 30118-1, ISO/IEC  
550 30118-3 and the following apply.

551 ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following  
552 addresses:

553 – ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp>

554 – IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>

555 **3.1.1**

556 **Access Management Service (AMS)**

557 service that dynamically constructs ACL Resources in response to a Device Resource request

558 Note 1 to entry: An AMS can evaluate access policies remotely and supply the result to a Server which allows or denies  
559 a pending access request. An AMS is authorised to provision ACL Resources.

560 **3.1.2**

561 **Credential Management Service (CMS)**

562 Device that is authorized to provision credential Resources

563 **3.1.3**

564 **Device Class**

565 IETF RFC 7228 defined device class

566 **3.1.4**

567 **Device Ownership Transfer Service (DOTS)**

568 logical entity that establishes device ownership

569 **3.1.5**

570 **End-Entity**

571 any certificate holder which is not a Root or Intermediate Certificate Authority

572 Note 1 to entry: Typically, a device certificate.

573 **3.1.6**

574 **Intermediary**

575 Device that implements both Client and Server roles and may perform protocol translation, virtual  
576 device to physical device mapping or Resource translation

577 **3.1.7**

578 **OCF Cipher Suite**

579 set of algorithms and parameters that define the cryptographic functionality of a Device. The OCF  
580 Cipher Suite includes the definition of the public key group operations, signatures, and specific  
581 hashing and encoding used to support the public key.

582 **3.1.8**

583 **OCF Rooted Certificate Chain**

584 collection of X.509 v3 certificates in which each certificate chains to a trust anchor certificate which  
585 has been issued by a certificate authority under the direction, authority, and approval of the Open  
586 Connectivity Foundation Board of Directors as a trusted root for the OCF ecosystem.

587 **3.1.9**

588 **Onboarding Tool (OBT)**

589 tool that implements *DOTS*(3.1.4), *AMS*(3.1.1), and *CMS*(3.1.2) functionality

590 **3.1.10**

591 **Out of Band Communication Channel**

592 any mechanism for delivery of a secret from one party to another, not specified by OCF

593 **3.1.11**  
594 **Owner Credential (OC)**  
595 credential, provisioned to a Device, for the purposes of mutual authentication of the Device and  
596 *OBT*(3.1.9) during subsequent interactions, identified by having a Subject UUID matching the  
597 Resource Owner Id of the Device Ownership Transfer Resource hosted by a Device that has the  
598 credential

599 **3.1.12**  
600 **Role (Network context)**  
601 stereotyped behavior of a Device; one of [Client, Server or Intermediary]

602 **3.1.13**  
603 **Role Identifier**  
604 Property of an OCF credentials Resource or element in a role certificate that identifies a privileged  
605 role that a Server Device associates with a Client Device for the purposes of making authorization  
606 decisions when the Client Device requests access to Device Resources.

607 **3.1.14**  
608 **Secure Resource Manager (SRM)**  
609 module in the OCF Core that implements security functionality that includes management of  
610 security Resources such as ACLs, credentials and Device owner transfer state.

611 **3.1.15**  
612 **Security Virtual Resource (SVR)**  
613 Resource supporting security features.

614 Note 1 to entry: For a list of all the SVRs please see clause 13.

615 **3.1.16**  
616 **Trust Anchor**  
617 well-defined, shared authority, within a trust hierarchy, by which two cryptographic entities (e.g. a  
618 Device and an *OBT*(3.1.9)) can assume trust

619 **3.1.17**  
620 **Device Configuration Resource (DCR)**  
621 Resource that is any of the following:

- 622 a) a Discovery Core Resource, or
- 623 b) a Security Virtual Resource, or
- 624 c) a Wi-Fi Easy Setup Resource ("oic.r.easyssetup", "oic.r.wificonf", "oic.r.devconf"), or
- 625 d) a CoAP Cloud Configuration Resource ("oic.r.coapcloudconf"), or
- 626 e) a Software Update Resource ("oic.r.softwareupdate"), or
- 627 f) a Maintenance Resource ("oic.wk.mnt").

628 **3.1.18**  
629 **Non-Configuration Resource (NCR)**  
630 Resource that is not a Device Configuration Resource (3.1.17)

631 **3.1.19**  
632 **OCF Security Domain**  
633 set of onboarded OCF Devices that are provisioned with credentialing information for confidential  
634 communication with one another

635 **3.1.20**  
636 **Owned (or "in Owned State")**  
637 having the "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource equal to "TRUE"

638 **3.1.21**  
639 **Unowned (or "in Unowned State")**  
640 having the "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource equal to "FALSE"

641 **3.1.22**  
642 **OCF Onboarding**  
643 initial establishment of ownership over a Device, and initial provisioning of the Device for normal  
644 operation

645 **3.1.23**  
646 **Auditable Event**  
647 system activity that may be indicative of a violation of security policy

648 **3.1.24**  
649 **Auditable Event Entry**  
650 record of the details of an Auditable Event

651 **3.1.25**  
652 **End User**  
653 person using the [particular] product

654 **3.1.26**  
655 **End-to-End Secure**  
656 securely encapsulate information so that *OCF Proxies* (3.1.28) on the end-to-end delivery path do  
657 not need to be trusted with the confidentiality, integrity and freshness of that information

658 **3.1.27**  
659 **End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages**  
660 interoperable mechanism which End-to-End Secures the exchange of unicast OCF CRUDN  
661 messages

662 **3.1.28**  
663 **OCF Proxy**  
664 functionality which can interpret the OCF compliant URIs of request messages intended for  
665 resources on another OCF Server and can route those request messages accordingly

666 **3.1.29**  
667 **Origin Client**  
668 Client which originally generated a request, as opposed to the Client functionality of a Proxy which  
669 is forwarding a request from another Device

670 **3.1.30**  
671 **OSCORE Master Secret**  
672 "Master Secret" as defined in clause 3.1 of IETF RFC 8613

673 **3.1.31**  
674 **OSCORE Recipient ID**  
675 "Recipient ID" as defined in clause 3.1 of IETF RFC 8613

676 **3.1.32**  
677 **OSCORE Security Context**  
678 "Security Context" as defined in clause 3.1 of IETF RFC 8613

679 **3.1.33**  
680 **OSCORE Sender ID**  
681 "Sender ID" as defined in clause 3.1 of IETF RFC 8613

682 **3.1.34**  
683 **OSCORE Sender Sequence Number**  
684 "Sender Sequence Number" as defined in clause 3.1 of IETF RFC 8613

685 **3.1.35**  
686 **Target Server**  
687 Server to which a request is addressed, as opposed to the Server functionality of a *OCF Proxy*  
688 (3.1.28) which receives a request to be forwarded to another Device

689 **3.1.36**  
690 **Simple Secure Multicast**  
691 delivery of UPDATE request messages from a Client to a group of Servers using network-layer  
692 multicast, where the messages are protected with a simple security mechanism

693 **3.1.37**  
694 **Simple Secure Multicast Client Context**  
695 *OSCORE Security Context* (3.1.32) parameters provisioned to the Client of a *Simple Secure*  
696 *Multicast Group* (3.1.38) to enable End-to-End Security of *Simple Secure Multicast Requests*  
697 (3.1.39) sent to Servers of that *Simple Secure Multicast Group* (3.1.38)

698 **3.1.38**  
699 **Simple Secure Multicast Group**  
700 group of Servers and one (1) associated Client provisioned with credentials to enable *Simple*  
701 *Secure Multicast* (3.1.36) from the Client to the set of Servers

702 **3.1.39**  
703 **Simple Secure Multicast Request**  
704 OSCORE-protected UPDATE request message delivered from a Client to a group of Servers using  
705 *Simple Secure Multicast* (3.1.36)

706 **3.1.40**  
707 **Simple Secure Multicast Server Context**  
708 OSCORE Security Context parameters provisioned to Servers of a Simple Secure Multicast Group  
709 (3.1.38) to enable End-to-End Security of *Simple Secure Multicast Requests* (3.1.39) sent by the  
710 Client of that *Simple Secure Multicast Group* (3.1.38)

711 **3.1.41**  
712 **Device Onboarding Connection (DOC)**  
713 special DTLS connection established for the purposes of onboarding the Device securely when a  
714 Device is in RFOTM

715 NOTE: The Owner Transfer Method selected will determine the specifics of the DOC used.

716 **3.1.42**  
717 **Ready For Normal Operation State**  
718 state of a Device in which *NCRs* (3.1.18) can be accessed

719 **3.1.43**  
720 **Ready For Owner Transfer Mechanism State**  
721 state of a Device in which a Device can be Onboarded

722 **3.1.44**  
723 **Ready For Provisioning State**  
724 state of a Device in which *SVRs* (3.1.15) can be configured

725 **3.1.45**  
726 **Reset State**  
727 state of a Device in which the configurable Properties of Device's resources are reset to the  
728 manufacturer default and the Device becomes *Unowned* (3.1.21)

729 **3.1.46**  
730 **Soft Reset State**  
731 state of a Device in which SVRs (3.1.15) can be configured, with slightly more Properties available  
732 than in RFPRO

### 733 **3.2 Symbols and abbreviated terms**

734 AC            Access Control

735 ACE           Access Control Entry

736 ACL           Access Control List

737 AEAD          Authenticated Encryption with Authenticated Data

738 NOTE: Defined in IETF RFC 8152

739 AEE           Auditable Event Entry

740 AES           Advanced Encryption Standard

741 AMS           Access Management Service

742 CMS           Credential Management Service

743 COSE          CBOR Object Signing and Encryption

744 NOTE: Defined in IETF RFC 8152

745 CRUDN        CREATE, RETREIVE, UPDATE, DELETE, NOTIFY

746 CSR           Certificate Signing Request

747 DOC           Device Onboarding Connection

748 ECC           Elliptic Curve Cryptography

749 ECDSA        Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

750 EKU           Extended Key Usage

751 DOTS          Device Ownership Transfer Service

752 ID            Identity/Identifier

753 JSON          JavaScript Object Notation.

754 NVRAM        Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory

755 OC            Owner Credential

756 OCSP          Online Certificate Status Protocol

757 OBT           Onboarding Tool

758 OID           Object Identifier

759	OSCORE	Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
760	NOTE: Defined in IETF RFC 8613	
761	OTM	Owner Transfer Method
762	PE	Policy Engine
763	PIN	Personal Identification Number
764	PPSK	PIN-authenticated pre-shared key
765	PRF	Pseudo Random Function
766	PSI	Persistent Storage Interface
767	PSK	Pre Shared Key
768	RBAC	Role Based Access Control
769	RM	Resource Manager
770	RNG	Random Number Generator
771	RESET	Reset State
772	RFNOP	Ready For Normal Operation State
773	RFOTM	Ready For Owner Transfer Mechanism State
774	RFPRO	Ready For Provisioning State
775	SBAC	Subject Based Access Control
776	SEE	Secure Execution Environment
777	SRESET	Soft Reset State
778	SRM	Secure Resource Manager
779	SSM	Simple Secure Multicast
780	SVR	Security Virtual Resource
781	URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
782	VOD	Virtual OCF Device

## 783 **4 Document conventions and organization**


### 784 **4.1 Conventions**

785 This document defines Resources, protocols and conventions used to implement security for OCF  
786 core framework and applications.

787 For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 30118-1 apply.

788 In this document, to be consistent with the IETF usages for RESTful operations, the RESTful  
789 operation words CRUDN, CREATE, RETRIVE, UPDATE, DELETE, and NOTIFY will have all letters  
790 capitalized. Any lowercase uses of these words have the normal technical English meaning.

791 Figure 1 depicts interaction between OCF Devices.



792

793

**Figure 1 – OCF interaction**

794 Devices may implement a Client role that performs Actions on Servers. Actions access Resources  
 795 managed by Servers. The OCF stack enforces access policies on Resources. End-to-end Device  
 796 interaction can be protected using session protection protocol (e.g. DTLS) or with data encryption  
 797 methods.

798 **4.2 Notation**

799 In this document, features are described as required, recommended, allowed or DEPRECATED as  
 800 follows:

801 **Required (or shall or mandatory).**

802 These basic features shall be implemented to comply with OCF Core Architecture. The phrases  
 803 "shall not", and "PROHIBITED" indicate behaviour that is prohibited, i.e. that if performed means  
 804 the implementation is not in compliance.

805 **Recommended (or should).**

806 These features add functionality supported by OCF Core Architecture and should be implemented.  
 807 Recommended features take advantage of the capabilities OCF Core Architecture, usually without  
 808 imposing major increase of complexity. Notice that for compliance testing, if a recommended  
 809 feature is implemented, it shall meet the specified requirements to be in compliance with these  
 810 guidelines. Some recommended features could become requirements in the future. The phrase  
 811 "should not" indicates behaviour that is permitted but not recommended.

812 **Allowed (may or allowed).**

813 These features are neither required nor recommended by OCF Core Architecture, but if the feature  
 814 is implemented, it shall meet the specified requirements to be in compliance with these guidelines.

815 **Conditionally allowed (CA)**

816 The definition or behaviour depends on a condition. If the specified condition is met, then the  
 817 definition or behaviour is allowed, otherwise it is not allowed.

818 **Conditionally required (CR)**

819 The definition or behaviour depends on a condition. If the specified condition is met, then the  
 820 definition or behaviour is required. Otherwise the definition or behaviour is allowed as default  
 821 unless specifically defined as not allowed.

822 **DEPRECATED**

823 Although these features are still described in this document, they should not be implemented except  
 824 for backward compatibility. The occurrence of a deprecated feature during operation of an  
 825 implementation compliant with the current document has no effect on the implementation's

826 operation and does not produce any error conditions. Backward compatibility may require that a  
827 feature is implemented and functions as specified but it shall never be used by implementations  
828 compliant with this document.

829 Strings that are to be taken literally are enclosed in "double quotes".

830 Words that are emphasized are printed in italic.

### 831 **4.3 Data types**

832 See ISO/IEC 30118-1.

### 833 **4.4 Document structure**

834 Informative clauses may be found in the Overview clauses, while normative clauses fall outside of  
835 those clauses.

836 The Security Specification may use the OpenAPI specification as the API definition language. The  
837 mapping of the CRUDN actions is specified in ISO/IEC 30118-1.


838

839 **5 Security overview**

840 **5.1 Security model of operation**

841 The goal of OCF's security architecture is to protect the data and device states represented by the  
 842 OCF Resources. From the OCF perspective, a Device is a certifiable logical entity that participates  
 843 in an OCF ecosystem. During interactions between Devices, the Device acting as the Server holds  
 844 and controls the Resources and provides the Device acting as a Client access to those Resources,  
 845 subject to a set of security mechanisms and conforming to the policies configured by the OCF  
 846 Security Domain Owner. The Platform hosting the Device may provide security hardening to ensure  
 847 robustness of the variety of operations described in this document. Multiple Devices may be hosted  
 848 by the same Platform.

849 The security model of operation for direct Device-to-Device interaction (that is, exchanges which  
 850 are not facilitated by entities acting as OCF Proxies between the Client and Server) is depicted in  
 851 Figure 2 and described in the following steps:



852

853 **Figure 2 – OCF layers for direct Device-to-Device interaction**

- 854 1) The Client establishes a network connection to the Server (Device holding the Resources).
- 855 2) The Devices (Server and Client) exchange messages either via a mutually-authenticated  
 856 secure channel between the two Devices or via an unsecured connection.
- 857 a) The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource on each Device holds the credentials used for mutual  
 858 authentication and credentials used for role authorization.
- 859 b) Messages received over a secured channel are associated with a "deviceUUID". In the case  
 860 of a certificate credential, the "deviceUUID" is part of the certificate received from the other  
 861 Device. In the case of a symmetric key credential, the "deviceUUID" is associated with the  
 862 credential in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.
- 863 c) The Client may present its role certificate to request association with a role identifier  
 864 ("roleid"). The Server may associate the Client with any number of role identifiers.
- 865 d) Requests received by a Server over an unsecured channel are treated as anonymous and  
 866 are not associated with any "deviceUUID" or "roleid".

- 867 3) The Client submits a request to the Server.
- 868 4) The Server receives the request.
- 869 a) If the request is received over an unsecured channel, the Server treats the request as  
870 anonymous and no "deviceUUID" or "roleid" are associated with the request.
- 871 b) If the request is received over a secured channel, then the Server associates the request  
872 with the "deviceUUID" of the Client and all valid "roleid" values of the Client by default.
- 873 c) The Server then consults the Access Control List (ACL), and looks for an Access Control  
874 Entry (ACE) matching the following criteria:
- 875 i) The requested Resource matches a Resource reference in the ACE
- 876 ii) The requested operation is permitted by the "permissions" of the ACE, and
- 877 iii) The "subjectUUID" contains either one of a special set of wildcard values or, if the  
878 Device is not anonymous, the subject matches the Client "deviceUUID" associated with  
879 the request or a valid "roleid" associated with the request. The special wildcard values  
880 authorize all Devices communicating over either authenticated and encrypted sessions  
881 or unsecured sessions to interact according to the ACE.
- 882 If there is a matching ACE, then access to the Resource is permitted; otherwise access  
883 is denied. Access is enforced by the Server's Secure Resource Manager (SRM).

884 5) The Server sends a response back to the Client.

885 OCF also supports exchange of messages between an Origin Client and Target Server facilitated  
886 at one or more entities acting as OCF Proxies.

887 NOTE 1: Any number of OCF Proxies may be on the path between the Origin Client and Target Server, although this  
888 number is expected to be small in practice.


889 In some scenarios, an OCF Proxy acts as a Server to incoming OCF CRUDN request messages:  
890 processing the OCF CRUDN request messages; and then sending appropriate OCF CRUDN  
891 request messages onwards towards the Target Server. The OCF Proxy can also process the  
892 corresponding incoming OCF CRUDN response message and send appropriate OCF CRUDN  
893 request messages back towards the Origin Client.

894 This approach implies that the owner of the Security Domain (containing the Origin Client and  
895 Target Server) is willing to trust all OCF Proxies on the message delivery path with the  
896 confidentiality, integrity and freshness of the OCF CRUDN messages. Alternatively, the Origin  
897 Client and Target Server can apply End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages which enables  
898 securing the exchange of OCF CRUDN messages so that OCF Proxies do not need to be trusted  
899 with the confidentiality and integrity of the OCF CRUDN messages.

900 The security model of operation when using OCF Proxies without End-to-End Security of Unicast  
901 Messages is described in OCF Cloud Specification, OCF Cloud Security Specification, and C2C  
902 API.

903 Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the security model of operation when using OCF Proxies and End-to-  
904 End Security of Messages is applied; see also the following steps. Figure 3 illustrates an example  
905 with one OCF Proxy. Figure 4 illustrates a more complex example with two OCF Proxies using OCF  
906 Cloud API for Cloud Services Specification; see notes 1 and 2.


907 NOTE 2: If the OCF Proxies in Figure 4 are OCF Clouds, OCF Proxy A is the Origin Cloud to which the Origin Client is  
908 registered, and OCF Proxy B is the Target Cloud to which the Target Server is registered.



909

910

**Figure 3 – OCF layers for interactions via one OCF Proxy**



911

912

**Figure 4 – OCF layers for interactions via two OCF Proxies**

- 913 1) Pairwise network connections are established.
- 914 2) Messages are exchanged over each network connection via pairwise mutually-authenticated  
915 secure transport connection.
- 916 3) The Origin Client and Target Server establish an End-to-End Secured channel which is  
917 mutually-authenticated using credentials held in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resources of the Origin  
918 Client and Target Server.
- 919 4) The Origin Client generates an OCF CRUDN request message to the Target Server. The Origin  
920 Client encapsulates the OCF CRUDN request message into an End-to-End Secured request  
921 message of the End-to-End Secured channel (established in step 3). Information identifying the  
922 Target Server is left un-encrypted in the End-to-End Secured request message, so OCF Proxies  
923 can use the identifying information to route the End-to-End Secured request message correctly.  
924 The Origin Client sends the End-to-End Secured request message to its OCF Proxy, over the  
925 optionally secured transport connection established with that OCF Proxy. See Note 3.


- 926 5) Each OCF Proxy on the path extracts the identifying information of the Target Server from the  
927 request message and, subject to the OCF Proxy's policies governing End-to-End Secured  
928 request messages, forwards the end-to- End-to-End Secured request message towards the  
929 Target Server over an optionally secured transport connection. See notes 3, 4 and 5.
- 930 6) The Target Server verifies and decrypts the End-to-End Secured request message as a  
931 message of the End-to-End Secured channel (established at step 3) to extract the encapsulated  
932 OCF CRUDN request message from the Origin Client. The OCF CRUDN request message is  
933 treated as being received over an authenticated encrypted ("auth-crypt") connection and  
934 associated with a "deviceUUID". The "deviceUUID" is associated with the credential in the  
935 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource used to establish the End-to-End Secured channel in step 3.
- 936 7) The Target Server determines whether access to the resource is permitted as described in step  
937 4c of the Security model for direct Device-to-Device interaction shown in Figure 2.
- 938 8) The Target Server generates an OCF CRUDN response message and encapsulates the OCF  
939 CRUDN response message into an End-to-End Secured response message of the End-to-End  
940 Secured channel (established at step 3). The Target Secure sends the End-to-End Secured  
941 response message to its OCF Proxy, over the optionally secured transport connection on which  
942 the corresponding request was received. See Note 3.
- 943 9) Each OCF Proxy on the path forwards the End-to-End Secured response message towards the  
944 Origin Client over the optionally secured transport connection on which the corresponding  
945 request message was received. See Note 3.
- 946 10) The Origin Client verifies and decrypts the End-to-End Secured response message as a  
947 message of the End-to-End Secured channel (established at step 3) to extract the encapsulated  
948 OCF CRUDN response message from the Target Server.

949 NOTE 3: While in transit, the OCF CRUDN message might be secured by up to two independent layers of Security: a  
950 layer of End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages (using OSCORE), and an independent layer of transport Security  
951 (using DTLS or TLS).

952 NOTE 4: This document does not address details of how an OCF Proxy determines if its policies permit forwarding the  
953 request message towards the identified Target Server. If an OCF Proxy permits forwarding a request message towards  
954 a Target Server, then it is assumed that the OCF Proxy also permits forwarding the corresponding response message(s)  
955 over the transport connection on which the corresponding request message was received.

956 NOTE 5: This document does not address how OCF Proxy A determines that OCF Proxy B is the correct OCF Proxy to  
957 forward the request message to. The OCF Cloud API for Cloud Services Specification provides the details for the case  
958 where the OCF Proxy A and OCF Proxy B are OCF Clouds.

959 As shown in Figure 5, Simple Secure Multicast (SSM) enables a Client to securely communicate  
960 an UPDATE request to a group of Servers with a single non-confirmable UPDATE request delivered  
961 via networking-layer multicast.




962

963

**Figure 5 – Single request reaches a group of Servers**

964 The Security model for SSM is described in Figure 6 and the accompanying steps.



965

966

**Figure 6 – OCF Layers for Simple Secure Multicast**

- 967 1) The Client and Servers in the SSM Group are configured with encryption/decryption. The Client
- 968 knows the preconfigured multicast address to use and how to create the actual payload of the
- 969 command to send.
- 970 2) Messages are exchanged over an unsecure transport connection.
- 971 3) The Client generates an UPDATE request message to the Servers.
- 972 4) The Client encapsulates the UPDATE request message into an End-to-End Secured request
- 973 message of the unsecured channel. The multicast address is left unencrypted in the Secured
- 974 request message.

975 The Client sends the Secured UPDATE request message to the multicast URL of the Servers,  
976 using the URL of the multicast enabled resource.

977 5) The Servers decrypt the message. The UPDATE request message is treated as being received  
978 over an authenticated encrypted ("auth-crypt") connection and associated with a "deviceUUID"  
979 (which can be the Device UUID of the Client).


980 6) The Server determines whether access to the Resource is permitted as described in step 4c of  
981 the Security model for direct Device-to-Device interaction shown in Figure 2.

982 Resource protection includes protection of data both while at rest and during transit. Aside from  
983 access control mechanisms, the OCF Security Specification does not include specification of  
984 secure storage of Resources. Secure storage may be accomplished through the use of hardware  
985 security or encryption of data at rest. The exact implementation of secure storage is subject to a  
986 set of hardening requirements that are specified in clause 14 and may be subject to certification  
987 guidelines.

988 Data in transit protection is specified fully as a normative part of this document. This document  
989 supports data in transit data protection at the transport layer through use of mechanisms such as  
990 DTLS and end-to-end data-in-transit protection through OSCORE.

991 NOTE 6: DTLS will provide packet by packet protection, rather than protection for the OCF CRUDN message as whole.  
992 For instance, if the integrity of the entire OCF CRUDN message as a whole is required, separate end-to-end Security  
993 (for example, using OSCORE) should be applied before passing the packet down to the transport layer.

994 Figure 7 depicts OCF Security Enforcement Points.



995

996

997 **Figure 7 – OCF security enforcement points**

998 **5.2 Access control**

999 **5.2.1 Access control general**

1000 The OCF framework assumes that Resources are hosted by a Server and are made available to  
1001 Clients subject to access control and authorization mechanisms. The Resources at the Server are  
1002 protected through implementation of access control, authentication and confidentiality protection.

1003 This clause provides an overview of access control through the use of Access Control Lists.  
1004 However, access control in OCF is agnostic regarding transport and connectivity abstraction layers.

1005 Implementation of access control relies on a-priori definition of a set of access policies for the  
1006 Resource. The policies are stored locally in an ACL Resource provisioned by an Access  
1007 Management Service (AMS) in the form of Access Control Entries (ACE). The lack of such an  
1008 associated ACE results in the Resource being inaccessible. Multiple types of access control  
1009 mechanisms may be applied:

- 1010 – Subject-based access control (SBAC), where the ACE matches the identity of the Client against  
1011 the subject included in the policy defined for the Resource. Asserting the identity of the Client  
1012 requires an authentication process.
- 1013 – Role-based Access Control (RBAC), where the ACE matches a role identifier included in the  
1014 policy for the Resource to a role identifier associated with the Client.
- 1015 – Wildcard-based Access Control, where the ACE matches a connection type, used to access the  
1016 Resource (i.e. any mutually-authenticated connection).

1017  
1018 The ACE only applies if the ACE matches both the subject (i.e. Client) and the requested Resource.  
1019 There are multiple ways a subject could be matched, (1) Device UUID, (2) Role Identifier or (3)  
1020 wildcard. The way in which the Client connects to the Server may be relevant for making access  
1021 control decisions. Wildcard matching on authenticated vs. unauthenticated and encrypted vs.  
1022 unencrypted connection allows an access policy to be broadly applied to subject classes.

1023 Example Wildcard Matching Policy:

```
1024 "aclist2": [  
1025   {  
1026     "subject": {"conntype" : "anon-clear" },  
1027     "resources": [  
1028       { "wc": "*" }  
1029     ],  
1030     "permission": 31  
1031   },  
1032   {  
1033     "subject": {"conntype" : "auth-crypt" },  
1034     "resources": [  
1035       { "wc": "*" }  
1036     ],  
1037     "permission": 31  
1038   },  
1039 ]
```

1040 Details of the format for ACL are defined in clause 12. The ACL is composed of one or more ACEs.

1041 Some Resources, such as Collections, generate requests to linked Resources when appropriate  
1042 Interfaces are used. In such cases, additional access control considerations are necessary.  
1043 Additional access control considerations for Collections when using the batch OCF Interface are  
1044 found in clause 12.2.7.3. ACL Resource requires the same security protection as other sensitive  
1045 Resources when it comes to both storage and handling by the SRM.

1046 **5.2.2 ACL architecture**

1047 The Server examines the Resource(s) requested by the client before processing the request. The  
1048 access control Resource is searched to find one or more ACE entries that match the Client and  
1049 the requested Resources. If a match is found, then permission and period constraints are applied.  
1050 If more than one match is found, then each ACE entry is evaluated for a match independently.

1051 The Server uses the connection context to determine whether the subject has authenticated or not  
1052 and whether data confidentiality has been applied or not. If the user has authenticated, then subject  
1053 matching may happen at increased granularity based on role or device identity.


1054 Each ACE contains the permission set that will be applied for a given Client. Permissions consist  
1055 of a combination of CREATE, RETREIVE, UPDATE, DELETE and NOTIFY (CRUDN) actions.  
1056 Clients authenticate as a Device and optionally operating with one or more roles. Devices may  
1057 acquire elevated access permissions when asserting a role. For example, an "oic.role.owner" role  
1058 might expose additional Resources and OCF Interfaces not normally accessible.

1059 Servers host ACL Resources locally. Local ACLs allow greater autonomy in access control  
1060 processing.

1061 The following use cases describe the operation of access control:

1062 Use Case 1: As depicted in Figure 8, Server Device hosts 4 Resources (R1, R2, R3 and R4). Client  
1063 Device D1 requests access to Resource R1 hosted at Server Device 5. ACL[0] corresponds to  
1064 Resource R1 and includes D1 as an authorized subject. Thus, Device D1 receives access to  
1065 Resource R1 because the local ACL "/oic/sec/acl2/0" matches the request.

1066



1067

1068


**Figure 8 – Use case-1 showing simple ACL enforcement**

1069 **5.3 Onboarding overview**

1070 **5.3.1 Onboarding general**

1071 Before a Device becomes operational in an OCF environment and is able to interact with other  
1072 Devices, it needs to be appropriately onboarded. The first step in onboarding a Device is to  
1073 configure the ownership where the legitimate user that owns/purchases the Device uses an  
1074 Onboarding tool (OBT) and using the OBT uses one of the Owner Transfer Methods (OTMs) to  
1075 establish ownership. Once ownership is established, the OBT provisions the Device, at the end of  
1076 which the Device becomes operational and is able to interact with other Devices in an OCF  
1077 environment.

1078 Figure 9 depicts an overview of Onboarding.



1079  
1080

**Figure 9 – Onboarding overview**

1081 This clause explains the onboarding and security provisioning process but leaves the provisioning  
 1082 of non-security aspects to other OCF documents. In the context of security, all Devices are required  
 1083 to be provisioned with minimal security configuration that allows the Device to securely  
 1084 interact/communicate with other Devices in an OCF environment. This minimal security  
 1085 configuration is defined as the Onboarded Device RFNOP and is specified in 8.

1086 **5.3.2 Onboarding steps**

1087 The flowchart in Figure 10 shows the typical steps that are involved during onboarding. Although  
1088 onboarding may include a variety of non-security related steps, the diagram focus is mainly on the  
1089 security related configuration to allow a new Device to function within an OCF environment.  
1090 Onboarding typically begins with the Device becoming an Owned Device followed by configuring  
1091 the Device for the environment that it will operate in. This would include setting information such  
1092 as who may access the Device and what actions may be performed as well as what permissions  
1093 the Device has for interacting with other Devices.




Figure 10 – OCF onboarding process

1094

1095

1096 **5.3.3 Establishing a Device Owner**

1097 The objective behind establishing Device ownership is to allow the OCF Security Domain Owner to  
 1098 assert itself as the owner and manager of the Device and introduce the Device into the OCF  
 1099 Security Domain. This is done through the use of a DOTS that includes the creation of an ownership  
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1100 context between the new Device and the DOTS and asserts operational control and management  
1101 of the Device. The DOTS is hosted on an OBT.

1102 The DOTS uses one of the OTMs specified in 7.3 to securely establish Device ownership.

1103 An OTM establishes a new owner (the operator of DOTS) that is authorized to manage the Device.  
1104 Ownership Transfer accomplishes the following:

- 1105 – The DOTS provisions an Owner Credential (OC) to the "creds" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred"  
1106 Resource of the Device. This OC allows the Device and DOTS to mutually authenticate during  
1107 subsequent interactions. The OC associates the DOTS Device UUID with the "rowneruid"  
1108 Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource establishing it as the Resource owner.
- 1109 – The Device owner establishes trust in the Device through the OTM.
- 1110 – Provisioning of appropriate credentials for the Device to be a member of the OCF Security  
1111 Domain.

#### 1112 **5.3.4 Provisioning for Normal Operation**

1113 Once the Device has the necessary information to initiate provisioning, the next step is to provision  
1114 additional security configuration that allows the Device to become operational. This may include  
1115 setting various parameters and may also involve multiple steps. Also provisioning of ACL's for the  
1116 various Resources hosted by the Server on the Device is done at this time. The provisioning step  
1117 is not limited to this stage only. Device provisioning may happen at multiple stages in the Device's  
1118 operational lifecycle. However specific security related provisioning of Resource and Property state  
1119 would likely happen at this stage at the end of which, each Device reaches RFNOP. RFNOP is  
1120 consistent and well defined regardless of the specific OTM used or regardless of the variability in  
1121 what gets provisioned. However individual OTM mechanisms and provisioning steps may specify  
1122 additional configuration of Resources and Property states. The minimal mandatory configuration  
1123 required for a Device to be in RFNOP is specified in 8.

#### 1124 **5.3.5 OCF Compliance Management System**

1125 The OCF Compliance Management System (OCMS) is a service maintained by the OCF that  
1126 provides Certification status and information for OCF Devices.

1127 The OCMS shall provide a JSON-formatted Certified Product List (CPL), hosted at the URI:  
1128 <https://www.openconnectivity.org/certification/ocms-cpl.json>

1129 The OBT shall possess the Root Certificate needed to enable https connection to the URI  
1130 <https://www.openconnectivity.org/certification/ocms-cpl.json>.

1131 The OBT should periodically refresh its copy of the CPL via the URI  
1132 <https://www.openconnectivity.org/certification/ocms-cpl.json>, as appropriate to OCF Security  
1133 Domain owner policy requirements.

### 1134 **5.4 Provisioning**

#### 1135 **5.4.1 Provisioning general**

1136 OCF security provisioning includes processes during and after the ownership transfer like  
1137 configuration of credentials for interacting with provisioning services, configuration of any security  
1138 related Resources and credentials for interacting with any services or Devices that the provisioned  
1139 Device needs to contact later on.

1140 The Device needs to engage with the CMS and AMS to be provisioned with:

- 1141 – Security credentials through a CMS, which is currently assumed to be embedded in the same  
1142 OBT as the DOTS.
- 1143 – Access control policies and ACLs through an AMS, which is currently assumed to be embedded  
1144 in the same OBT as the DOTS.

1145 To be able to support the use of distinct device management services, some Device Secure Virtual  
1146 Resources (SVRs) have an associated Resource owner identified in the Resource's rowneruuid  
1147 Property.

1148 The "rowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" and "/oic/sec/pstat" Resources identifies the  
1149 DOTS.

1150 The "rowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource identifies the CMS.

1151 The "rowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource identifies the AMS.

1152 The DOTS provisions credentials that enable secure connections between OCF Services and the  
1153 new Device. The DOTS initiates client-directed provisioning by signaling the OCF Service.

#### 1154 **5.4.2 Access control provisioning**

1155 ACL provisioning is performed over a secure connection between the AMS and its Devices. The  
1156 AMS provisions the ACL by updating the Device's ACL Resource.

#### 1157 **5.4.3 Credential provisioning**

1158 The CMS securely provisions credentials for Device-to-Device interactions using the CMS  
1159 credential provisioned by the DOTS during the onboarding procedure. The CMS is also expected  
1160 to proactively monitor the credentials installed on the Device and update them when needed (e.g.  
1161 close to the expiration date).

#### 1162 **5.4.4 Role provisioning**

1163 The Servers, receiving requests for Resources they host, need to verify the role identifier(s)  
1164 asserted by the Client requesting the Resource and compare that role identifier(s) with the  
1165 constraints described in the Server's ACLs. Thus, a Client may need to be provisioned with one or  
1166 more role credentials. Once provisioned, the Client can assert the role it is using as described in  
1167 10.4.2, if it has a certificate role credential.

1168 Each Device holds the assertable role(s) information as a Property within the Credential Resource.  
1169 Each Device holds the asserted role(s) information as Properties within the Roles Resource.


1170 All asserted roles are used in ACL enforcement. When a server has multiple roles asserted for a  
1171 Client, access to a Resource is granted if it would be granted under any of the roles.

### 1172 **5.5 Secure Resource Manager (SRM)**

1173 SRM plays a key role in the overall security operation. In short, SRM performs both management  
1174 of SVR and access control for requests to access and manipulate Resources. SRM consists of 3  
1175 main functional elements:

- 1176 – A Resource manager (RM): responsible for 1) Loading SVRs from persistent storage (using PSI)  
1177 as needed. 2) Supplying the Policy Engine (PE) with Resources upon request. 3) Responding  
1178 to requests for SVRs. While the SVRs are in SRM memory, the SVRs are in a format that is  
1179 consistent with device-specific data store format. However, the RM will use JSON format to  
1180 marshal SVR data structures before being passed to PSI for storage, or travel off-device.
- 1181 – A Policy Engine (PE) that takes requests for access to SVRs and based on access control  
1182 policies responds to the requests with either "ACCESS\_GRANTED" or "ACCESS\_DENIED". To  
1183 make the access decisions, the PE consults the appropriate ACL and looks for best Access  
1184 Control Entry (ACE) that can serve the request given the subject (Device or role) that was  
1185 authenticated by DTLS.
- 1186 – Persistent Storage Interface (PSI): PSI provides a set of APIs for the RM to manipulate files in  
1187 its own memory and storage. The SRM design is modular such that it may be implemented in  
1188 the Platform's secure execution environment; if available.

1189 Figure 11 depicts OCF's SRM Architecture.



1190

1191

**Figure 11 – OCF's SRM architecture**

## 1192 **5.6 Credential overview**

1193 Devices may use credentials to prove the identity and role(s) of the parties in the Client to Server  
1194 communication. Credentials may be symmetric or asymmetric. Each Device stores secret and  
1195 public parts of its own credentials where applicable, as well as credentials for other Devices that  
1196 have been provisioned by the DOTS or a CMS. These credentials may then be used in the  
1197 establishment of secure communication sessions (e.g. using DTLS, TLS or OSCORE). Role  
1198 certificates may be used after an authenticated session is established to assert one or more roles  
1199 for a Device.

1200 The credential types available within this document include:

- 1201 – Pairwise symmetric keys
- 1202 – Certificates
- 1203 – Raw asymmetric keys

1204 Devices may not support all of these credential types. The set of supported credential types for  
1205 any Device is contained in its "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource.

## 1206 **5.7 Event logging**

### 1207 **5.7.1 Event logging general**

1208 An OCF Platform can generate various kinds of Auditable Events. These Auditable Events can be  
1209 used for log analysis or for real-time understanding of a system condition. Usually multiple  
1210 Auditable Events are stored to backtrack problems that have occurred in the system. The storage  
1211 capacity of IoT devices is typically very limited, so a specific type of data structure such as a ring  
1212 buffer is often used.

1213 An OCF Device logs Auditable Event Entries (AEE) for all Auditable Events that satisfy the  
1214 "categoryfilter" and "priorityfilter" Properties of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource. The AEEs are stored in  
1215 local storage (see Figure 1). Due to the limited size of the local storage, OCF Security Domain  
1216 Owner is expected to adjust the filtering options.



1217

1218

1219

**Figure 12 – Store Events in local storage**

1220 **5.8 End-to-End security of unicast messages**

1221 The Security model for End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages is described in Figure 3 and  
1222 Figure 4 of clause 5.1 and the accompanying steps.

1223 OCF uses the Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) protocol IETF  
1224 RFC 8613 for End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages. The Origin Client transforms a CoAP-  
1225 encoded OCF CRUDN request message into an OSCORE request message which can be  
1226 forwarded towards the Target Server by OCF Proxies; the Target Server then processes the  
1227 OSCORE request message to extract the OCF CRUDN request message. Likewise, the Target  
1228 Server then transforms a CoAP-encoded OCF CRUDN response message into an OSCORE  
1229 response message which can be forwarded towards the Origin Client by OCF Proxies; the Origin  
1230 Client then processes the OSCORE response message to extract the OCF CRUDN response  
1231 message. OSCORE preserves the confidentiality, integrity and freshness of the OCF CRUDN  
1232 messages while in transit between the Origin Client and the Target Server.

1233 OSCORE specification supports transporting OSCORE messages using the CoAP protocol already  
1234 used in OCF specifications. The payload of the OSCORE message is a CBOR Object Signature  
1235 and Encryption (COSE) object (see IETF RFC 8152) in which all elements of the CoAP-encoded  
1236 OCF CRUDN message, other than those parts which are needed for delivering the message to the  
1237 receiving Device, are encrypted and integrity protected. OSCORE also includes replay protection.

1238 **5.9 Overview of Simple Secure Multicast**

1239 The Security model for SSM is described in Figure 6 of clause 5.1 and the accompanying  
1240 steps. OCF uses the OSCORE protocol IETF RFC 8613 for the Security of SSM Messages. The  
1241 Client transforms a CoAP-encoded UPDATE request message into an OSCORE request message  
1242 which can be forwarded towards the Servers of the SSM Group using network-layer multicast; the  
1243 Server then processes the OSCORE request message to extract the UPDATE request message.

1244 Note: OSCORE is also used, albeit slightly differently, for End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages.


1245 The intended use of the SSM feature is only for updating Resources with one non-confirmable  
1246 multicast request. Other CRUDN operations (e.g. RETRIEVE, confirmable UPDATE, etc) are not  
1247 supported because the SSM protocol is not designed to send individual responses back on the  
1248 request. Hence when sending such operation by means of SSM, the individual Servers will silently  
1249 ignore the request message and not send a response.

1250 The OSCORE specification supports transporting OSCORE messages using the CoAP protocol  
1251 already used in OCF specifications. The payload of the OSCORE message is a CBOR Object  
1252 Signing and Encryption (COSE) object (see IETF RFC 8152) in which all elements of the CoAP-  
1253 encoded UPDATE request message, other than those parts which are needed for delivering the  
1254 message to the receiving Device, are encrypted and integrity protected. OSCORE also includes  
1255 replay protection.

1256 The setup of the OSCORE security context for an SSM Group is a 1-N relationship:

- 1257 – the SSM Client Context of the SSM Group is only provisioned once in the Client of the SSM  
1258 Group, and
- 1259 – copies of the SSM Server Context of the SSM Group are provisioned to one or more Servers in  
1260 the SSM Group.

1261 Figure 13 depicts the relationship of the SSM Client Context and SSM Server Context.




1262

1263

**Figure 13 – Relationship diagram for Simple Secure Multicast messages**

1264

Figure 14 depicts the full setup and usage.



1265

1266

**Figure 14 – Setup and usage of Secure Simple Multicast**

1267

1268

1269

The first message after onboarding is implicitly trusted by the Server as being a valid message. This is due to the replay window not yet being set up by the Server. The Server stores the received information so that the replay protection is enabled after receiving the first message.

## 1270 **6 Security for the Discovery process**

### 1271 **6.1 Preamble**

1272 The main function of a discovery mechanism is to provide Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs,  
1273 called links) for the Resources hosted by the Server, complemented by attributes about those  
1274 Resources and possible further link relations. (in accordance to clause 10 in ISO/IEC 30118-1)

### 1275 **6.2 Security considerations for Discovery**

1276 When defining discovery process, care must be taken that only a minimum set of Resources are  
1277 exposed to the discovering entity without violating security of sensitive information or privacy  
1278 requirements of the application at hand. This includes both data included in the Resources, as well  
1279 as the corresponding metadata.

1280 To achieve extensibility and scalability, this document does not provide a mandate on  
1281 discoverability of each individual Resource. Instead, the Server holding the Resource will rely on  
1282 ACLs for each Resource to determine if the requester (the Client) is authorized to see/handle any  
1283 of the Resources.

1284 The `"/oic/sec/acl2"` Resource contains ACL entries governing access to the Server hosted  
1285 Resources. (See 13.5)

1286 Aside from the privacy and discoverability of Resources from ACL point of view, the discovery  
1287 process itself needs to be secured. This document sets the following requirements for the discovery  
1288 process:

- 1289 1) Providing integrity protection for discovered Resources.
- 1290 2) Providing confidentiality protection for discovered Resources that are considered sensitive.

1291 The discovery of Resources is done by doing a RETRIEVE operation (either unicast or multicast)  
1292 on the known `"/oic/res"` Resource.

1293 The discovery request is sent over a non-secure channel (multicast or unicast without DTLS), a  
1294 Server cannot determine the identity of the requester. In such cases, a Server that wants to  
1295 authenticate the Client before responding can list the secure discovery URI (e.g.  
1296 `coaps://IP:PORT/oic/res`) in the unsecured `"/oic/res"` Resource response. This means the secure  
1297 discovery URI is by default discoverable by any Client. The Client will then be required to send a  
1298 separate unicast request using DTLS to the secure discovery URI.

1299 For example, a Client with Device UUID `"d1"` (UUID:`"0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"`)  
1300 makes a RETRIEVE request on the `"/door"` Resource hosted on a Server with  
1301 Device UUID `"d3"` where `d3` has the ACL2s:

```
1302 {  
1303   "aclist2": [  
1304     {  
1305       "subject": {"uuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"},  
1306       "resources": [{"href": "/door"}],  
1307       "permission": 2, // RETRIEVE  
1308       "aceid": 1  
1309     },  
1310     {  
1311       "subject": {"authority": "owner", "role": "owner"},  
1312       "resources": [{"href": "/door"}],  
1313       "permission": 2, // RETRIEVE  
1314       "aceid": 2
```

```

1315     },
1316     {
1317         "subject": {"uuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"},
1318         "resources": [{"href": "/door/lock"}],
1319         "permission": 4, // UPDATE
1320         "aceid": 3
1321     }
1322 ],
1323 "rowneruuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"
1324 }

```

1325 The ACL indicates that Client "d1" has RETRIEVE permissions on the Resource. Hence when  
1326 device "d1" does a discovery on the "/door" Resource of the Server "d3", the response will include  
1327 all the URIs in the "/door" Resource. Client "d2" without a Role ID "owner" will get an error response  
1328 that includes no URI.

1329 Discovery results delivered to d1 regarding d3's "/door" Resource from the secure interface:

```

1330 [
1331     {
1332         "href": "/door",
1333         "rel": "self",
1334         "rt": ["oic.wk.col"],
1335         "if": ["oic.if.ll", "oic.if.b", "oic.if.baseline"],
1336         "eps": [{"ep": "coaps://[2001:db8:a::b1d4]:5555"}]
1337     },
1338     {
1339         "href": "/door/lock",
1340         "rt": ["oic.r.lock.status "],
1341         "if": ["oic.if.a", "oic.if.baseline"],
1342         "eps": [{"ep": "coaps://[2001:db8:a::b1d4]:5555"}]
1343     }
1344 ]

```

## 1345 **7 Security provisioning**

### 1346 **7.1 Device identity**

#### 1347 **7.1.1 General Device identity**

1348 A Device shall be identified by a Device UUID value that is established as part of the device  
1349 onboarding and contained in the "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. Device  
1350 UUIDs shall be unique within the scope of the corresponding OCF Security Domain, and are  
1351 expected to be randomly generated and provisioned by the OBT. The DOTS is expected to verify  
1352 that the chosen new Device UUID does not conflict with Device UUIDs previously introduced into  
1353 the OCF Security Domain.

1354 Devices maintain an association of their Device UUIDs and their own cryptographic credential(s)  
1355 via "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. The identity is cryptographically bound in case of a certificate  
1356 credential, or is bound via internal mappings in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource otherwise. The  
1357 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource maintains a list of a Device's own and other Device's credentials. Multiple  
1358 credentials may be associated with the same Device UUID. A Device is expected to only present  
1359 credentials associated with its own Device UUID for peer authentication purposes. Devices regard  
1360 the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource as authoritative when verifying authentication credentials of a peer  
1361 Device.

1362 In case of an authenticated connection, the Device UUID is treated as a Client's identity for  
1363 purposes of the Access Control check for the target Resource. The Device UUID of a Client is  
1364 matched against the Subject UUIDs in the pre-provisioned entries of Server's "/oic/sec/acl2"  
1365 Resource. The Server determines Client's Device UUID based on the credential used for the  
1366 establishment of the session.

1367 An OCF Platform, which may host multiple Devices, is identified by a Platform ID. The Platform ID  
1368 is globally unique and inserted in the device in an integrity protected manner (e.g. inside secure  
1369 storage or signed and verified).

1370 An OCF Platform may have a secure execution environment, used to secure unique identifiers and  
1371 secrets. If a Platform hosts multiple Devices, some mechanism is needed to provide each Device  
1372 with the appropriate and separate security context.

#### 1373 **7.1.2 Device identity for Devices with UAID [Deprecated]**

1374 This clause is intentionally left blank.

### 1375 **7.2 Device ownership**

1376 This is an informative clause. Devices are logical entities that are security endpoints that have an  
1377 identity that is authenticable using cryptographic credentials. A Device is Unowned when it is first  
1378 initialized. Establishing device ownership is a process by which the device asserts its identity to  
1379 the DOTS and the DOTS provisions an owner identity. This exchange results in the device changing  
1380 its ownership state, thereby preventing a different DOTS from asserting administrative control over  
1381 the device.

1382 The ownership transfer process starts with the OBT discovering a new device that is in Unowned  
1383 state through examination of the "Owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource of the new  
1384 device. At the end of ownership transfer, the following is accomplished:

- 1385 1) The DOTS establishes a secure session with new device.
- 1386 2) Optionally asserts any of the following:
  - 1387 a) Proximity (using PIN) of the OBT to the Platform.
  - 1388 b) Manufacturer's certificate asserting Platform vendor, model and other Platform specific  
1389 attributes.

- 1390 3) Determines the device identifier.
- 1391 4) Determines the device owner.
- 1392 5) Specifies the device owner (e.g. Device UUID of the OBT).
- 1393 6) Provisions the device with owner's credentials.
- 1394 7) Sets the "Owned" state of the new device to TRUE.

1395 .

1396 **7.3 Device Ownership Transfer Methods**


1397 **7.3.1 OTM implementation requirements**

1398 This document provides specifications for several methods for ownership transfer. Implementation  
 1399 of each individual ownership transfer method is considered optional. However, each device shall  
 1400 implement at least one of the ownership transfer methods not including vendor specific methods.

1401 All OTMs included in this document are considered optional. Each vendor is required to choose  
 1402 and implement at least one of the OTMs specified in this document. The OCF, does however,  
 1403 anticipate vendor-specific approaches will exist. Should the vendor wish to have interoperability  
 1404 between a vendor-specific OTM and OBTs from other vendors, the vendor must work directly with  
 1405 OBT vendors to ensure interoperability. Notwithstanding, standardization of OTMs is the preferred  
 1406 approach. In such cases, a set of guidelines is provided in 7.3.7 to help vendors in designing  
 1407 vendor-specific OTMs.

1408 The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource is extensible to accommodate vendor-defined owner transfer  
 1409 methods (OTM). The DOTS determines which OTM is most appropriate to onboard the new Device.  
 1410 All OTMs shall represent the onboarding capabilities of the Device using the "oxms" Property of  
 1411 the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. The DOTS determines the Device's supported credential types using  
 1412 the Supported Credential Types "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. The DOTS and  
 1413 CMS provision credentials according to the credential types supported.

1414 Figure 15 depicts new Device discovery sequence.



1415

1416 **Figure 15 – Discover new Device sequence**

1417

**Table 1 – Discover new Device details**

Step	Description
1	The DOTS queries to see if the new device is not yet owned.
2	The new device returns the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource containing ownership status and supported OTMs. It also contains a temporal Device UUID that may change subsequent to successful owner transfer. The device should supply a temporal ID to facilitate discovery as a guest device. Refer to OCF Onboarding Tool Specification for security considerations regarding selecting an OTM.

1419 A Device shall support selective use of unsecured multicast to receive RETRIEVE requests to the  
 1420 Device "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource, as shown in Figure 15. Clause 10.4 of the ISO/IEC 30118-1  
 1421 provides the generic details for using CoAP multicast requests in OCF. Multicast retrieval of the  
 1422 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource supports filtering using the "owned" query parameter. When a multicast  
 1423 RETRIEVE request omits the "owned" query parameter or includes the "owned" query parameter  
 1424 set to "false", then the Device shall respond only if the Device is in RFOTM and there is no open  
 1425 Device Onboarding Connection. Otherwise the request shall be ignored by the Device, regardless  
 1426 of ACE configuration.

1427 Vendor-specific device OTMs shall adhere to the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource Specification for OCS  
 1428 that results from vendor-specific device OTM. Vendor-specific OTM should include provisions for  
 1429 establishing trust in the new Device by the DOTS and optionally establishing trust in the OBT by  
 1430 the new Device.

1431 The new device may have to perform some initialization steps at the beginning of an OTM. For  
 1432 example, if the Random PIN Based OTM is initiated, the new device may generate a random PIN  
 1433 value. The DOTS updates the oxmsel property of "/oic/sec/doxm" to the value corresponding to the  
 1434 OTM being used, before performing other OTM steps. This update notifies the new device that  
 1435 ownership transfer is starting.

1436 The end state of a vendor-specific OTM shall allow the new Device to authenticate to the OBT and  
 1437 the OBT to authenticate to the new device.

1438 Additional provisioning steps may be performed subsequent to owner transfer success leveraging  
 1439 the established OTM session.

### 1440 **7.3.2 SharedKey credential calculation**

1441 The SharedKey credential is derived using a PRF that accepts the key\_block value resulting from  
 1442 the DTLS handshake used for onboarding. The new Device shall use the following calculation to  
 1443 ensure interoperability across vendor products (the DOTS performs the same calculation):

1444 SharedKey = *PRF*(Secret, Message);

1445 Where:

1446 - PRF shall use TLS 1.2 PRF defined by IETF RFC 5246 clause 5.

1447 - Secret is the key\_block resulting from the DTLS handshake

1448     ▪ See IETF RFC 5246 clause 6.3

1449     ▪ The length of key\_block depends on cipher suite.

1450         • (e.g. 96 bytes for TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256  
 1451             40 bytes for TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8)

1452 - Message is a concatenation of the following:

1453     ▪ DoxmType string for the current onboarding method (e.g. "oic.sec.doxm.jw")

1454         • See clause 13.2.2 for specific DoxmTypes

- 1455                   ▪ Owner ID is a UUID identifying the device owner identifier and the device that maintains SharedKey.
- 1456                    • Use raw bytes as specified in IETF RFC 4122 clause 4.1.2
- 1457                   ▪ Device UUID is new device's UUID
- 1458                    • Use raw bytes as specified in IETF RFC 4122 clause 4.1.2
- 1459           - SharedKey Length will be 32 octets.
- 1460                   ▪ If subsequent DTLS sessions use 128 bit encryption cipher suites the left most 16 octets will be used.
- 1461                    DTLS sessions using 256-bit encryption cipher suites will use all 32 octets.

### 1462 **7.3.3 Certificate credential generation**

1463 The Certificate Credential will be used by Devices for secure bidirectional communication. The  
1464 certificates will be issued by a CMS or an external certificate authority (CA). This CA will be used  
1465 to mutually establish the authenticity of the Device.


### 1466 **7.3.4 Just-Works OTM**

#### 1467 **7.3.4.1 Just-Works OTM general**

1468 Just-works OTM creates a symmetric key credential that is a pre-shared key used to establish a  
1469 secure connection through which a device should be provisioned for use within the owner's OCF  
1470 Security Domain. Provisioning additional credentials and Resources is a typical step following  
1471 ownership establishment. The pre-shared key is called SharedKey.

1472 The DOTS selects the Just-works OTM using the "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm"  
1473 Resource and establishes a DTLS session using a cipher suite defined for the Just-works OTM.

1474 Just Works OTM sequence is shown in Figure 16 and steps described in Table 2.



1475  
1476  
1477  
1478

**Figure 16 – A Just Works OTM**

**Table 2 – A Just Works OTM details**

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS notifies the Device that it selected the "Just Works" method.
3 - 8	A DTLS session is established using anonymous Diffie-Hellman. <sup>a</sup>
<sup>a</sup> This method assumes the operator is aware of the potential for man-in-the-middle attack and has taken precautions to perform the method in a clean-room network.	

1479  
1480  
1481  
1482  
1483  
1484

**7.3.4.2 Security considerations**

Anonymous Diffie-Hellman key agreement is subject to a man-in-the-middle attacker. Use of this method presumes that both the DOTS and the new device perform the "just-works" method assumes onboarding happens in a relatively safe environment absent of an attack device.

This method doesn't have a trustworthy way to prove the Device UUID asserted is reliably bound to the device.

1485 The new device should use a temporal Device UUID prior to transitioning to an owned device while  
1486 it is considered a guest device to prevent privacy sensitive tracking. The device asserts a non-  
1487 temporal Device UUID that could differ from the temporal value during the secure session in which  
1488 owner transfer exchange takes place. The DOTS verifies the asserted Device UUID does not  
1489 conflict with a Device UUID already in use. If it is already in use the existing credentials are used  
1490 to establish a secure session.

1491 An un-owned Device that also has established device credentials might be an indication of a  
1492 corrupted or compromised device.


### 1493 **7.3.5 Random PIN based OTM**

#### 1494 **7.3.5.1 Random PIN based OTM general**

1495 The Random PIN method establishes physical proximity between the new device and the OBT can  
1496 prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The Device generates a random number that is communicated  
1497 to the DOTS over an Out of Band Communication Channel. The definition of an Out of Band  
1498 Communication Channel is outside the scope of the definition of device OTMs. The DOTS and new  
1499 Device use the PIN in a key exchange as evidence that an End User authorized the transfer of  
1500 ownership by having physical access to the new Device via the Out-of-Band Communication  
1501 Channel.

#### 1502 **7.3.5.2 Random PIN based Owner Transfer sequence**

1503 Random PIN-based OTM sequence is shown in Figure 17 and steps described in Table 3.



1505

1506

**Figure 17 – Random PIN-based OTM**

1507

1508

**Table 3 – Random PIN-based OTM details**

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS notifies the Device that it selected the "Random PIN" method.
3 - 8	A DTLS session is established using PSK-based Diffie-Hellman cipher suite. The PIN is supplied as the PSK parameter. The PIN is randomly generated by the new device then communicated via an Out of Band Communication Channel that establishes proximal context between the new device and the DOTS. The security principle is the attack device will be unable to intercept the PIN due to a lack of proximity.

1509

The following requirements apply to the DTLS handshake messages for this OTM:

1510

– At step 6:

1511

– The Server shall only use a DTLS ciphersuite supported by the Random PIN Based OTM (see clause 11.3.2.2),

1512

- 1513 – The new Device shall set the "psk\_identity\_hint" field of the ServerKeyExchange message
- 1514 to the concatenation of
  - 1515 – the string "oic.sec.doxm.rdp";
  - 1516 – the colon character ':';
- 1517 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource being sent in responses when
- 1518 the new Device is in RFOTM and when a Device Onboarding Connection is not currently
- 1519 established.

- 1520 – At step 7:
  - 1521 – If the new Device determines that the "psk\_identity" field of the ClientKeyExchange
  - 1522 message does not match the string "oic.sec.doxm.rdp", then the new Device shall reject
  - 1523 the DTLS Handshake.
  - 1524 – the new Device shall apply the key derivation below.

1525 NOTE The string "oic.sec.doxm.rdp" is the URN defined for the Random PIN-based OTM in Table 19 and is included to  
 1526 allow future OTMs to re-use the DTLS cipher suites without confusion about which OTM should be applied.

1527 This OTM uses a pseudo-random function (PBKDF2) defined by IETF RFC 2898 and a PIN  
 1528 exchanged via an Out of Band Communication Channel to generate a pre-shared key. The PIN-  
 1529 authenticated pre-shared key (PPSK) is supplied to TLS cipher suites that accept a PSK.

- 1530 – PPSK = PBKDF2(PRF, PIN, Device UUID, c, dkLen)

1531 The PBKDF2 function has the following parameters:

- 1532 – PRF – Uses the TLS 1.2 PRF defined by IETF RFC 5246.
- 1533 – PIN – obtained via Out of Band Communication Channel.
- 1534 – Device UUID – the "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource being sent in
- 1535 responses when the new Device is in RFOTM and when a Device Onboarding Connection is
- 1536 not currently established.

1537 Use raw bytes as specified in IETF RFC 4122 clause 4.1.2

- 1538 – c – Iteration count initialized to 1000
- 1539 – dkLen – Desired length of the derived PSK in octets.

### 1540 7.3.5.3 Security considerations

1541 Security of the Random PIN mechanism depends on the entropy of the PIN. Using a PIN with  
 1542 insufficient entropy may allow a man-in-the-middle attack to recover any long-term credentials  
 1543 provisioned as a part of onboarding. In particular, learning the provisioned symmetric key  
 1544 credentials allows an attacker to masquerade as the onboarded device.

1545 It is recommended that the entropy of the PIN be enough to withstand an online brute-force attack,  
 1546 40 bits or more. For example, a 12-digit numeric PIN, or an 8-character alphanumeric (0-9a-z), or  
 1547 a 7-character case-sensitive alphanumeric PIN (0-9a-zA-Z). A man-in-the-middle attack is when  
 1548 the attacker is active on the network and can intercept and modify messages between the DOTS  
 1549 and device. In the man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker must recover the PIN from the key  
 1550 exchange messages in "real time", i.e., before the peer's time out and abort the connection attempt.  
 1551 Having recovered the PIN, he can complete the authentication step of key exchange. The guidance  
 1552 given here calls for a minimum of 40 bits of entropy, however, the assurance this provides depends  
 1553 on the resources available to the attacker. Given the parallelizable nature of a brute force guessing  
 1554 attack, the attack enjoys a linear speedup as more cores/threads are added. A more conservative  
 1555 amount of entropy would be 64 bits. Since the Random PIN OTM requires using a DTLS cipher  
 1556 suite that includes an ECDHE key exchange, the security of the Random PIN OTM is always at  
 1557 least equivalent to the security of the JustWorks OTM.

1558 The Random PIN OTM also has an option to use PBKDF2 to derive key material from the PIN. The  
1559 rationale is to increase the cost of a brute force attack, by increasing the cost of each guess in the  
1560 attack by a tuneable amount (the number of PBKDF2 iterations). In theory, this is an effective way  
1561 to reduce the entropy requirement of the PIN. Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify the reduction,  
1562 since an X-fold increase in time spent by the honest peers does not directly translate to an X-fold  
1563 increase in time by the attacker. This asymmetry is because the attacker may use specialized  
1564 implementations and hardware not available to honest peers. For this reason, when deciding how  
1565 much entropy to use for a PIN, it is recommended that implementers assume PBKDF2 provides no  
1566 security, and ensure the PIN has sufficient entropy.

1567 The Random PIN device OTM security depends on an assumption that a secure Out of Band  
1568 Communication Channel for communicating a randomly generated PIN from the new device to the  
1569 OBT exists. If the Out of Band Communication Channel leaks some or the entire PIN to an attacker,  
1570 this reduces the entropy of the PIN, and the attacks described above apply. The Out of Band  
1571 Communication Channel should be chosen such that it requires proximity between the DOTS and  
1572 the new device. The attacker is assumed to not have compromised the Out of Band Communication  
1573 Channel. As an example Out of Band Communication Channel, the device may display a PIN to be  
1574 entered into the OBT software. Another example is for the device to encode the PIN as a 2D  
1575 barcode and display it for a camera on the DOTS device to capture and decode.

### 1576 **7.3.6 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM**

#### 1577 **7.3.6.1 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM general**

1578 The manufacturer certificate-based OTM shall use a certificate embedded into the device by the  
1579 manufacturer and may use a signed OBT, which determines the Trust Anchor between the device  
1580 and the DOTS.

1581 Manufacturer embedded certificates do not necessarily need to chain to an OCF Root CA trust  
1582 anchor.

1583 For some environments, policies or administrators, additional information about device  
1584 characteristics may be sought. This list of additional attestations that OCF may or may not have  
1585 tested (understanding that some attestations are incapable of testing or for which testing may be  
1586 infeasible or economically unviable) can be found under the OCF Security Claims x509.v3  
1587 extension described in 9.4.2.2.6.

1588 When utilizing certificate-based ownership transfer, devices shall utilize asymmetric keys with  
1589 certificate data to authenticate their identities with the DOTS in the process of bringing a new  
1590 device into operation on an OCF Security Domain. The onboarding process involves several  
1591 discrete steps:

#### 1592 1) Pre-on-board conditions

1593 a) The credential element of the Device's credential Resource ("/oic/sec/cred") containing the  
1594 manufacturer certificate shall be identified by the "credusage" Property containing the string  
1595 "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert" to indicate that the credential contains a manufacturer certificate.

1596 b) The manufacturer certificate chain shall be contained in the identified credential element's  
1597 "publicdata" Property.

1598 c) The device shall contain a unique and immutable ECC asymmetric key pair.

1599 d) If the device requires authentication of the DOTS as part of ownership transfer, it is  
1600 presumed that the DOTS has been registered and has obtained a certificate for its unique  
1601 and immutable ECC asymmetric key pair signed by the predetermined Trust Anchor.

1602 e) An End User has configured the DOTS app with network access info and account info (if  
1603 any).

1604 2) The DOTS authenticates the Device using ECDSA to verify the signature. Additionally, the  
1605 Device may authenticate the DOTS to verify the DOTS signature.

1606 3) If authentication fails, the Device shall indicate the reason for failure and return to the RFOTM.  
1607 If authentication succeeds, the Device shall establish an encrypted link with the DOTS in  
1608 accordance with the negotiated cipher suite.

1609 **7.3.6.2 Certificate Profiles**


1610 See 9.4.2 for details.

1611 **7.3.6.3 Certificate Owner Transfer sequence security considerations**

1612 The OBT shall authenticate the device during onboarding. The device will not authenticate the OBT.  
1613 During the DTLS handshake the server shall not send a Certificate Request.

1614 **7.3.6.4 Manufacturer Certificate based OTM sequence**

1615 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM sequence is shown in Figure 18 and steps described in  
1616 Table 4.



1618

1619

**Figure 18 – Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM Sequence**

1620

1621

**Table 4 – Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM Details**

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS notifies the Device that it selected the "Manufacturer Certificate" method.

3 - 8	A DTLS session is established using the device's manufacturer certificate. The device's manufacturer certificate may contain data attesting to the Device hardening and security properties.
-------	--

1622 If the Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM is selected at step 1, then the following requirements  
1623 apply:

1624 – At step 6:

1625 – The new Device shall use a DTLS ciphersuite supported for use with the Manufacturer  
1626 Certificate Based OTM (see clause 11.3.2.3),

1627 – The new Device shall not send a CertificateRequest message.

1628 NOTE: CertificateRequest message is sent when establishing the DTLS connection for Device authentication using  
1629 certificates (clause 10.4.1).

### 1630 **7.3.6.5 Security considerations**

1631 The manufacturer certificate private key is embedded in the Platform with a sufficient degree of  
1632 assurance that the private key cannot be compromised.

1633 The Platform manufacturer issues the manufacturer certificate and attests the private key  
1634 protection mechanism.

### 1635 **7.3.7 Vendor specific OTMs**

#### 1636 **7.3.7.1 Vendor specific OTM general**

1637 The OCF anticipates situations where a vendor will need to implement an OTM that accommodates  
1638 manufacturing or Device constraints. The Device OTM Resource is extensible for this purpose.  
1639 Vendor-specific OTMs shall adhere to a set of conventions that all OTMs follow.

1640 – The OBT may determine which credential types are supported by the Device. This is  
1641 accomplished by querying the Device's "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to identify supported  
1642 credential types.


1643 – The OBT provisions the Device with OC(s).

1644 – The OBT supplies the Device UUID and credentials for subsequent access to the OBT.

1645 – The OBT may perform additional provisioning steps.

#### 1646 **7.3.7.2 Vendor-specific Owner Transfer Sequence Example**

1647 Vendor-specific OTM sequence example is shown in Figure 19 and steps described in Table 5.



**Figure 19 – Vendor-specific Owner Transfer sequence**

**Table 5 – Vendor-specific Owner Transfer details**

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS selects a vendor-specific OTM.
3	The vendor-specific OTM is applied

**7.3.7.3 Security considerations**

The vendor is responsible for considering security threats and mitigation strategies.

**7.3.8 Establishing Owner Credentials**


Once the OBT and the new Device have authenticated and established an encrypted connection using one of the defined OTM methods, the Owner Credential(s) can be provisioned.

The Owner Credential is provisioned as part of Ownership Transfer Method, and may be provisioned directly by CMS.


The steps for establishing Device's owner credentials (OC) as part of OTM are:

- 1) The OBT establishes the Device UUID and Device Owner Id.
- 2) The OBT then establishes Device's symmetric OC - See Figure 20 and Table 6.
- 3) Configure Device services.
- 4) Configure Device for peer to peer interaction.

### Symmetric Owner Credential (OC) Assignment Sequence



1665



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1669

**Figure 20 – Symmetric Owner Credential provisioning sequence**

**Table 6 – Symmetric Owner Credential assignment details**

Step	Description
1, 2	The OBT uses a pseudo-random-function (PRF), the master secret resulting from the DTLS handshake, and other information to generate a symmetric key credential Resource Property - SharedKey.
3	The OBT creates a credential Resource Property set based on SharedKey and then sends the Resource Property set to the new Device with empty "privatedata" Property value.
4, 5	The new Device locally generates the SharedKey and updates it to the "privatedata" Property of the credential Resource Property set.
6	The new Device sends a success message.
7	The onboarding service creates a subjects Resource for the new device (e.g./A71C3xxx-...)
8	The onboarding service provisions its "/oic/svc/dots/subjects/A71C3xxx-/cred" Resource with

	the owner credential. Credential type is SYMMETRIC KEY.
9	(optional) The onboarding service provisions its own "/oic/sec/cred" Resource with the owner credential for new device. Credential type is SYMMETRIC KEY.

- 1670 In particular, when OBT establishes symmetric owner credentials as part of OTM sequence:
- 1671 – The OBT generates a Shared Key using the SharedKey Credential Calculation method
  - 1672 described in 7.3.2.
  - 1673 – The OBT sends an empty key to the new Device's "/oic/sec/cred" Resource, identified as a
  - 1674 symmetric pair-wise key. The Subject UUID of the "/oic/sec/cred" entry shall match the Device
  - 1675 UUID of the OBT.
  - 1676 – Upon receipt of the OBT's symmetric owner credential, the new Device shall independently
  - 1677 generate the Shared Key using the SharedKey Credential Calculation method described in 7.3.2
  - 1678 and store it with the owner credential.
  - 1679 – The new Device shall use the Shared Key owner credential(s) stored via the "/oic/sec/cred"
  - 1680 Resource to authenticate the owner during subsequent connections.

### 1681 7.3.9 Security profile assignment

1682 OCF Devices may have been evaluated according to an OCF Security Profile. Evaluation results  
 1683 could be accessed from a manufacturer's certificate, OCF web server or other public repository.  
 1684 The DOTS reviews evaluation results to determine which OCF Security Profiles the OCF Device is  
 1685 authorized to possess and configures the Device with the subset of evaluated security profiles best  
 1686 suited for the OCF Security Domain owner's intended segmentation strategy.

1687 The OCF Device vendor shall set a manufacturer default value for the "supportedprofiles" Property  
 1688 of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource to match those approved by OCF's testing and certification process.  
 1689 The "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource shall be set to one of the values  
 1690 contained in the "supportedprofiles". The manufacturer default value shall be re-asserted when the  
 1691 Device transitions to RESET.

1692 The OCF Device shall only allow the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource to be updated when the Device is in  
 1693 one of the following Device States: RFOTM, RFPRO, SRESET and may not allow any update as  
 1694 directed by a Security Profile.

1695 The DOTS may update the "supportedprofiles" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource with a subset  
 1696 of the OCF Security Profiles values the Device achieved as part of OCF Conformance testing. The  
 1697 DOTS may locate conformance results by inspecting manufacturer certificates supplied with the  
 1698 OCF Device by selecting the "credusage" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource having the value  
 1699 of "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert". The DOTS may further locate conformance results by visiting a well-  
 1700 known OCF web site URI corresponding to the ocfCPLAttributes extension fields (clause 9.4.2.2.7).  
 1701 The DOTS may select a subset of Security Profiles (from those evaluated by OCF conformance  
 1702 testing) based on a local policy.

1703 As part of onboarding (while the OTM session is active) the DOTS should configure ACE entries to  
 1704 allow DOTS access subsequent to onboarding.

1705 The DOTS should update the "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource with the value  
 1706 that most correctly depicts the OCF Security Domain owner's intended Device deployment strategy.

1707 The CMS may issue role credentials using the Security Profile value (e.g. the "sp-blue-v0 OID") to  
 1708 indicate the OCF Security Domain owner's intention to segment the OCF Security Domain  
 1709 according to a Security Profile. The CMS retrieves the supportedprofiles Property of the  
 1710 "/oic/sec/sp" Resource to select role names corroborated with the Device's supported Security  
 1711 Profiles when issuing role credentials.

1712 If the CMS issues role credentials based on a Security Profile, the AMS supplies access control  
 1713 entries that include the role designation(s).

1714 **7.4 Provisioning**

1715 **7.4.1 Provisioning flows**

1716 **7.4.1.1 Provisioning flows general**


1717 As part of onboarding a new Device a secure channel is formed between the new Device and the  
 1718 OBT. Subsequent to the Device ownership status being changed to "owned", there is an opportunity  
 1719 to begin provisioning. The OBT provisions the support services that should be subsequently used  
 1720 to complete Device provisioning and on-going Device management.

1721 The Device employs a Client-directed provisioning strategy. The "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource  
 1722 identifies the provisioning strategy and current provisioning status. The provisioning service should  
 1723 determine which provisioning strategy is most appropriate for the OCF Security Domain. See 13.8  
 1724 for additional detail.

1725 **7.4.1.2 Client-directed provisioning**

1726 Client-directed provisioning relies on a provisioning service that identifies Servers in need of  
 1727 provisioning then performs all necessary provisioning duties.

1728 An example of Client-directed provisioning is shown in Figure 21 and steps described in Table 7.



1729

1730

**Figure 21 – Example of Client-directed provisioning**

1731

1732

**Table 7 – Steps describing Client -directed provisioning**

Step	Description
1	Discover Devices that are owned and support Client-directed provisioning.
2	The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource identifies the Device and it's owned status.
3	DOTS (on OBT) obtains the new Device's provisioning status found in "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource
4	The "pstat" Resource describes the types of provisioning modes supported and which is currently configured. A Device manufacturer should set a default current operational mode ("om"). If the "om" isn't configured for Client-directed provisioning, its "om" value can be changed.
5 - 6	Change Device state to RFPRO.
7 - 8	CMS (on OBT) instantiates the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. It contains credentials for the provisioned services and other Devices
9 - 10	AMS (on OBT) instantiates "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.
11	The new Device provisioning status mode is updated to reflect that ACLs have been configured. (RFNOP).
12	The secure session is closed.

1733 **7.4.1.3 Server-directed provisioning [DEPRECATED]**

1734 This clause is intentionally left blank.

1735 **7.4.1.4 Server-directed provisioning Involving multiple support services [DEPRECATED]**


1736 This clause is intentionally left blank.

1737 **8 Device Onboarding state definitions**

1738 **8.1 Device Onboarding general**

1739 As explained in 5.3, the process of onboarding completes after the ownership of the Device has  
1740 been transferred and the Device has been provisioned with relevant configuration/services as  
1741 explained in 5.4. The Figure 22 shows the various states a Device can be in during the Device  
1742 lifecycle. Device shall reject any requests to perform a state transition not shown on Figure 22.

1743 The "/pstat.dos.s" Property is RW by the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource owner (e.g. "doxs" service) so  
1744 that the Resource owner can remotely update the Device state. When the Device is in RFNOP or  
1745 RFPRO, ACLs can be used to allow remote control of Device state by other Devices. When the  
1746 Device state is SRESET the Device OC may be the only indication of authorization to access the  
1747 Device. The Device owner may perform low-level consistency checks and re-provisioning to get  
1748 the Device suitable for a transition to RFPRO.



1749  
1750

**Figure 22 – Device state model**

1751 As shown in the diagram, at the conclusion of the provisioning step, the Device comes in RFNOP  
1752 where it has all it needs in order to start interoperating with other Devices. Clause 8.5 specifies the  
1753 minimum mandatory configuration that a Device shall hold in order to be considered as RFNOP.

1754 In the event of power loss or Device failure, the Device should remain in the same state that it was  
1755 in prior to the power loss / failure

1756 If a Device or Resource owner OBSERVES "/pstat.dos.s", then transitions to SRESET will give  
1757 early warning notification of Devices that may require SVR consistency checking.

1758 In order for onboarding to function, the Device shall have the following Resources installed:

- 1759 1) "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource
- 1760 2) "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource
- 1761 3) "/oic/sec/cred" Resource

1762 The values contained in these Resources are specified in the state definitions in 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5  
1763 and 8.6. Access policy for these and other SVRs are also described.

1764 **8.2 Device Reset state definition**

1765 The /pstat.dos.s = RESET is defined as a "hard" reset to manufacturer defaults. Hard reset also  
1766 defines a state where the Device asset is ready to be transferred to another party.

1767 The Platform manufacturer should provide a physical mechanism (e.g. button) that forces Platform  
1768 reset. All Devices hosted on the same Platform transition their Device states to RESET when the  
1769 Platform reset is asserted.

1770 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified:

- 1771 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall transition to FALSE.
- 1772 – The "devowneruid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be nil UUID.

- 1773 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer  
1774 default value.
- 1775 – The "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be reset to the manufacturer's default  
1776 value.
- 1777 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be reset to the manufacturer's  
1778 default value.
- 1779 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.
- 1780 – The "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: dos.s shall equal "RESET".
- 1781 – The "om" (operational modes) Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be set to the  
1782 manufacturer default value.
- 1783 – The "sm" (supported operational modes) Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be set  
1784 to the manufacturer default value.
- 1785 – The "creds" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer default  
1786 value.
- 1787 – The "aclist2" Property of the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer default  
1788 value.
- 1789 – The "rowneruuid" Property of "/oic/sec/pstat", "/oic/sec/doxm", "/oic/sec/acl2", and  
1790 "/oic/sec/cred" Resources shall be nil UUID.
- 1791 – The "usedspace" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to 0.
- 1792 – The "categoryfilter" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer's  
1793 default value.
- 1794 – The "priorityfilter" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer's  
1795 default value.
- 1796 – The "events" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to an empty array.
- 1797 – The "supportedprofiles" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer  
1798 default value.
- 1799 – The "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer  
1800 default value.
- 1801 – If "/oic/sec/sdi" Resource is exposed by a Device:
- 1802 – The "uuid" Property of the Resource shall be set to nil UUID
- 1803 – The "name" Property of the Resource shall be set to the empty string
- 1804 – The "priv" Property of the Resource shall be set to FALSE
- 1805 – The Device shall not accept DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor any  
1806 other requests, including discovery requests.
- 1807 – Any existing DTLS or TLS Connections shall be closed.

### 1808 **8.3 Device Ready For Owner Transfer Mechanism state definition**

1809 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified when the  
1810 Device enters ready for ownership transfer:

- 1811 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be FALSE and will transition to  
1812 TRUE.
- 1813 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be nil UUID.
- 1814 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer  
1815 default value.
- 1816 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.

- 1817 – The "dos" of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: "dos.s" shall equal "RFOTM".
  - 1818 – The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credential(s) if required by the selected OTM
  - 1819 – If there is no open Device Onboarding Connection, then
    - 1820 – The Device shall expose an unsecured OCF Endpoint for the Resources "/oic/sec/doxm"
    - 1821 and "/oic/sec/pstat".
    - 1822 – For all SVRs other than "/oic/sec/doxm" and "/oic/sec/pstat":
      - 1823 – The SVR shall not expose an Unsecured OCF Endpoint.
      - 1824 – Anonymous Retrieve and Updates requests (those arriving over unauthenticated channel
      - 1825 such as CoAP) for the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be granted.
      - 1826 – If an anonymous request to Update the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource attempts to update
      - 1827 "oxmsel" to a value that is not indicated as supported by the Device in "oxms", then the
      - 1828 Device shall reject the request with an appropriate error message (e.g. bad request).
      - 1829 – All Retrieve requests to the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be granted.
      - 1830 – All other requests, with the exception of Retrieve requests to the Discovery Resources
      - 1831 ("/oic/res", "/oic/d" and "/oic/p"), shall be rejected with an appropriate error message (e.g.
      - 1832 forbidden).
      - 1833 – Prior to a successful anonymous Update of "oxmsel" in "/oic/sec/doxm", all attempts to
      - 1834 establish new DTLS connections shall be rejected.
      - 1835 – After a successful anonymous Update of "oxmsel" in "/oic/sec/doxm",
        - 1836 – The Device shall allow establishing a Device Onboarding Connection (DOC) matching the
        - 1837 "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource (as specified in clause 7.3) , and shall
        - 1838 reject attempts to establish other DTLS connections.
    - 1839 – If there is an open DOC, then
      - 1840 – For all SVRs:
        - 1841 – The Device shall not expose an Unsecured OCF Endpoint for the SVR.
        - 1842 – All requests received over the DOC which target DCRs shall be granted, regardless of the
        - 1843 configuration of the ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.
        - 1844 – All unicast requests which are not received over the open Device DOC shall be rejected
        - 1845 with an appropriate error message (e.g. forbidden), regardless of the configuration of the
        - 1846 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.
        - 1847 – All attempts to establish new DTLS connections shall be rejected.
      - 1848 – If the DOC is closed in RFOTM, then the Device shall transition to RESET.
- 1849 **8.4 Device Ready For Provisioning state definition**
- 1850 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified when the
- 1851 Device enters ready for provisioning:
- 1852 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be TRUE.
  - 1853 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID.
  - 1854 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID and shall be
  - 1855 set to the value that was determined during RFOTM processing.
  - 1856 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall have the value of the actual OTM
  - 1857 used during ownership transfer.
  - 1858 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.
  - 1859 – The "dos" of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: "dos.s" shall equal "RFPRO".

- 1860 – The "rowneruuid" Property of every installed Resource shall be set to a valid Resource owner  
1861 (i.e. an entity that is authorized to instantiate or update the given Resource). Failure to set a  
1862 "rowneruuid" may result in an orphan Resource.
- 1863 – The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credentials for each entity referenced by  
1864 "rowneruuid" and "devowneruuid" Properties.
- 1865 – All requests to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource received over a mutually-authenticated connection  
1866 established using an identity certificate shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the  
1867 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, subject to the conditions in clause 10.4.2.
- 1868 – If there is an open DOC, then all requests received over the DOC which target a DCR shall be  
1869 granted, regardless of the configuration of the ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.
- 1870 – The Device shall allow establishing DTLS connections authenticated with locally issued  
1871 credentials (clauses 10.2 and 10.4) and shall reject attempts to establish other DTLS  
1872 connections.
- 1873 – For all SVRs:
- 1874 – The SVR shall not expose an Unsecured OCF Endpoint.
- 1875 – The Device shall ignore all ACEs with "subject" matching either {"conntype": "anon-clear"}  
1876 or {"conntype": "auth-crypt"} when making access decisions for requests to the SVR.

## 1877 **8.5 Device Ready For Normal Operation state definition**

1878 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified when the  
1879 Device enters ready for normal operation:

- 1880 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be TRUE.
- 1881 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID.
- 1882 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID and shall be  
1883 set to the ID that was configured during OTM. Also the value of the "di" Property in "/oic/d" shall  
1884 be the same as the deviceuuid.
- 1885 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall have the value of the actual OTM  
1886 used during ownership transfer.
- 1887 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be set to TRUE by the Server once  
1888 transition to RFNOP is otherwise complete.
- 1889 – The "dos" of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: "dos.s" shall equal "RFNOP".
- 1890 – The "rowneruuid" Property of every installed Resource shall be set to a valid Resource owner  
1891 (i.e. an entity that is authorized to instantiate or update the given Resource). Failure to set a  
1892 "rowneruuid" results in an orphan Resource.
- 1893 – The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credentials for each service referenced by  
1894 "rowneruuid" and "devowneruuid" Properties.
- 1895 – All requests to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource received over a mutually-authenticated connection  
1896 established using an identity certificate shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the  
1897 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, subject to the conditions in clause 10.4.2.
- 1898 – If there is an open DOC, then requests received over the DOC shall have access decisions  
1899 determined as follows:
  - 1900 – A request which targets a DCR shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the ACEs  
1901 in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.
  - 1902 – A request which targets an NCR shall be granted by matching an ACE as per normal request  
1903 authorization, with "subject" matching the "anon-clear" connection type.
- 1904 – The Device shall allow establishing DTLS connections authenticated with locally issued  
1905 credentials and shall reject attempts to establish other DTLS connections.

- 1906 – For all SVRs:  
1907 – The SVR shall not expose an Unsecured OCF Endpoint.  
1908 – The Device shall ignore all ACEs with "subject" matching either {"conntype": "anon-clear"}  
1909 or {"conntype": "auth-crypt"} when making access decisions for requests to the SVR.

## 1910 **8.6 Device Soft Reset state definition**

1911 The soft reset state is defined (e.g. "/pstat.dos.s" = SRESET) where entrance into this state means  
1912 the Device is not operational but remains owned by the current owner. The Device may exit  
1913 SRESET by authenticating to a DOTS (e.g. "rt" = "oic.r.doxs") using the OC provided during original  
1914 onboarding (but should not require use of an OTM /doxm.oxtms).

1915 If the DOTS credential cannot be found or is determined to be corrupted, the Device state  
1916 transitions to RESET. The Device should remain in SRESET if the DOTS credential fails to validate  
1917 the DOTS. This mitigates denial-of-service attacks that may be attempted by non-DOTS Devices.

1918 When in SRESET, the following Resources and their specific Properties shall have the values as  
1919 specified.

- 1920 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be TRUE.  
1921 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall remain non-null.  
1922 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall remain non-null.  
1923 – The "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall retain its value.  
1924 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall retain its value.  
1925 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.  
1926 – The "/oic/sec/pstat.dos.s" Property shall be SRESET.  
1927 – The "om" (operational modes) Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be "client-directed  
1928 mode".  
1929 – The "sm" (supported operational modes) Property of "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource may be updated  
1930 by the Device owner (aka DOTS).  
1931 – The "rowneruuid" Property of "/oic/sec/pstat", "/oic/sec/doxm", "/oic/sec/acl2", and  
1932 "/oic/sec/cred" Resources may be reset by the Device owner (aka DOTS) and re-provisioned.  
1933 – All requests to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource received over a mutually-authenticated connection  
1934 established using an identity certificate shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the  
1935 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, subject to the conditions in clause 10.4.2.  
1936 – If there is an open DOC, then all requests received over the DOC which target a DCR shall be  
1937 granted, regardless of the configuration of the ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.  
1938 – The Device shall allow establishing DTLS connections authenticated with locally issued  
1939 credentials and shall reject attempts to establish other DTLS connections.
- 1940 – For all SVRs:  
1941 – The SVR shall not expose an Unsecured OCF Endpoint.  
1942 – The Device shall ignore all ACEs with "subject" matching either {"conntype": "anon-clear"}  
1943 or {"conntype": "auth-crypt"} when making access decisions for requests to the SVR.

1944

1945 **9 Security Credential management**

1946 **9.1 Preamble**

1947 This clause provides an overview of the credential types in OCF, along with details of credential  
1948 use, provisioning and ongoing management.

1949 **9.2 Credential lifecycle**

1950 **9.2.1 Credential lifecycle general**

1951 OCF credential lifecycle has the following phases: (1) creation, (2) deletion, (3) refresh and (4)  
1952 revocation.

1953 **9.2.2 Creation**

1954 The CMS can provision credentials to the credential Resource onto the Device. The Device shall  
1955 verify the CMS is authorized by matching the rowneruuid Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource  
1956 to the DeviceID of the credential the CMS used to establish the secure connection.

1957 Credential Resources created using a CMS may involve specialized credential issuance protocols  
1958 and messages. These may involve the use of public key infrastructure (PKI) such as a certificate  
1959 authority (CA), symmetric key management such as a key distribution centre (KDC) or as part of a  
1960 provisioning action by a DOTS, CMS or AMS.

1961 **9.2.3 Deletion**

1962 The CMS can delete credentials from the credential Resource. The Device (e.g. the Device where  
1963 the credential Resource is hosted) should delete credential Resources that have expired.

1964 An expired credential Resource may be deleted to manage memory and storage space.

1965 Deletion in OCF key management is equivalent to credential suspension.

1966 **9.2.4 Refresh**

1967 Credential refresh may be performed before it expires. The CMS performs credential refresh.

1968 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource supports expiry using the Period Property. Credential refresh may be  
1969 applied when a credential is about to expire or is about to exceed a maximum threshold for bytes  
1970 encrypted.

1971 A credential refresh method specifies the options available when performing key refresh. The  
1972 Period Property informs when the credential should expire. The Device may proactively obtain a  
1973 new credential using a credential refresh method using current unexpired credentials to refresh the  
1974 existing credential. If the Device does not have an internal time source, the current time should be  
1975 obtained from a CMS at regular intervals.

1976 If the onboarding established credentials are allowed to expire the DOTS shall re-onboard the  
1977 Device to re-apply device owner transfer steps.

1978 All Devices shall support at least one credential refresh method.

1979 **9.2.5 Revocation**

1980 Credentials issued by a CMS may be equipped with revocation capabilities. In situations where the  
1981 revocation method involves provisioning of a revocation object that identifies a credential that is to  
1982 be revoked prior to its normal expiration period, a credential Resource is created containing the  
1983 revocation information that supersedes the originally issued credential. The revocation object  
1984 expiration should match that of the revoked credential so that the revocation object is cleaned up  
1985 upon expiry.

1986 It is conceptually reasonable to consider revocation applying to a credential or to a Device. Device  
1987 revocation asserts all credentials associated with the revoked Device should be considered for  
1988 revocation. Device revocation is necessary when a Device is lost, stolen or compromised. Deletion  
1989 of credentials on a revoked Device might not be possible or reliable.

### 1990 **9.3 Credential types**

#### 1991 **9.3.1 Preamble**

1992 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource maintains a credential type Property that supports several  
1993 cryptographic keys and other information used for authentication and data protection. The  
1994 credential types supported include symmetric pair-wise key, group symmetric group key,  
1995 asymmetric signing key, asymmetric signing key with certificate and shared-secret (i.e. PIN or  
1996 password). The Device shall always support symmetric pair-wise key and asymmetric signing key  
1997 with certificate credential types. Other credential types are optional.

#### 1998 **9.3.2 Pair-wise symmetric key credentials**

1999 The CMS shall provision exactly one other pair-wise symmetric credential to a peer Device. The  
2000 CMS should not store pair-wise symmetric keys it provisions to managed Devices.

2001 Pair-wise keys could be established through ad-hoc key agreement protocols.

2002 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the symmetric key.

2003 The "PublicData" Property may contain a token encrypted to the peer Device containing the pair-  
2004 wise key.

2005 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

2006 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the  
2007 "PrivateData" remains private.

2008 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection  
2009 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized  
2010 modifications.

#### 2011 **9.3.3 Group symmetric key credentials**

2012 Group keys are symmetric keys shared among a group of Devices (3 or more). Group keys are  
2013 used for efficient sharing of data among group participants.

2014 Group keys do not provide authentication of Devices but only establish membership in a group.

2015 The CMS shall provision group symmetric key credentials to the group members. The CMS  
2016 maintains the group memberships.

2017 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the symmetric key.

2018 The "PublicData" Property may contain the group name.

2019 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

2020 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the  
2021 "PrivateData" remains private.

2022 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection  
2023 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized  
2024 modifications.

2025 **9.3.4 Asymmetric authentication key credentials**

2026 **9.3.4.1 Asymmetric authentication key credentials general**

2027 Asymmetric authentication key credentials contain either a public and private key pair or only a  
2028 public key. The private key is used to sign Device authentication challenges. The public key is used  
2029 to verify a device authentication challenge-response.

2030 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the private key.

2031 The "PublicData" Property contains the public key.

2032 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

2033 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the  
2034 "PrivateData" remains private.

2035 Devices should generate asymmetric authentication key pairs internally to ensure the private key  
2036 is only known by the Device. See 9.3.4.2 for when it is necessary to transport private key material  
2037 between Devices.

2038 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection  
2039 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized  
2040 modifications.

2041 **9.3.4.2 External creation of asymmetric authentication key credentials**

2042 Devices should employ industry-standard high-assurance techniques when allowing off-device key  
2043 pair creation and provisioning. Use of such key pairs should be minimized, particularly if the key  
2044 pair is immutable and cannot be changed or replaced after provisioning.

2045 When used as part of onboarding, these key pairs can be used to prove the Device possesses the  
2046 manufacturer-asserted properties in a certificate to convince a DOTS or a user to accept  
2047 onboarding the Device. See 7.3.3 for the OTM that uses such a certificate to authenticate the  
2048 Device, and then provisions new OCF Security Domain credentials for use.

2049 **9.3.5 Asymmetric key encryption key credentials**

2050 The asymmetric key-encryption-key (KEK) credentials are used to wrap symmetric keys when  
2051 distributing or storing the key.

2052 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the private key.

2053 The "PublicData" Property contains the public key.

2054 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

2055 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the  
2056 "PrivateData" remains private.

2057 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection  
2058 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized  
2059 modifications.

2060 **9.3.6 Certificate credentials**

2061 Certificate credentials are asymmetric keys that are accompanied by a certificate issued by a CMS  
2062 or an external certificate authority (CA).

2063 A certificate enrolment protocol is used to obtain a certificate and establish proof-of-possession.

2064 The issued certificate is stored with the asymmetric key credential Resource.

2065 Other objects useful in managing certificate lifecycle such as certificate revocation status are  
2066 associated with the credential Resource.

2067 Either an asymmetric key credential Resource or a self-signed certificate credential is used to  
2068 terminate a path validation.

2069 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the private key.

2070 The "PublicData" Property contains the issued certificate.

2071 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

2072 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the  
2073 PrivateData remains private.

2074 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection  
2075 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized  
2076 modifications.

### 2077 **9.3.7 Password credentials**

2078 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the PIN, password and other  
2079 values useful for changing and verifying the password.

2080 The "PublicData" Property may contain the user or account name if applicable.

2081 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

2082 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the  
2083 "PrivateData" remains private.

2084 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection  
2085 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized  
2086 modifications.

### 2087 **9.3.8 Credentials for direct provisioning an OSCORE security context**

2088 A credential entry with the credential type 64 is used for direct provisioning of OSCORE Security  
2089 Context parameters for use in End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages.

2090 The "privatedata" Property of the credential entry with the credential type 64 in the "/oic/sec/cred"  
2091 Resource contains the OSCORE Master Key.

2092 A credential entry with the credential type 64 shall expose the OSCORE Configuration ("oscore")  
2093 Property, which includes:

2094 – The "senderid" Property containing the OSCORE Sender ID parameter.

2095 – The "recipientid" Property containing the OSCORE Recipient ID parameter.

2096 – The "ssn" Property contains a read-only value used to store the OSCORE Sender Sequence  
2097 Number.

2098 NOTE: values of "senderid" and "recipientid" are expected to be lowercase hexadecimal encoded with "0x" encoding  
2099 prefix omitted.

2100 See clause 16.2 for description of the OSCORE parameters.

### 2101 **9.3.9 Credentials for Simple Secure Multicast**

2102 There are two distinct credential types used for provisioning OSCORE Security Context parameters  
2103 used in Simple Secure Multicast (SSM): one for the SSM Client Context identified using  
2104 "credtype" : "128"; and one for the SSM Server Context identified using "credtype" : "256". In a

2105 Client of an SSM Group, the Client's OSCORE Security Context (Sender context) is derived from  
2106 a provisioned SSM Client Context. In the Servers of an SSM Group, the Server's OSCORE Security  
2107 Context (Recipient Context) is derived from a provisioned SSM Server Context.

2108 For both of these credential types, the "privatedata" Property of the credential entry in the  
2109 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the value of the OSCORE Master Secret of the SSM Group,  
2110 which is generated by the OBT.

2111 A SSM Client Context credential entry shall expose the OSCORE Configuration ("oscore") Property,  
2112 which for this credential type shall include:

- 2113 – The "senderid" Property containing the OSCORE Sender ID parameter.
  - 2114 – This value is selected and provisioned by the OBT.
- 2115 – The "desc" Property containing a description of the usage of the security context
  - 2116 – This Property contains a human-readable description intended for identifying the  
2117 corresponding SSM Group when a Security Domain contains multiple SSM Groups.
  - 2118 – This value is selected and provisioned by the OBT
- 2119 – The "ssn" Property contains a read-only value used to store the OSCORE Sender Sequence  
2120 Number.

2121 NOTE 1: The value of "senderid" is expected to be lowercase hexadecimal encoded with "0x" encoding prefix omitted.

2122 An SSM Server Context credential entry shall include the OSCORE Configuration ("oscore")  
2123 Property, which shall include:

- 2124 – The "recipientid" Property containing the OSCORE Group Recipient ID parameter.
  - 2125 – This value is equal for all Servers in the SSM Group, and is the same as the value of the  
2126 "senderid" of the Client Context for the SSM Group
  - 2127 – This value is selected and provisioned by the OBT
- 2128 – The "desc" Property containing a description of the usage of the security context
  - 2129 – This Property contains a human-readable description intended for identifying the  
2130 corresponding SSM Group when a Security Domain contains multiple SSM Groups.
  - 2131 – This value is selected and provisioned by the OBT

2132 NOTE 2: The value of "recipientid" is expected to be lowercase hexadecimal encoded with "0x" encoding prefix omitted.

2133 See clause 16.3.3 for description of the OSCORE parameters used in SSM.

## 2134 **9.4 Certificate based key management**

### 2135 **9.4.1 Overview**

2136 To achieve authentication and transport security during communications in OCF Security Domain,  
2137 certificates containing public keys of communicating parties and private keys can be used.

2138 The certificate and private key may be issued by a local or remote certificate authority (CA).

2139 The OCF certificate format is a subset of X.509 format, only elliptic curve algorithm and PEM  
2140 encoding format are allowed, most of optional fields in X.509 are not supported so that the format  
2141 intends to meet the constrained Device's requirement.

2142 The CMS manages the certificate lifecycle for certificates it issues. The DOTS assigns a CMS to a  
2143 Device when it is newly onboarded.

2144 **9.4.2 X.509 Digital certificate profiles**

2145 **9.4.2.1 Digital certificate profile general**

2146 An OCF certificate format is a subset of X.509 format (version 3 or above) as defined in  
2147 IETF RFC 5280.

2148 This clause develops a profile to facilitate the use of X.509 certificates within OCF applications for  
2149 those communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. The X.509 v3 certificate format is  
2150 described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of OCF specific  
2151 extension(s). The supported standard certificate extensions are also listed.

2152 Certificate Format: The OCF certificate profile is derived from IETF RFC 5280. However, this  
2153 document does not support the "issuerUniqueID" and "subjectUniqueID" fields which are  
2154 deprecated and shall not be used in the context of OCF. If these fields are present in a certificate,  
2155 compliant entities shall ignore their contents.

2156 Certificate Encoding: Conforming entities shall use the Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) to encode  
2157 certificates.

2158 Certificates Hierarchy and Crypto Parameters. OCF supports a three-tier hierarchy for its Public  
2159 Key Infrastructure (i.e., a Root CA, an Intermediate CA, and EE certificates). OCF accredited CAs  
2160 SHALL use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) keys (secp256r1 – OID:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) and  
2161 use the ecdsaWithSHA256 (OID:1.2.840.10045.4.3.2) algorithm for certificate signatures. Elliptic  
2162 Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

2163 The following clauses specify the supported standard and custom extensions for the OCF  
2164 certificates profile.

2165 **9.4.2.2 Certificate profile and fields**

2166 **9.4.2.2.1 Root CA certificate profile**

2167 Table 8 describes X.509 v1 fields required for Root CA Certificates.

2168 **Table 8 – X.509 v1 fields for Root CA certificates**

V1 Field	Value / Remarks
signatureAlgorithm	ecdsa-with-SHA256 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
Version	v3 (value is 2)
SerialNumber	SHALL be a positive integer, unique among all certificates issued by a given CA
Issuer	SHALL match the Subject field
Subject	SHALL match the Issuer field
notBefore	The time at which the Root CA Certificate was generated. See 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
notAfter	No stipulation for expiry date. See 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
Subject Public Key Info	id-ecPublicKey (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1) secp256r1 (OID:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

2169 Table 9 describes X.509 v3 extensions required for Root CA Certificates.

2170

**Table 9 - X.509 v3 extensions for Root CA certificates**

Extension	Required/Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
authorityKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
subjectKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	keyCertSign (5) & cRLSign (6) bits shall be enabled. digitalSignature(0) bit may be enabled. All other bits shall not be enabled.
basicConstraints	REQUIRED	Critical	cA = TRUE pathLenConstraint = not present (unlimited)

2171

**9.4.2.2.2 Intermediate CA certificate profile**

2172

Table 10 describes X.509 v1 fields required for intermediate CA certificates.

2173

**Table 10 - X.509 v1 fields for intermediate CA certificates**

V1 Field	Value / Remarks
signatureAlgorithm	ecdsa-with-SHA256 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
Version	v3 (value is 2)
SerialNumber	SHALL be a positive integer, unique among all certificates issued by Root CA
Issuer	SHALL match the Subject field of the issuing Root CA
Subject	(no stipulation)
notBefore	The time at which the Intermediate CA Certificate was generated. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
notAfter	No stipulation for expiry date. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
Subject Public Key Info	id-ecPublicKey (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1) secp256r1 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

2174

Table 11 describes X.509 v3 extensions required for intermediate CA certificates.

2175

**Table 11 – X.509 v3 extensions for intermediate CA certificates**

Extension	Required/Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
authorityKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
subjectKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	keyCertSign (5) & cRLSign (6) bits shall be enabled. digitalSignature (0) bit may be enabled All other bits shall not be enabled.
basicConstraints	REQUIRED	Critical	cA = TRUE

			pathLenConstraint = 0 (can only sign End-Entity certs)
certificatePolicies	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	(no stipulation)
cRLDistributionPoints	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	1 or more URIs where the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) from the Root can be obtained.
authorityInformationAccess	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	OCSP URI – the URI of the Root CA's OCSP Responder

2176 **9.4.2.2.3 End-Entity Black certificate profile**

2177 Table 12 describes X.509 v1 fields required for end-entity certificates used for Black security profile.

2178 **Table 12 – X.509 v1 fields for end-entity certificates**

V1 Field	Value / Remarks
signatureAlgorithm	ecdsa-with-SHA256 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
Version	v3 (value is 2)
SerialNumber	SHALL be a positive integer, unique among all certificates issued by the Intermediate CA
Issuer	SHALL match the Subject field of the issuing Intermediate CA
Subject	Subject DN shall include: o=OCF-verified device manufacturer organization name.  The Subject DN may include other attributes (e.g. cn, c, ou, etc.) with no stipulation by OCF.
notBefore	The time at which the End-Entity Certificate was generated. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
notAfter	No stipulation. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
Subject Public Key Info	id-ecPublicKey (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1) secp256r1 (OID:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

2179 Table 13 describes X.509 v3 extensions required for end-entity certificates.

2180 **Table 13 – X.509 v3 extensions for end-entity Certificates**

Extension	Required/ Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
authorityKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
subjectKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	digitalSignature (0) and keyAgreement(4) bits SHALL be the only bits enabled
basicConstraints	OPTIONAL	Non-Critical	cA = FALSE pathLenConstraint = not present

certificatePolicies	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	<p>End-Entity certificates chaining to an OCF Root CA SHOULD contain at least one PolicyIdentifierId set to the OCF Certificate Policy OID – (1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.1.2) corresponding to the version of the OCF Certificate Policy under which it was issued.</p> <p>Additional manufacturer-specific CP OIDs may also be populated.</p>
extendedKeyUsage	REQUIRED	Non-critical	<p>The following extendedKeyUsage (EKU) OIDs SHALL both be present:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• serverAuthentication - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1</li> <li>• clientAuthentication - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2</li> </ul> <p>Exactly ONE of the following OIDs SHALL be present:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity certificate - 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6</li> <li>• Role certificate - 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7</li> </ul> <p>End-Entity certificates SHALL NOT contain the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID (2.5.29.37.0)</p>
subjectAlternativeName	REQUIRED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS	Non-critical	<p>The subjectAltName extension is used to encode one or more Role ID values in role certificates, binding the roles to the subject public key.</p> <p>When the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) extension contains the Identity Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6), the subjectAltName extension SHOULD NOT be present.</p> <p>If the EKU extension contains the Role Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7), the subjectAltName extension SHALL be present and populated as follows:</p> <p>Each GeneralName in the GeneralNames SEQUENCE which encodes a role shall be a directoryName, which is of type Name. Name is an X.501 Distinguished Name. Each Name shall contain exactly one CN (Common Name) component, and zero or one OU (Organizational Unit) components. The OU component, if present, shall specify the authority that defined the semantics of the</p>

			role. If the OU component is absent, the certificate issuer has defined the role. The CN component shall encode the role ID. Other GeneralName types in the SEQUENCE may be present, but shall not be interpreted as roles. The role, and authority shall be encoded as ASN.1 PrintableString type, the restricted character set [0-9a-z-A-z '()+,./:=?].
cRLDistributionPoints	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	1 or more URIs where the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) from the Intermediate CA can be obtained.
authorityInformationAccess	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	OCSP URI – the URI of the Intermediate CA's OCSP Responder
OCF Compliance	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	See 9.4.2.2.4
Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	Contains a single Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that points to an on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate subject. See 9.4.2.2.5
OCF Security Claims	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	Contains a list of security claims above those required by this OCF Compliance version or Security Profile. See 9.4.2.2.6
OCF CPL Attributes	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	Contains the list of OCF Attributes used to perform OCF Certified Product List lookups

2181 **9.4.2.2.4 OCF Compliance X.509v3 Extension**

2182 The OCF Compliance Extension defines required parameters to correctly identify the type of Device,  
2183 its manufacturer, its OCF Version, and the Security Profile compliance of the device.

2184 The extension carries an "ocfVersion" field which provides the specific base version of the OCF  
2185 documents the device implements. The "ocfVersion" field shall contain a sequence of three integers  
2186 ("major", "minor", and "build"). For example, if an entity is certified to be compliant with OCF  
2187 specifications 1.3.2, then the "major", "minor", and "build" fields of the "ocfVersion" will be set to  
2188 "1", "3", and "2" respectively. The "ocfVersion" may be used by Security Profiles to denote  
2189 compliance to a specified base version of the OCF documents.

2190 The "securityProfile" field shall carry the ocfSecurityProfile OID(s) (clause 14.8.3) of one or more  
2191 supported Security Profiles associated with the certificate in string form (UTF-8). All Security  
2192 Profiles associated with the certificate should be identified by this field.

2193 The extension shall also carry two string fields (UTF-8): "DeviceName" and "deviceManufacturer".  
2194 The fields carry human-readable descriptions of the Device's name and manufacturer, respectively.

2195 The ASN.1 definition of the OCFCompliance extension (OID – 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.1.0) is defined as  
2196 follows:

```
2197 id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
2198                               private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
```

2199

```

2200     id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
2201
2202     id-ocfCompliance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 0 }
2203
2204 ocfVersion ::= SEQUENCE {
2205     major    INTEGER,
2206             --Major version number
2207     minor    INTEGER,
2208             --Minor version number
2209     build    INTEGER,
2210             --Build/Micro version number
2211 }
2212
2213 ocfCompliance ::= SEQUENCE {
2214     version          ocfVersion,
2215                     --Device/OCF version
2216     securityProfile SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ocfSecurityProfileOID,
2217                     --Sequence of OCF Security Profile OID strings
2218                     --Clause 14.8.2 defines valid ocfSecurityProfileOIDs
2219     deviceName      UTF8String,
2220                     --Name of the device
2221     deviceManufacturer UTF8String,
2222                     --Human-Readable Manufacturer
2223                     --of the device
2224 }

```

#### 2225 **9.4.2.2.5 Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) X.509v3 Extension**

2226 The goal of the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) extension is to provide a means for devices  
2227 to signal to the network the access and network functionality they require to properly function.  
2228 Access controls can be more easily achieved and deployed at scale when the MUD extension is  
2229 used.

2230 The MUD X.509 v3 extension is specified in IETF RFC 8520 with the full ASN.1 definition in clause  
2231 11.

#### 2232 **9.4.2.2.6 OCF Security Claims X.509v3 Extension**

2233 The OCF Security Claims Extension defines a list of OIDs representing security claims that the  
2234 manufacturer/integrator is making as to the security posture of the device above those required by  
2235 the OCF Compliance version or that of the OCF Security Profile being indicated by the device.

2236 The purpose of this extension is to allow for programmatic evaluation of assertions made about  
2237 security to enable some platforms/policies/administrators to better understand what is being  
2238 onboarded or challenged.

2239 The ASN.1 definition of the OCF Security Claims extension (OID – 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.1.1) is defined  
2240 as follows:

```

2241 id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
2242     private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
2243
2244     id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
2245
2246     id-ocfSecurityClaims OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 1 }
2247
2248     claim-secure-boot ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 0 }
2249     --Device claims that the boot process follows a procedure trusted
2250     --by the firmware and the BIOS
2251
2252     claim-hw-backed-cred-storage ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 1 }
2253     --Device claims that credentials are stored in a specialized hardware
2254     --protection environment such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or

```

2255 --similar mechanism.  
2256

2257 ocfSecurityClaimsOID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER  
2258

2259 ocfSecurityClaims ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) of ocfSecurityClaimsOID

#### 2260 **9.4.2.2.7 OCF Certified Product List Attributes X.509v3 Extension**

2261 The OCF Certified Product List Extension defines required parameters to utilize the OCF  
2262 Compliance Management System Certified Product List (OCMS-CPL). This clause is only  
2263 applicable if you plan to utilize the OCMS-CPL. The OBT may make use of these attributes to verify  
2264 the compliance level of a device.

2265 The extension carries the OCF CPL Attributes: IANA Private Enterprise Number (PEN), Model and  
2266 Version.

2267 The 'cpl-at-IANAPen' IANA Private Enterprise Number (PEN) provides the manufacturer's unique  
2268 PEN established in the IANA PEN list located at: [https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-](https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers)  
2269 [numbers](https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers). The 'cpl-at-IANAPen' field found in end-products shall be the same information as  
2270 reported during OCF Certification.

2271 The 'cpl-at-model' represents an OCF-Certified product's model name. The 'cpl-at-model' field  
2272 found in end-products shall be the same information as reported during OCF Certification.

2273 The 'cpl-at-version' represents an OCF-Certified product's version. The 'cpl-at-version' field found  
2274 in end-products shall be the same information as reported during OCF Certification.

2275 The ASN.1 definition of the OCF CPL Attributes extension (OID – 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.1.2) is defined  
2276 as follows:

```
2277 id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
2278                               private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
```

```
2279
2280 id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
```

```
2281
2282 id-ocfCPLAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 2 }
```

```
2283
2284 cpl-at-IANAPen ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 0 }
2285 cpl-at-model ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 1 }
2286 cpl-at-version ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 2 }
```

```
2287
2288
2289 ocfCPLAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
2290     cpl-at-IANAPen UTF8String,
2291     --Manufacturer's registered IANA Private Enterprise Number
2292     cpl-at-model UTF8String,
2293     --Device OCF Security Profile
2294     cpl-at-version UTF8String
2295     --Name of the device
2296 }
```

#### 2297 **9.4.2.3 Supported certificate extensions**

2298 As these certificate extensions are a standard part of IETF RFC 5280, this document includes the  
2299 clause number from that RFC to include it by reference. Each extension is summarized here, and  
2300 any modifications to the RFC definition are listed. Devices shall be capable of parsing and enforcing  
2301 the extensions listed here; other extensions from the RFC are not included in this document and  
2302 therefore are not required. Clause 10.4 describes what Devices implement when validating  
2303 certificate chains, including processing of extensions, and actions to take when certain extensions  
2304 are absent.

2305 – Authority Key Identifier (4.2.1.1)

2306 The Authority Key Identifier (AKI) extension provides a means of identifying the public key  
2307 corresponding to the private key used to sign a certificate. This document makes the following  
2308 modifications to the referenced definition of this extension:

2309 The "authorityCertIssuer" or "authorityCertSerialNumber" fields of the "AuthorityKeyIdentifier"  
2310 sequence are not permitted; only "keyIdentifier" is allowed. This results in the following  
2311 grammar definition:

```
2312 id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }
```

```
2313 AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {  
2314     keyIdentifier          [0] KeyIdentifier          }
```

```
2316 KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING  
2317
```

#### 2318 – Subject Key Identifier (4.2.1.2)

2319 The Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension provides a means of identifying certificates that  
2320 contain a particular public key.

2321 This document makes the following modification to the referenced definition of this extension:

2322 Subject Key Identifiers should be derived from the public key contained in the certificate's  
2323 "SubjectPublicKeyInfo" field or a method that generates unique values. This document  
2324 RECOMMENDS the 256-bit SHA-2 hash of the value of the BIT STRING "subjectPublicKey"  
2325 (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits). Devices verifying certificate chains shall  
2326 not assume any particular method of computing key identifiers, and shall only base matching  
2327 AKI's and SKI's in certification path constructions on key identifiers seen in certificates.

#### 2328 – Subject Alternative Name

2329 If the EKU extension is present, and has the Role Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7) ,  
2330 indicating that this is a role certificate, the Subject Alternative Name (subjectAltName)  
2331 extension shall be present and interpreted as described below. When no EKU is present, or has  
2332 another value, the "subjectAltName" extension should be absent. The "subjectAltName"  
2333 extension is used to encode one or more Role ID values in role certificates, binding the roles  
2334 to the subject public key. The "subjectAltName" extension is defined in IETF RFC 5280 (See  
2335 4.2.1.6):

```
2336 id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 }
```

```
2337 SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames  
2338
```

```
2340 GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName  
2341
```

```
2342 GeneralName ::= CHOICE {  
2343     otherName                [0]     OtherName,  
2344     rfc5322Name              [1]     IA5String,  
2345     dNSName                  [2]     IA5String,  
2346     x400Address              [3]     ORAddress,  
2347     directoryName            [4]     Name,  
2348     ediPartyName             [5]     EDIPartyName,  
2349     uniformResourceIdentifier [6]     IA5String,  
2350     iPAddress                [7]     OCTET STRING,  
2351     registeredID             [8]     OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
```

```
2352 EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {  
2353     nameAssigner [0]     DirectoryString OPTIONAL,  
2354     partyName    [1]     DirectoryString }
```

2356  
2357 Each "GeneralName" in the "GeneralNames" SEQUENCE which encodes a role shall be a  
2358 "directoryName", which is of type Name. Name is an X.501 Distinguished Name. Each Name  
2359 shall contain exactly one CN (Common Name) component, and zero or one OU (Organizational  
2360 Unit) components. The OU component, if present, shall specify the authority that defined the

2361 semantics of the role. If the OU component is absent, the certificate issuer has defined the role.  
 2362 The CN component shall encode the role ID. Other "GeneralName" types in the SEQUENCE  
 2363 may be present, but shall not be interpreted as roles. Therefore, if the certificate issuer includes  
 2364 non-role names in the "subjectAltName" extension, the extension should not be marked critical.

2365 The role, and authority need to be encoded as ASN.1 "PrintableString" type, the restricted  
 2366 character set [0-9a-z-A-z '()+, -./:=?].

2367 – Key Usage (4.2.1.3)

2368 The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, signature, certificate signing)  
 2369 of the key contained in the certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that  
 2370 could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted.

2371 This document does not modify the referenced definition of this extension.

2372 – Basic Constraints (4.2.1.9)

2373 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and the  
 2374 maximum depth of valid certification paths that include this certificate. Without this extension,  
 2375 a certificate cannot be an issuer of other certificates.

2376 This document does not modify the referenced definition of this extension.

2377 – Extended Key Usage (4.2.1.12)

2378

2379 Extended Key Usage describes allowed purposes for which the certified public key may be used.  
 2380 When a Device receives a certificate, it determines the purpose based on the context of the  
 2381 interaction in which the certificate is presented, and verifies the certificate may be used for that  
 2382 purpose.

2383 This document makes the following modifications to the referenced definition of this extension:  
 2384 CAs should mark this extension as critical.

2385 CAs shall not issue certificates with the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID (2.5.29.37.0).  
 2386

2387 The list of OCF-specific purposes and the assigned OIDs to represent them are:

2388 – Identity certificate 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6  
 2389 – Role certificate 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7

2390 **9.4.2.4 Cipher suite for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity**

2391 OCF compliant entities shall support TLS version 1.2. Compliant entities shall support  
 2392 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 cipher suite as defined in IETF RFC 7251 and may  
 2393 support additional ciphers as defined in the TLS v1.2 specifications.

2394 **9.4.2.5 Encoding of certificate**

2395 See 9.4.2 for details.

2396 **9.4.3 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile [Deprecated]**

2397 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2398 **9.4.4 Resource model**

2399 Device certificates and private keys are kept in "cred" Resource.

2400 The "cred" Resource contains the certificate information pertaining to the Device. The "PublicData"  
 2401 Property holds the device certificate and CA certificate chain. "PrivateData" Property holds the  
 2402 Device private key paired to the certificate. (See 13.3 for additional detail regarding the  
 2403 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource).

2404 **9.4.5 Certificate provisioning**


2405 The CMS (e.g. a hub or a smart phone) issues certificates for new Devices.

2406 The CA in the CMS retrieves a Device's public key and proof of possession of the private key,  
2407 generates a Device's certificate signed by this CA certificate, and then the CMS transfers them to  
2408 the Device including its CA certificate chain. Optionally, the CMS can also transfer one or more  
2409 role certificates, which shall have the format described in clause 9.4.2. The "subjectPublicKey" of  
2410 each role certificate shall match the "subjectPublicKey" in the Device certificate.

2411 In the sequence in Figure 23, the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is defined by PKCS#10 in  
2412 IETF RFC 2986, and is included here by reference.

2413 The sequence flow of a certificate transfer for a Client-directed model is described in Figure 23.

- 2414 1) The CMS retrieves a CSR from the Device that requests a certificate. In this CSR, the Device  
2415 shall place its requested UUID into the subject and its public key in the "SubjectPublicKeyInfo".  
2416 The Device determines the public key to present; this may be an already-provisioned key it has  
2417 selected for use with authentication, or if none is present, it may generate a new key pair  
2418 internally and provide the public part. The key pair shall be compatible with the allowed cipher  
2419 suites listed in 9.4.2.4 and 11.3.4, since the certificate will be restricted for use in OCF  
2420 authentication.
- 2421 2) 2) Alternatively, the CMS generates and provisions a private key and corresponding certificate  
2422 directly to the Device.
- 2423 3) The CMS transfers the issued certificate and CA chain to the designated Device using the same  
2424 credid, to maintain the association with the private key. The credential type ("oic.sec.cred")  
2425 used to transfer certificates in Figure 23 is also used to transfer role certificates, by including  
2426 multiple credentials in the POST from CMS to Device. Identity certificates shall be stored with  
2427 the credusage Property set to "oic.sec.cred.cert" and role certificates shall be stored with the  
2428 credusage Property set to "oic.sec.cred.rolecert".



2429

2430 **Figure 23 – Client-directed Certificate Transfer**

2431 **9.4.6 CRL provisioning [Deprecated]**

2432 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2433

2434 **9.4.7 Role and identity certificate profile**

2435 During onboarding, identity and optional role certificate is generated by the OBT and distributed to  
 2436 the Device. Table 14 is the list of required and optional fields of the certificate. If optional fields are  
 2437 used (from Table 14) then the device might refuse the certificate due to its size and the OBT will  
 2438 create a certificate that will not use the optional fields.

2439 **Table 14 - X.509 v3 extensions for role and identity certificates**

Extension	Required/Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	digitalSignature (0) and keyAgreement(4) bits SHALL be the only bits enabled
certificatePolicies	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	End-Entity certificates chaining to an OCF Root CA SHOULD contain at least one PolicyIdentifierId set to the OCF Certificate Policy OID – (1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.1.2) corresponding to the version of the OCF Certificate Policy under which it was issued.  Additional manufacturer-specific CP OIDs may also be populated
extendedKeyUsage	REQUIRED	Non-critical	The following extendedKeyUsage (EKU) OIDs SHALL both be present: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• serverAuthentication - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1</li> <li>• clientAuthentication - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2</li> </ul> Exactly ONE of the following OIDs SHALL be present: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity certificate - 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6</li> <li>• Role certificate - 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7</li> </ul> End-Entity certificates SHALL NOT contain the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID (2.5.29.37.0)
subjectAlternativeName	REQUIRED	Non-critical	The subjectAltName extension is used to encode one or more Role ID values in role certificates, binding the roles to the subject public key.  When the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) extension contains the Identity Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6), the subjectAltName

			<p>extension SHOULD NOT be present.</p> <p>If the EKU extension contains the Role Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7), the subjectAltName extension SHALL be present and populated as follows:</p> <p>Each GeneralName in the GeneralNames SEQUENCE which encodes a role shall be a directoryName, which is of type Name. Name is an X.501 Distinguished Name. Each Name shall contain exactly one CN (Common Name) component, and zero or one OU (Organizational Unit) components. The OU component, if present, shall specify the authority that defined the semantics of the role. If the OU component is absent, the certificate issuer has defined the role. The CN component shall encode the role ID. Other GeneralName types in the SEQUENCE may be present, but shall not be interpreted as roles.</p> <p>The role, and authority shall be encoded as ASN.1 PrintableString type, the restricted character set [0-9a-z-A-z '()+,./:=?].</p>
--	--	--	--

2440

## 2441 **10 Device authentication**

### 2442 **10.1 Device authentication general**

2443 When a Client is accessing a restricted Resource on a Server, the Server shall authenticate the  
2444 Client. Clients shall authenticate Servers while requesting access. Clients may also assert one or  
2445 more roles that the server can use in access control decisions. Roles may be asserted when the  
2446 Device authentication is done with certificates.

### 2447 **10.2 Device authentication with symmetric key credentials**

2448 When using symmetric keys to authenticate, the Server Device shall include the  
2449 "ServerKeyExchange" message and set "psk\_identity\_hint" to the Server's Device UUID. The Client  
2450 shall validate that it has a credential with the Subject UUID set to the Server's Device UUID, and  
2451 a credential type of PSK. If it does not, the Client shall respond with an unknown\_psk\_identity error  
2452 or other suitable error.

2453 If the Client finds a suitable PSK credential, it shall reply with a "ClientKeyExchange" message that  
2454 includes a "psk\_identity" set to the Client's Device UUID. The Server shall verify that it has a  
2455 credential with the matching Subject UUID and type. If it does not, the Server shall respond with  
2456 an "unknown\_psk\_identity" or other suitable error code. If it does, then it shall continue with the  
2457 DTLS protocol, and both Client and Server shall compute the resulting premaster secret.

### 2458 **10.3 Device authentication with raw asymmetric key credentials**

2459 When using raw asymmetric keys to authenticate, the Client and the Server shall include a suitable  
2460 public key from a credential that is bound to their Device. Each Device shall verify that the provided  
2461 public key matches the Public Data field of a credential they have, and use the corresponding  
2462 Subject UUID of the credential to identify the peer Device.

### 2463 **10.4 Device authentication with certificates**

#### 2464 **10.4.1 Device authentication with certificates general**

2465 When using certificates to authenticate, the Client and Server shall each include their certificate  
2466 chain, as stored in the appropriate credential, as part of the selected authentication cipher suite.  
2467 Each Device shall validate the certificate chain presented by the peer Device. Each certificate  
2468 signature shall be verified until a public key is found within the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource with the  
2469 "oic.sec.cred.trustca" credusage.

2470 Devices shall follow the certificate path validation algorithm in clause 6 of IETF RFC 5280. In  
2471 addition:

- 2472 – For both End-Entity certificates and non-End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that  
2473 "notBefore" and "notAfter" fields in the certificates conform to IETF RFC 5280 clauses 4.1.2.5,  
2474 4.1.2.5.1, and 4.1.2.5.2.
- 2475 – For non-End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the Basic Constraints extension is  
2476 present, and that the "cA" boolean in the extension is TRUE. If any of these are false, the  
2477 certificate chain shall be rejected. If the pathLenConstraint field is present, Devices shall verify  
2478 that the number of certificates between this certificate and the End-Entity certificate is less than  
2479 or equal to "pathLenConstraint". In particular, if "pathLenConstraint" is zero, only an End-Entity  
2480 certificate can be issued by this certificate. If the "pathLenConstraint" field is absent, there is  
2481 no limit to the chain length.
- 2482 – For End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the Basic Constraints extension (if present)  
2483 has a "cA" boolean value of FALSE, and does not contain a "pathLenConstraint" ASN.1  
2484 sequence.
- 2485 – For non-End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the Key Usage extension is present,  
2486 and that the "keyCertSign" (5) bit is asserted.

- 2487 – For End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the Key Usage extension is present and  
2488 that "digitalSignature" (0) and "keyAgreement" (4) bits are asserted.
- 2489 – For End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension  
2490 is present and suitable to the purpose for which it is being presented: Identity  
2491 ("1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6") or Role ("1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7"). An End-Entity certificate which  
2492 contains no EKU extension, or presents both identity and role OIDs is not valid and shall be  
2493 rejected. Any certificate which contains the "anyExtendedKeyUsage" purpose ("2.5.29.37.0")  
2494 shall be rejected, even if other valid EKUs are also present. For End-Entity certificates, Devices  
2495 shall verify that the EKU extension also contains OIDs for "serverAuthentication"  
2496 ("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1") and "clientAuthentication" ("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2") for compatibility with  
2497 various TLS implementations.
- 2498 – For End-Entity certificates which chain to an OCF Root CA, the Devices should verify that they  
2499 contain at least one "PolicyIdentifierId" set to the OCF Certificate Policy OID –  
2500 ("1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.1.2") corresponding to the version of the OCF Certificate Policy under  
2501 which it was issued. Additional manufacturer-specific CP OIDs may also be populated.

2502 If the Device does not recognize an extension, it shall examine the "critical" field. If the field is  
2503 TRUE, the Device shall reject the certificate. If the field is FALSE, the Device shall treat the  
2504 certificate as if the extension were absent and proceed accordingly. This applies to all certificates  
2505 in a chain.

2506 A Device retrieves the Subject UUID from the "Common Name" component of the "Subject Name"  
2507 property of the End-Entity certificate which has the following format: "uuid: X", where X is  
2508 provisioned by the CMS to match the "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. The  
2509 Device treats all requests arriving over a connection authenticated by this End-Entity certificate as  
2510 having originated from the Device with this Subject UUID. The Device shall use this Subject UUID  
2511 to match against the "subjectuuid" Property of the provisioned ACL entries to perform access  
2512 control checks.

#### 2513 **10.4.2 Role assertion with certificates**


2514 This clause describes role assertion by a client to a server using a certificate role credential.

2515 Following authentication with a certificate, an OCF Client shall assert Roles by updating the  
2516 Server's "/oic/sec/roles" Resource with all the Role certificates it possesses, unless the device  
2517 manufacturer provides a vendor-specific mechanism for End User to select which roles to assert.  
2518 The Role credentials shall be certificate credentials and shall include a certificate chain. The Server  
2519 shall validate each certificate chain as specified in clause 10.3. Additionally, the public key in the  
2520 End-Entity certificate used for Device authentication shall be identical to the public key in all Role  
2521 (End-Entity) certificates. Also, the common name component of the subject name for both Role  
2522 certificates and identity certificates shall include a string of format "uuid:X" where X matches the  
2523 "deviceuuid" Property of the "oic.sec.doxm" Resource.

2524 Furthermore, a Client is prohibited from adding Role certificates for other Clients. The Server shall  
2525 reject Clients' request to add Role certificates if either (1) the request was received over an un-  
2526 secured connection or (2) the request was received over a secured connection but the public key  
2527 in the Role certificate does not match the public key in the identity certificate, which was used to  
2528 establish the secured connection.

2529 The Roles asserted are encoded in the "subjectAltName" extension in the certificate. The  
2530 "subjectAltName" field can have multiple values, allowing a single certificate to encode multiple  
2531 Roles that apply to the Client. The Server shall also check that the EKU extension of the Role  
2532 certificate(s) contains the value "1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7" (see clause 9.4.2.2) indicating the  
2533 certificate may be used to assert Roles. Figure 24 describes how a Client Device asserts Roles to  
2534 a Server.

## Asserting Certificate Role Credentials



2535

2536

**Figure 24 – Asserting a role with a certificate role credential.**

2537 Additional comments for Figure 24

2538 1) The response shall contain "204 No Content" to indicate success or 4xx to indicate an error. If  
2539 the server does not support certificate credentials, it should return "501 Not Implemented"

2540 2) Roles asserted by the client may be kept for a duration chosen by the server. The duration shall  
2541 not exceed the validity period of the role certificate.

2542 3) Servers should choose a nonzero duration to avoid the cost of frequent re-assertion of a role  
2543 by a client. It is recommended that servers use the validity period of the certificate as a duration,  
2544 effectively allowing the CMS to decide the duration.

2545 4) The format of the data sent in the create call shall be a list of credentials ("oic.sec.cred", see  
2546 Table 20). They shall have "credtype" 8 (indicating certificates) and "PrivateData" field shall  
2547 not be present. For fields that are duplicated in the "oic.sec.cred" object and the certificate, the  
2548 value in the certificate shall be used for validation. For example, if the "Period" field is set in  
2549 the credential, the server shall treat the validity period in the certificate as authoritative. Similar  
2550 for the roleid data (authority, role).

2551 5) Certificates shall be encoded as in Figure 23 (PEM-encoded certificate chain).

2552 6) Clients may GET the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource to determine the roles that have been previously  
2553 asserted. An array of credential objects shall be returned. If there are no valid certificates  
2554 corresponding to the currently connected and authenticated Client's identity, then an empty  
2555 array (i.e. []) shall be returned.

### 2556 10.4.3 OCF PKI Roots

2557 This clause intentionally left empty.

### 2558 10.4.4 PKI Trust Store

2559 Each Device using a certificate chained to an OCF Root CA trust anchor SHALL securely store the  
2560 OCF Root CA certificates in the "oic/sec/cred" Resource and SHOULD physically store this  
2561 Resource in a hardened memory location where the certificates cannot be tampered with.

### 2562 10.4.5 Path Validation and extension processing

2563 See clause 10.3.

2564

2565 **11 Message integrity and confidentiality**

2566 **11.1 Preamble**

2567 Secured communications between Clients and Servers are protected against eavesdropping,  
2568 tampering, or message replay, using security mechanisms that provide message confidentiality and  
2569 integrity.

2570 **11.2 Session protection with DTLS**

2571 **11.2.1 DTLS protection general**

2572 Devices shall support DTLS for secured communications as defined in IETF RFC 6347. Devices  
2573 using TCP shall support TLS v1.2 for secured communications as defined in IETF RFC 5246. See  
2574 11.3 for a list of required and optional cipher suites for message communication.

2575 OCF Devices shall support (D)TLS version 1.2 or greater and shall not support versions 1.1 or  
2576 lower.

2577 Multicast session semantics are not yet defined in this version of the security document.

2578 **11.2.2 Unicast session semantics**

2579 For unicast messages between a Client and a Server, both Devices shall authenticate each other.  
2580 See clause 9.4.7 for details on Device Authentication.

2581 Secured unicast messages between a Client and a Server shall employ a cipher suite from 11.3.  
2582 The sending Device shall encrypt and authenticate messages as defined by the selected cipher  
2583 suite and the receiving Device shall verify and decrypt the messages before processing them.

2584 **11.3 Cipher suites**

2585 **11.3.1 Cipher suites general**

2586 The cipher suites allowed for use can vary depending on the context. This clause lists the cipher  
2587 suites allowed during ownership transfer and normal operation. The following RFCs provide  
2588 additional information about the cipher suites used in OCF.

2589 IETF RFC 4279: Specifies use of pre-shared keys (PSK) in (D)TLS

2590 IETF RFC 4492: Specifies use of elliptic curve cryptography in (D)TLS

2591 IETF RFC 5489: Specifies use of cipher suites that use elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) and  
2592 PSKs

2593 IETF RFC 6655 and IETF RFC 7251: Specifies AES-CCM mode cipher suites, with ECDHE

2594 **11.3.2 Cipher suites for Device Ownership Transfer**

2595 **11.3.2.1 Just Works Method cipher suites**

2596 The Just Works OTM may use the following (D)TLS cipher suites.

2597 TLS\_ECDH\_ANON\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256

2598 All Devices supporting Just Works OTM shall implement:

2599 TLS\_ECDH\_ANON\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 (with the value 0xFF00)

2600 **11.3.2.2 Random PIN Method cipher suites**

2601 The Random PIN Based OTM may use the following (D)TLS cipher suites.

2602 TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256

2603 All Devices supporting Random Pin Based OTM shall implement:

2604 TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256

2605 **11.3.2.3 Certificate Method cipher suites**

2606 The Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM may use the following (D)TLS cipher suites.

2607 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8,

2608 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8,

2609 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM,

2610 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM

2611 Using the following curve:

2612 secp256r1 (See IETF RFC 4492)

2613 All Devices supporting Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM shall implement:

2614 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8

2615 Devices supporting Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM should implement:

2616 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8,

2617 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM,

2618 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM

2619 **11.3.3 Cipher suites for symmetric keys**

2620 The following cipher suites are defined for (D)TLS communication using PSKs:

2621 TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256,

2622 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8, (\* 8 OCTET Authentication tag \*)

2623 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8,

2624 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM, (\* 16 OCTET Authentication tag \*)

2625 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM,

2626 All CCM based cipher suites also use HMAC-SHA-256 for authentication.

2627 All Devices shall implement the following:

2628 TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256,

2629

2630 Devices should implement the following:

2631 TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256,

2632 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8,

2633 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8,

2634 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM,

2635 TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM

2636 **11.3.4 Cipher suites for asymmetric credentials**

2637 The following cipher suites are defined for (D)TLS communication with asymmetric keys or  
2638 certificates:

2639 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8,

2640 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8,  
2641 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM,  
2642 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM  
2643 Using the following curve:  
2644 secp256r1 (See IETF RFC 4492)  
2645 All Devices supporting Asymmetric Credentials shall implement:  
2646 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8  
2647 All Devices supporting Asymmetric Credentials should implement:  
2648 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8,  
2649 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM,  
2650 TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM  
2651

2652 **12 Access control**

2653 **12.1 ACL generation and management**

2654 This clause intentionally left empty.

2655 **12.2 ACL evaluation and enforcement**

2656 **12.2.1 ACL evaluation and enforcement general**

2657 The Server enforces access control over application Resources before exposing them to the  
2658 requestor. The Security Layer in the Server authenticates the requestor when access is received  
2659 via the secure port. Authenticated requestors, known as the "subject" can be used to match ACL  
2660 entries that specify the requestor's identity, role or may match authenticated requestors using a  
2661 subject wildcard.

2662 If the request arrives over the unsecured port, the only ACL policies allowed are those that use a  
2663 subject wildcard match of anonymous requestors.

2664 Access is denied if a requested Resource is not matched by an ACL entry.

2665 NOTE There are documented exceptions pertaining to Device onboarding where access to Security Virtual Resources  
2666 may be granted prior to provisioning of ACL Resources.

2667 The second generation ACL (i.e. "/oic/sec/acl2") contains an array of Access Control Entries (ACE2)  
2668 that employ a Resource matching algorithm that uses an array of Resource references to match  
2669 Resources to which the ACE2 access policy applies. Matching consists of comparing the values of  
2670 the ACE2 "resources" Property (see clause 13) to the requested Resource. Resources are matched  
2671 in two ways:

- 2672 1) host reference ("href")
- 2673 2) Resource wildcard ("wc").

2674 **12.2.2 Host reference matching**

2675 When present in an ACE2 matching element, the Host Reference (href) Property shall be used for  
2676 Resource matching.

2677 – The href Property shall be used to find an exact match of the Resource name if present.

2678 **12.2.3 Resource wildcard matching**

2679 When present, a wildcard ("wc") expression shall be used to match multiple Resources using a  
2680 wildcard Property contained in the "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref" structure.

2681 A wildcard expression may be used to match multiple Resources using a wildcard Property  
2682 contained in the "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref" structure. The wildcard matching strings are defined  
2683 in Table 15.

2684 **Table 15 – ACE2 wildcard matching strings description**

String	Description
"+"	Shall match all Discoverable Non-Configuration Resources which expose at least one Secure OCF Endpoint.
"_"	Shall match all Discoverable Non-Configuration Resources which expose at least one Unsecure OCF Endpoint.
"**"	Shall match all Non-Configuration Resources.

2685 NOTE Discoverable Resources appear in the "/oic/res" Resource, while non-discoverable Resources may appear in  
2686 other collection Resources but do not appear in the /res collection.

2687 **12.2.4 Multiple criteria matching**

2688 If the ACE2 "resources" Property contains multiple entries, then a logical OR shall be applied for  
2689 each array element. For example, if a first array element of the "resources" Property contains  
2690 "href="/a/light" and the second array element of the "resources" Property contains "href="/a/led",  
2691 then Resources that match either of the two "href" criteria shall be included in the set of matched  
2692 Resources.

2693 Example 1 JSON for Resource matching

```
2694 {  
2695 //Matches Resources named "/x/door1" or "/x/door2"  
2696 "resources": [  
2697   {  
2698     "href": "/x/door1"  
2699   },  
2700   {  
2701     "href": "/x/door2"  
2702   },  
2703 ]  
2704 }
```

2705 Example 2 JSON for Resource matching

```
2706 {  
2707 // Matches all Resources  
2708 "resources": [  
2709   {  
2710     "wc": "*"   
2711   }  
2712 ]  
2713 }
```

2714 **12.2.5 Subject matching using wildcards**

2715 When the ACE subject is specified as the wildcard string "\*" any requestor is matched. The OCF  
2716 server may authenticate the OCF client, but is not required to.

2717 Examples: JSON for subject wildcard matching

```
2718 //matches all subjects that have authenticated and confidentiality protections in place.  
2719 "subject" : {  
2720   "conntype" : "auth-crypt"  
2721 }  
2722 //matches all subjects that have NOT authenticated and have NO confidentiality protections in place.  
2723 "subject" : {  
2724   "conntype" : "anon-clear"  
2725 }
```

2726 **12.2.6 Subject matching using roles**

2727 When the ACE subject is specified as a role, a requestor shall be matched if either:

- 2728 1) The requestor authenticated with a symmetric key credential, and the role is present in the  
2729 "roleid" Property of the credential's entry in the "credential" Resource, or

2730 2) The requestor authenticated with a certificate, and a valid role certificate is present in the roles  
2731 Resource with the requestor's certificate's public key at the time of evaluation. Validating role  
2732 certificates is defined in 10.3.1.

## 2733 **12.2.7 ACL evaluation**

### 2734 **12.2.7.1 ACE2 matching algorithm**

2735 The OCF Server shall apply an ACE2 matching algorithm that matches in the following sequence:

- 2736 1) The local "/oc/sec/acl2" Resource contributes its ACE2 entries for matching.
- 2737 2) Access shall be granted when all these criteria are met:
  - 2738 a) The requestor is matched by the ACE2 "subject" Property.
  - 2739 b) The requested Resource is matched by the ACE2 "resources" Property and the requested  
2740 Resource shall exist on the local Server.
  - 2741 c) The "period" Property constraint shall be satisfied.
  - 2742 d) The "permission" Property constraint shall be applied.

2743 If multiple ACE2 entries match the Resource request, the union of permissions, for all matching  
2744 ACEs, defines the effective permission granted. E.g. If Perm1=CR---; Perm2=--UDN; Then UNION  
2745 (Perm1, Perm2)=CRUDN.

2746 The Server shall enforce access based on the effective permissions granted.

2747 Batch requests to Resource containing Links require additional considerations when accessing the  
2748 linked Resources. ACL considerations for batch request to the Atomic Measurement Resource  
2749 Type are provided in clause 12.2.7.2. ACL considerations for batch request to the Collection  
2750 Resource Type are provided in clause 12.2.7.3.

2751 Clause 12.2.7.4 provides ACL considerations when a new Resource is created on a Server in  
2752 response to a CREATE request.

### 2753 **12.2.7.2 ACL considerations for batch request to the Atomic Measurement Resource** 2754 **Type**

2755 The present clause shall apply to any Resource Type based on the Atomic Measurement Resource  
2756 Type.

2757 If an OCF Server receives a batch OCF Interface request to an Atomic Measurement Resource and  
2758 there is an ACE matching the Atomic Measurement Resource which permits the request, then the  
2759 corresponding requests to the linked Resources of the Atomic Measurement Resource shall be  
2760 permitted by the OCF Server. That is, the request to each linked Resource is permitted regardless  
2761 of whether there is an ACE configured on the OCF Server which would permit a corresponding  
2762 request from the OCF Client (which sent the batch OCF Interface request to the Atomic  
2763 Measurement Resource) addressing the linked Resource.

2764 NOTE As specified in ISO/IEC 30118-1, the linked Resources of an Atomic Measurement Resource are hosted on the  
2765 same Device as the Atomic Measurement Resource.

### 2766 **12.2.7.3 ACL considerations for a batch OCF Interface request to a Collection**

2767 This clause addresses the additional authorization processes which take place when a Server  
2768 receives a batch OCF Interface request from a Client to a Collection hosted on that Server,  
2769 assuming there is an ACE matching the Collection which permits the original Client request. For  
2770 the purposes of this clause, the Server hosting this Collection is called the "Collection host". The  
2771 additional authorization process is dependent on whether the linked Resource is hosted on the  
2772 Collection host or the linked Resource is hosted on another Server:

- 2773 – For each generated request to a linked Resource hosted on the Collection host, the Collection  
2774 host shall apply the ACE2 matching algorithm in clause 12.2.7.1 to determine whether the linked  
2775 Resource is permitted to process the generated request, with the following clarifications:
- 2776 – The requestor in clause 12.2.7.1 shall be the Client which sent the original Client request.
  - 2777 – The requested Resource in clause 12.2.7.1 shall be the linked Resource, which shall be  
2778 matched using at least one of:
    - 2779 – a Resource Wildcard matching the linked Resource, or
    - 2780 – an exact match of the local path of the linked Resource with a "href" Property in the  
2781 "resources" array in the ACE2.
    - 2782 – an exact match of the full URI of the linked Resource with a "href" Property in the  
2783 "resources" array in the ACE2.

2784 NOTE The full URI of a linked Resource is obtained by concatenating the "anchor" Property of the Link, if present, and  
2785 the "href" Property of the Link. The local path can then be determined from the full URI.

2786 If the linked Resource is not permitted to process the generated request, then the Collection host  
2787 shall treat such cases as a linked Resource which cannot process the request when composing the  
2788 aggregated response to the original Client Request, as specified for the batch OCF Interface in the  
2789 ISO/IEC 30118-1.

#### 2790 **12.2.7.4 ACL considerations on creation of a new Resource**

2791 When a new Resource is created on a Server in response to a CREATE request, there might be  
2792 no ACEs permitting access to the newly created Resource. The present clause describes how the  
2793 Server autonomously modifies the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource to provide some initial authorizations  
2794 for accessing the newly created Resource. The purpose of this autonomous modification is to avoid  
2795 relying on the AMS update the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource after every new Resource is created.

2796 Subsequent to a Server creating a Collection inside another Collection in response to a CREATE  
2797 request from a Client, and prior to sending a response to the Client:

- 2798 – If there is an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID of the Client, and "permissions" exactly  
2799 matching the CREATE, RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations, then the Server shall  
2800 autonomously add an "href" entry to "resources" with the URI of the newly created Collection.
- 2801 – Otherwise, the Server shall autonomously add an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID  
2802 of the Client, "resources" containing an "href" entry with the URI of the newly created  
2803 Collection, and "permissions" exactly matching the CREATE, RETRIEVE, UPDATE and  
2804 DELETE operations.

2805 Subsequent to a Server creating a non-Collection Resource inside another Collection in response  
2806 to a CREATE request from a Client, and prior to sending a response to the Client:

- 2807 – If there is an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID of the Client, and "permissions" exactly  
2808 matching the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations, then the Server shall  
2809 autonomously add an "href" entry to "resources" with the URI of the newly created Resource.
- 2810 – Otherwise, the Server shall autonomously add an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID  
2811 of the Client, "resources" containing an "href" entry with the URI of the newly created, and  
2812 "permissions" exactly matching the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations.

2813

2814 **13 Security Resources**


2815 **13.1 Security Resources general**

2816 OCF Security Resources are shown in Figure 25.

2817 `"/oic/sec/cred"` Resource and Properties are shown in Figure 26.

2818 `"/oic/sec/acl2"` Resource and Properties are shown in Figure 27.

2819



2820

**Figure 25 – OCF Security Resources**




Figure 26 – "/oic/sec/cred" Resource and Properties

2821

2822





Figure 27 – "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource and Properties

2823



2824 **Figure 28 – "/oic/sec/ael" Resource and Properties**

2825 **13.2 Device Owner Transfer Resource**

2826 **13.2.1 Device Owner Transfer Resource general**

2827 The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource contains the set of supported Device OTMs.

2828 Resource discovery processing respects the CRUDN constraints supplied as part of the security  
 2829 Resource definitions contained in this document.

2830 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource is defined in Table 16.

2831 **Table 16 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/doxm	Device OTMs	oic.r.doxm	oic.if.baselin e, oic.if.rw	Resource for supporting Device owner transfer	Configuration

2832 Table 17 defines the Properties of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource.

2833 **Table 17 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandato ry	Device State	Access Mode	Description
OTM	oxms	oic.sec.doxm type	array	Yes		R	Value identifying the owner-transfer-method and the organization that defined the method.
OTM Selection	oxmsel	oic.sec.doxm type	UINT16	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to (4) "oic.sec.oxm.self"
					RFOTM (no open DOC)	RW	DOTS shall set to its selected DOTS and both parties execute the DOTS. After secure owner transfer session is established DOTS shall update the oxmsel again making it permanent. If the

							DOTS fails the Server shall transition device state to RESET.
					RFOTM (open DOC)	R	n/a
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	R	n/a
Supported Credential Types	supported credential types	oic.sec.credtypes	bitmask	Yes		R	Identifies the types of credentials the Device supports. The Server sets this value at framework initialization after determining security capabilities.  The Device always supports symmetric pair-wise key and asymmetric signing key with certificate (bit positions 0x1 and 0x8 respectively). Other credential types are optional as per clause 9.3
Device Ownership Status	owned	Boolean	T F	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to FALSE.
					RFOTM (no open DOC)	R	FALSE
					RFOTM (open DOC)	RW	DOTS (Device communicating over DOC) shall set to TRUE after secure owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	TRUE
					RFNOP	R	TRUE
					SRESET	R	TRUE
Device UUID	deviceuuid	String	oic.sec.deviceidtype	Yes	RESET	R	No stipulation.
					RFOTM (no open DOC)	R	n/a
					RFOTM (open DOC)	RW	DOTS (Device communicating over DOC) updates to a value it has selected after secure owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	R	n/a
Device Owner Id	deviceowneruid	String	owneruid	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" )
					RFOTM (no open DOC)	R	n/a
					RFOTM (open DOC)	RW	DOTS (Device communicating over DOC) shall set value after secure owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	R	n/a

Resource Owner Id	rowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" )
					RFOTM (no open DOC)	R	n/a
					RFOTM (open DOC)	RW	The DOTS (Device communicating over DOC) shall configure the rowneruuid Property when a successful owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property) should verify and if needed, update the Resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the rowneruuid does not refer to a valid DOTS device identifier the Server shall transition to RESET.

2834 Table 18 defines the Properties of the "oic.sec.didtype".

2835 **Table 18 – Properties of the "oic.sec.didtype" type**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
Device UUID	uuid	String	uuid	Yes	RW	-	A uuid value

2836 The "oxms" Property contains a list of OTM where the entries appear in the order of preference.  
 2837 This Property contains the higher priority methods appearing before the lower priority methods.  
 2838 The DOTS queries this list at the time of onboarding and selects the most appropriate method.

2839 OTMs consist of two parts, a URI identifying the vendor or organization and the specific method.

```

2840 <DoxmType> ::= <NSS>
2841 <NSS> ::= <Identifier> | { {<NID> "." } <NameSpaceQualifier> "." } <Method>
2842 <NID> ::= <Vendor-or-Organization>
2843 <Identifier> ::= INTEGER
2844 <NameSpaceQualifier> ::= String
2845 <Method> ::= String
2846 <Vendor-Organization> ::= String

```

2847 When an OTM successfully completes, the "owned" Property is set to "1" (TRUE). Consequently,  
 2848 subsequent attempts to take ownership of the Device will fail.

2849 There are four device identifiers:

- 2850 1) "deviceuuid" Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource - random DOTS-provisioned value unique  
 2851 for a given security domain, used as a device identity for access control, mapped internally to  
 2852 a device-owned credential.
- 2853 2) "di" Property of "/oic/d" Resource - mirroring the value of "deviceuuid" Property of  
 2854 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource.
- 2855 3) "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Resource - defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1.
- 2856 4) "pi" Property of "/oic/p" Resource - defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1.

2857 The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource supports CoAP multicast requests in certain cases. For details see  
 2858 clause 7.3.1

2859 **13.2.2 OCF defined OTMs**

2860 Table 19 defines the Properties of the "oic.sec.doxmtype".

2861 **Table 19 – Properties of the "oic.sec.doxmtype" type**

Value Type Name	Value Type URN (optional)	Enumeration Value (mandatory)	Description
OCFJustWorks	oic.sec.doxm.jw	0	The just-works method relies on anonymous Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol to allow a DOTS to assert ownership of the new Device. The first DOTS to make the assertion is accepted as the Device owner. The just-works method results in a shared secret that is used to authenticate the Device to the DOTS and likewise authenticates the DOTS to the Device. The Device permits the DOTS to take ownership of the Device, after which a second attempt to take ownership by a different DOTS will fail <sup>a</sup> .
OCFSharedPin	oic.sec.doxm.rdp	1	The new Device randomly generates a PIN that is communicated via an Out Of Band Communication Channel to a DOTS. An in-band Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol establishes that both endpoints possess the PIN. Possession of the PIN by the DOTS signals the new Device that device ownership can be asserted.
OCFMfgCert	oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert	2	The new Device is presumed to have been manufactured with an embedded asymmetric private key that is used to sign a Diffie-Hellman exchange at Device onboarding. The manufacturer certificate should contain Platform hardening information and other security assurances assertions.
OCF Reserved	<Reserved>	3	Reserved
OCFSelf	oic.sec.oxm.self	4	The manufacturer shall set the "/doxm.oxmsel" value to (4). The Server shall reset this value to (4) upon entering RESET.
OCF Reserved	<Reserved>	5~0xFEFF	Reserved for OCF use
Vendor-defined Value Type Name	<Reserved>	0xFF00~0xFFFF	Reserved for vendor-specific OTM use
<p><sup>a</sup> The just-works method is subject to a man-in-the-middle attacker. Precautions should be taken to provide physical security when this method is used.</p>			

2862 **13.3 Credential Resource**

2863 **13.3.1 Credential Resource general**

2864 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource maintains credentials used to authenticate the Server to Clients and  
 2865 support services as well as credentials used to verify Clients and support services.

2866 Multiple credential types are anticipated by the OCF framework, including pair-wise pre-shared  
 2867 keys, asymmetric keys, certificates and others. The credential Resource uses a Subject UUID to  
 2868 distinguish the Clients and support services it recognizes by verifying an authentication challenge.

2869 In order to provide an interface which allows management of the "creds" Array Property, the  
 2870 RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations on the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall behave as  
 2871 follows:

- 2872 1) A RETRIEVE shall return the full Resource representation, except that any write-only Properties  
 2873 shall be omitted (e.g. private key data).
- 2874 2) An UPDATE shall replace or add to the Properties included in the representation sent with the  
 2875 UPDATE request, as follows:

- 2876 a) If an UPDATE representation includes the "creds" array Property, then:
- 2877 i) Supplied "creds" with a "credid" that matches an existing "credid" shall replace
- 2878 completely the corresponding "cred" in the existing "creds" array.
- 2879 ii) Supplied "creds" without a "credid" shall be appended to the existing "creds" array, and
- 2880 a unique (to the "cred" Resource) "credid" shall be created and assigned to the new
- 2881 "cred" by the Server. The "credid" of a deleted "cred" should not be reused, to improve
- 2882 the determinism of the interface and reduce opportunity for race conditions.
- 2883 iii) Supplied "creds" with a "credid" that does not match an existing "credid" shall be
- 2884 appended to the existing "creds" array, using the supplied "credid".
- 2885 iv) The rows in Table 21 corresponding to the "creds" array Property dictate the Device
- 2886 States in which an UPDATE of the "creds" array Property is always rejected. If OCF
- 2887 Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode in this row contains "R", then the
- 2888 OCF Device shall reject all UPDATES of the "creds" array Property.
- 2889 3) A DELETE without query parameters shall set the "creds" array to the empty array, but shall
- 2890 not remove the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.
- 2891 4) A DELETE with one or more "credid" query parameters shall remove the "cred"(s) with the
- 2892 corresponding "credid"(s) from the "creds" array.
- 2893 5) The rows in Table 21 corresponding to the "creds" array Property dictate the Device States in
- 2894 which a DELETE is always rejected. If OCF Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode
- 2895 in this row contains "R", then the OCF Device shall reject all DELETES.
- 2896 NOTE The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource's use of the DELETE operation is not in accordance with the OCF Interfaces defined
- 2897 in ISO/IEC 30118-1.
- 2898 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource is defined in Table 20.

2899 **Table 20 – Definition of the "/oic /sec/cred" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/cred	Credentials	oic.r.cred	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource containing credentials for Device authentication, verification and data protection	Security

2900 Table 21 defines the Properties of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.

**Table 21 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
Credentials	creds	oic.sec.cred	array	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to manufacturer defaults.
					RFOTM	RW	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
					RFPRO	RW	Set by the CMS (referenced via the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/cred" Resource) after successful authentication. Access to NCRs is prohibited.
					RFNOP	R	Access to NCRs is permitted after a matching ACE is found.
					SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource or the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should evaluate the integrity of and may update creds entries when a secure session is established and the Server and DOTS are authenticated.
Resource Owner ID	rowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" )
					RFOTM	RW	The DOTS shall configure the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/cred" Resource when a successful owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource or the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should verify and if needed, update the Resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the "rowneruuid" Property does not refer to a valid DOTS the Server shall transition to RESET.

2902 All secure Device accesses shall have a "/oic/sec/cred" Resource that protects the end-to-end  
2903 interaction.

2904 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall be updateable by the service named in its rowneruuid Property.

2905 ACLs naming "/oic/sec/cred" Resource should further restrict access beyond CRUDN access  
2906 modes.

2907 Table 22 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.creds".

**Table 22 – Properties of the "oic.sec.creds" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Credential ID	credid	UINT16	0 – 64K-1	Yes	RW		Short credential ID for local references from other Resource
Subject UUID	subjectuuid	String	uuid	Yes	RW		A uuid that identifies the subject to which this credential applies or "*" if any identity is acceptable
Role ID	roleid	oic.sec.roletype	-	No	RW		Identifies the role(s) the subject is authorized to assert.
Credential Type	credtype	oic.sec.credtype	bitmask	Yes	RW		Represents this credential's type. 0 – Used for testing 1 – Symmetric pair-wise key 2 – Symmetric group key 4 – Asymmetric signing key 8 – Asymmetric signing key with certificate 16 – PIN or password 32 – Asymmetric encryption key 64 – Directly Provisioned OSCORE Security Context 128 – Simple Secure Multicast Client Context 256 – Simple Secure Multicast Server Context
Credential Usage	credusage	oic.sec.credusage	String	No	RW		Used to resolve undecidability of the credential. Provides indication for how/where the cred is used "oic.sec.cred.trustca": certificate trust anchor "oic.sec.cred.cert": identity certificate "oic.sec.cred.rolecert": role certificate "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca": manufacturer certificate trust anchor "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert": manufacturer certificate
Public Data	publicdata	oic.sec.pubdatatype	-	No	RW		Credential Type dependent. Public credential information 1:2: ticket, public SKDC values 4, 32: Public key value 8: A chain of one or more certificate
Private Data	privatedata	oic.sec.privdatatype	-	No	-	RESET	Server shall set to manufacturer default
					RW	RFOTM	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
					W	RFPRO	Set by authenticated DOTS or CMS
					-	RFNOP	Not writable during normal operation.
					W	SRESET	DOTS may modify to enable transition to RFPRO.
Optional Data	optionaldata	oic.sec.optdatatype	-	No	RW		Credential Type dependent. Credential revocation status information 1, 2, 4, 32, 64: revocation status information 8: Revocation information

Period	period	String	-	No	RW		Period as defined by IETF RFC 5545. The credential should not be used if the current time is outside the Period window.
Credential Refresh Method	crms	oic.sec.crmtype	array	No	RW		Credentials with a Period Property are refreshed using the credential refresh method (crm) according to the type definitions for "oic.sec.crm".
OSCORE Configuration	oscore	oic.sec.oscoretype		No	RW		Contains parameters for use with credentials intended for use with OSCORE. See type definition for "oic.sec.oscoretype"

2909 Table 23 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.credusagetype".

2910 **Table 23: Properties of the "oic.sec.credusagetype" Property**

Value Type Name	Value Type URN (mandatory)
Trust Anchor	oic.sec.cred.trustca
Certificate	oic.sec.cred.cert
Role Certificate	oic.sec.cred.rolecert
Manufacturer Trust CA	oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca
Manufacturer CA	oic.sec.cred.mfgcert

2911 Table 24 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.pubdatatype".

2912 **Table 24 – Properties of the "oic.sec.pubdatatype" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Encoding format	encoding	String	N/A	RW	No	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the pubdata "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded certificate or chain
Data	data	String	N/A	RW	No	The encoded value

2913 Table 25 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.privdatatype".

2914 **Table 25 – Properties of the "oic.sec.privdatatype" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Encoding format	encoding	String	N/A	RW	Yes	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the privdata "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded private key "oic.sec.encoding.base64" – Encoding of Base64 encoded PSK "oic.sec.encoding.handle" – Data is contained in a storage sub-system referenced using a handle "oic.sec.encoding.raw" – Raw hex encoded data
Data	data	String	N/A	W	No	The encoded value This value shall not be RETRIEVE-able.
Handle	handle	UINT16	N/A	RW	No	Handle to a key storage Resource

2915 Table 26 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.optdatatype".

2916

**Table 26 – Properties of the "oic.sec.optdatatype" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Revocation status	revstat	Boolean	T   F	RW	Yes	Revocation status flag True – revoked False – not revoked
Encoding format	encoding	String	N/A	RW	No	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the optdata "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded certificate or chain
Data	data	String	N/A	RW	No	The encoded structure

2917 Table 27 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.roletype".

2918

**Table 27 – Definition of the "oic.sec.roletype" type.**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Authority	authority	String	N/A	R	No	A name for the authority that defined the role. If not present, the credential issuer defined the role. If present, is expressible as an ASN.1 PrintableString.
Role	role	String	N/A -	R	Yes	An identifier for the role. Is expressible as an ASN.1 PrintableString.

2919 Table 28 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.oscoretype".

2920

**Table 28 – Definition of the "oic.sec.oscoretype" type.**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
OSCORE Sender ID	senderid	String	Hexadecimal encoding	RW	No	OSCORE Sender ID for this OSCORE Security Context.
OSCORE Recipient ID	recipientid	String		RW	No	OSCORE Recipient ID for this OSCORE Security Context.
OSCORE Sender Sequence Number 1	ssn	Integer		R	No	OSCORE Sender Sequence Number being stored in non volatile memory to handle the loss of mutable security context parameters. See clause 16.2.4.
OSCORE Security Context Description	desc	String		RW	No	Description of the usage of this OSCOE Security Context.

2921 **13.3.2 Properties of the Credential Resource**2922 **13.3.2.1 Credential ID**

2923 Credential ID ("credid") is a local reference to an entry in a "creds" Property array of the  
 2924 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. The SRM generates it. The "credid" Property shall be used to  
 2925 disambiguate array elements of the "creds" Property.

#### 2926 **13.3.2.2 Subject UUID**

2927 The "subjectuuid" Property identifies the Device to which an entry in a "creds" Property array of the  
2928 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall be used to establish a secure session, verify an authentication  
2929 challenge-response or to authenticate an authentication challenge.

2930 A "subjectuuid" Property that matches the Server's own "deviceuuid" Property, distinguishes the  
2931 array entries in the "creds" Property that pertain to this Device.

2932 The "subjectuuid" Property shall be used to identify a group to which a group key is used to protect  
2933 shared data.

2934 When certificate chain is used during secure connection establishment, the "subjectuuid" Property  
2935 shall also be used to verify the identity of the responder. The presented certificate chain shall be  
2936 accepted, if there is a matching Credential entry on the Device that satisfies all of the following:

- 2937 – Public Data of the entry contains trust anchor (root) of the presented chain.
- 2938 – Subject UUID of the entry matches UUID in the Common Name field of the End-Entity certificate  
2939 in the presented chain. If Subject UUID of the entry is set as a wildcard "\*", this condition is  
2940 automatically satisfied.
- 2941 – Credential Usage of the entry is "oic.sec.cred.trustca".

#### 2942 **13.3.2.3 Role ID**

2943 The "roleid" Property identifies a role that has been granted to the credential.

#### 2944 **13.3.2.4 Credential type**

2945 The "credtype" Property is used to interpret several of the other Property values whose contents  
2946 can differ depending on credential type. These Properties include "publicdata", "privatedata" and  
2947 "optionaldata". The "credtype" Property value of "0" ("no security mode") is reserved for testing and  
2948 debugging circumstances. Production deployments shall not allow provisioning of credentials of  
2949 type "0". The SRM should introduce checking code that prevents its use in production deployments.

#### 2950 **13.3.2.5 Public data**

2951 The "publicdata" Property contains information that provides additional context surrounding the  
2952 issuance of the credential. For example, it might contain information included in a certificate or  
2953 response data from a CMS. It might contain wrapped data.

#### 2954 **13.3.2.6 Private data**

2955 The "privatedata" Property contains secret information that is used to authenticate a Device, protect  
2956 data or verify an authentication challenge-response.

2957 The "privatedata" Property shall not be disclosed outside of the SRM's trusted computing perimeter.  
2958 A secure element (SE) or trusted execution environment (TEE) should be used to implement the  
2959 SRM's trusted computing perimeter. The privatedata contents may be referenced using a handle;  
2960 for example, if used with a secure storage sub-system.

#### 2961 **13.3.2.7 Optional data**

2962 The "optionaldata" Property contains information that is optionally supplied, but facilitates key  
2963 management, scalability or performance optimization.

#### 2964 **13.3.2.8 Period**

2965 The "period" Property identifies the validity period for the credential. If no validity period is specified,  
2966 the credential lifetime is undetermined. Constrained devices that do not implement a date-time  
2967 capability shall obtain current date-time information from its CMS.

2968 **13.3.2.9 Credential Refresh Method type definition [Deprecated]**

2969 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2970 **13.3.2.10 Credential usage**

2971 Credential Usage indicates to the Device the circumstances in which a credential should be used.  
2972 Five values are defined:

- 2973 – "oic.sec.cred.trustca": This certificate is a trust anchor for the purposes of certificate chain  
2974 validation, as defined in 10.4. OCF Server SHALL remove any "/oic/sec/cred" entries with an  
2975 "oic.sec.cred.trustca" credusage upon transitioning to RFOTM. OCF Servers SHALL use  
2976 "/oic/sec/cred" entries that have an "oic.sec.cred.trustca" Value of "credusage" Property only  
2977 as trust anchors for post-onboarding (D)TLS session establishment in RFNOP; these entries  
2978 are not to be used for onboarding (D)TLS sessions.
- 2979 – "oic.sec.cred.cert": This "credusage" is used for certificates for which the Device possesses the  
2980 private key and uses it for identity authentication in a secure session, as defined in clause 10.4.
- 2981 – "oic.sec.cred.rolecert": This "credusage" is used for certificates for which the Device possesses  
2982 the private key and uses to assert one or more roles, as defined in clause 10.4.2.
- 2983 – "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca": This certificate is a trust anchor for the purposes of the Manufacturer  
2984 Certificate Based OTM as defined in clause 7.3.6. OCF Servers SHALL use "/oic/sec/cred"  
2985 entries that have an "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca" Value of "credusage" Property only as trust  
2986 anchors for onboarding (D)TLS session establishment; these entries are not to be used for post-  
2987 onboarding (D)TLS sessions.
- 2988 – "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert": This certificate is used for certificates for which the Device possesses  
2989 the private key and uses it for authentication in the Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM as  
2990 defined in clause 7.3.6.

2991 **13.3.2.11 Resource Owner**

2992 The Resource Owner Property allows credential provisioning to occur soon after Device onboarding  
2993 before access to support services has been established. It identifies the entity authorized to  
2994 manage the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource in response to Device recovery situations.

2995 **13.3.3 Key formatting**

2996 **13.3.3.1 Symmetric key formatting**

2997 Symmetric keys shall have the format described in Table 29 and Table 30.

2998 **Table 29 – 128-bit symmetric key**

Name	Value	Type	Description
Length	16	OCTET	Specifies the number of 8-bit octets following Length
Key	opaque	OCTET Array	16-byte array of octets. When used as input to a PSK function Length is omitted.

2999

3000 **Table 30 – 256-bit symmetric key**

Name	Value	Type	Description
Length	32	OCTET	Specifies the number of 8-bit octets following Length
Key	opaque	OCTET Array	32-byte array of octets. When used as input to a PSK function Length is omitted.

3001 **13.3.3.2 Asymmetric keys**

3002 Asymmetric key formatting is not available in this revision of the document.

3003 **13.3.3.3 Asymmetric keys with certificate**  
 3004 Key formatting is defined by certificate definition.  
 3005 **13.3.3.4 Passwords**  
 3006 Password formatting is not available in this revision of the document.

3007 **13.3.4 Credential Refresh Method details [Deprecated]**  
 3008 This clause is intentionally left blank.

3009 **13.4 Certificate Revocation List**

3010 **13.4.1 CRL Resource definition [Deprecated]**  
 3011 This clause is intentionally left blank.

3012 **13.5 ACL Resources**

3013 **13.5.1 ACL Resources general**

3014 All Resource hosted by a Server are required to match an ACL policy. ACL policies can be  
 3015 expressed using "/oic/sec/acl2". The subject (e.g. "deviceuuid" of the Client) requesting access to  
 3016 a Resource shall be authenticated prior to applying the ACL check. Resources that are available  
 3017 to multiple Clients can be matched using a wildcard subject. All Resources accessible via the  
 3018 unsecured communication endpoint shall be matched using a wildcard subject.

3019 **13.5.2 OCF Access Control List (ACL) BNF defines ACL structures.**

3020 ACL structure in Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation is defined in Table 31:

3021 **Table 31 – BNF definition of OCF ACL**

<ACL>	<ACE> {<ACE>}
<ACE>	<SubjectId> <ResourceRef> <Permission> {<Validity>}
<SubjectId>	<DeviceId>   <Wildcard>   <RoleId>
<DeviceId>	<UUID>
<RoleId>	<Character>   <RoleName><Character>
<RoleName>	" "   <Authority><Character>
<Authority>	<UUID>
<ResourceRef>	' (' <OIC_LINK> {',' {OIC_LINK}} ')'
<Permission>	('C'   '-') ('R'   '-') ('U'   '-') ('D'   '-') ('N'   '-')
<Validity>	<Period> {<Recurrence>}
<Wildcard>	'*'
<URI>	IETF RFC 3986
<UUID>	IETF RFC 4122
<Period>	IETF RFC 5545 Period
<Recurrence>	IETF RFC 5545 Recurrence
<OIC_LINK>	ISO/IEC 30118-1 defined in JSON Schema
<Character>	<Any UTF8 printable character, excluding NUL>

3022 The <DeviceId> token means the requestor must possess a credential that uses <UUID> as its  
 3023 identity in order to match the requestor to the <ACE> policy.

3024 The <RoleId> token means the requestor must possess a role credential with <Character> as its  
 3025 role in order to match the requestor to the <ACE> policy.

3026 The <Wildcard> token "\*" means any requestor is matched to the <ACE> policy, with or without  
3027 authentication.

3028 When a <SubjectId> is matched to an <ACE> policy the <ResourceRef> is used to match the <ACE>  
3029 policy to Resources.

3030 The <OIC\_LINK> token contains values used to query existence of hosted Resources.

3031 The <Permission> token specifies the privilege granted by the <ACE> policy given the <SubjectId>  
3032 and <ResourceRef> matching does not produce the empty set match.

3033 Permissions are defined in terms of CREATE ("C"), RETRIEVE ("R"), UPDATE ("U"), DELETE ("D"),  
3034 NOTIFY ("N") and NIL ("-"). NIL is substituted for a permissions character that signifies the  
3035 respective permission is not granted.

3036 The empty set match result defaults to a condition where no access rights are granted.

3037 If the <Validity> token exists, the <Permission> granted is constrained to the time <Period>.  
3038 <Validity> may further be segmented into a <Recurrence> pattern where access may alternatively  
3039 be granted and rescinded according to the pattern.

### 3040 **13.5.3 ACL Resource**

3041 An "acl2" is a list of type "ace2".

3042 In order to provide an interface which allows management of array elements of the "aclist2"  
3043 Property associated with a "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE  
3044 operations on the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource SHALL behave as follows:

- 3045 1) A RETRIEVE shall return the full Resource representation.
- 3046 2) An UPDATE shall replace or add to the Properties included in the representation sent with the  
3047 UPDATE request, as follows:
  - 3048 a) If an UPDATE representation includes the "aclist2" array Property, then:
    - 3049 i) Supplied ACEs with an "aceid" that matches an existing "aceid" shall replace completely  
3050 the corresponding ACE in the existing "aclist2" array.
    - 3051 ii) Supplied ACEs without an "aceid" shall be appended to the existing "aclist2" array, and  
3052 a unique (to the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource) "aceid" shall be created and assigned to the  
3053 new ACE by the Server. The "aceid" of a deleted ACE should not be reused, to improve  
3054 the determinism of the interface and reduce opportunity for race conditions.
    - 3055 iii) Supplied ACEs with an "aceid" that does not match an existing "aceid" shall be  
3056 appended to the existing "aclist2" array, using the supplied "aceid".
    - 3057 iv) The rows in Table 34 corresponding to the "aclist2" array Property dictate the Device  
3058 States in which an UPDATE of the "aclist2" array Property is always rejected. If OCF  
3059 Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode in this row contains "R", then the  
3060 OCF Device shall reject all UPDATES of the "aclist2" array Property.
- 3061 3) A DELETE without query parameters shall set the "aclist2" array to the empty array, but shall  
3062 not remove the "oic/sec/ace2" Resource.
- 3063 4) A DELETE with one or more "aceid" query parameters shall remove the ACE(s) with the  
3064 corresponding "aceid"(s) from the "aclist2" array.
- 3065 5) The rows in Table 34 corresponding to the "aclist2" array Property dictate the Device States in  
3066 which a DELETE is always rejected. If OCF Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode  
3067 in this row contains "R", then the OCF Device shall reject all DELETES.

3068 NOTE The "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource's use of the DELETE operation is not in accordance with the OCF Interfaces  
3069 defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1.

3070 Evaluation of local ACL Resource completes when all ACL Resource have been queried and no  
 3071 entry can be found for the requested Resource for the requestor – e.g. "/oic/sec/acl2" does not  
 3072 match the subject and the requested Resource.

3073 Table 32 defines the values of "oic.sec.crudntype".

3074 **Table 32 – Value definition of the "oic.sec.crudntype" Property**

Value	Access Policy	Description	RemarksNotes
bx0000,0000 (0)	No permissions	No permissions	N/A
bx0000,0001 (1)	C	CREATE	N/A
bx0000,0010 (2)	R	RETREIVE, OBSERVE, DISCOVER	The "R" permission bit covers both the Read permission and the Observe permission.
bx0000,0100 (4)	U	WRITE, UPDATE	N/A
bx0000,1000 (8)	D	DELETE	N/A
bx0001,0000 (16)	N	NOTIFY	The "N" permission bit is ignored in OCF 1.0, since "R" covers the Observe permission. It is documented for future versions

3075 "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource is defined in Table 20.

3076 **Table 33 – Definition of the "oic/sec/acl2" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/acl2	ACL2	oic.r.acl2	oic.if.baseli ne, oic.if.rw	Resource for managing access	Security

3077 Table 34 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.acl2".

**Table 34 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource**

Property Name	Value Type	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
aclist2	array of oic.sec.ace2	Yes	N/A		The aclist2 Property is an array of ACE records of type "oic.sec.ace2". The Server uses this list to apply access control to its local Resources.
N/A	N/A	N/A	RESET	R	Server shall set to manufacturer defaults.
			RFOTM	RW	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
			RFPRO	RW	The AMS (referenced via rowneruuid property) shall update the aclist entries after mutually authenticated secure session is established. Access to NCRs is prohibited.
			RFNOP	R	Access to NCRs is permitted after a matching ACE2 is found.
			SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm Resource") should evaluate the integrity of and may update aclist entries when a secure session is established and the Server and DOTS are authenticated.
rowneruuid	uuid	Yes	N/A		The Resource owner Property (rowneruuid) is used by the Server to reference a service provider trusted by the Server. Server shall verify the service provider is authorized to perform the requested action
			RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" )
			RFOTM	RW	The DOTS should configure the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource when a successful owner transfer session is established.
			RFPRO	R	n/a
			RFNOP	R	n/a
			SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property or rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should verify and if needed, update the Resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the rowneruuid Property does not refer to a valid DOTS the Server shall transition to RESET.

3079

3080 Table 35 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.ace2".

3081

**Table 35 – "oic.sec.ace2" data type definition.**

Property Name	Value Type	Mandatory	Description
subject	oic.sec.roletype, oic.sec.didtype, oic.sec.conntype	Yes	The Client is the subject of the ACE when the roles, Device UUID, or connection type matches.
resources	array of oic.sec.ace2.resource -ref	Yes	The application's Resources to which a security policy applies
permission	oic.sec.crudntype.bitmask	Yes	Bitmask encoding of CRUDN permission
validity	array of oic.sec.time-pattern	No	An array of a tuple of period and recurrence. Each item in this array contains a string representing a period using the IETF RFC 5545 Period, and a string array representing a recurrence rule using the IETF RFC 5545 Recurrence.
aceid	integer	Yes	An aceid is unique with respect to the array entries in the aclist2 Property.

3082 Table 36 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref".

3083

**Table 36 – "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref" data type definition.**

Property Name	Value Type	Mandatory	Description
href	uri	No	A URI referring to a Resource to which the containing ACE applies
wc	string	No	Refer to Table 15.

3084 Table 37 defines the values of "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref".

3085

**Table 37 – Value definition "oic.sec.conntype" Property**

Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Description
conntype	string	enum [ "auth-crypt", "anon-clear" ]	This Property allows an ACE to be matched based on the connection or message protection type
		auth-crypt	ACE applies if the Client is authenticated and the data channel or message is encrypted and integrity protected
		anon-clear	ACE applies if the Client is not authenticated and the data channel or message is not encrypted but may be integrity protected

3086 Local ACL Resources supply policy to a Resource access enforcement point within an OCF stack  
 3087 instance. The OCF framework gates Client access to Server Resources. It evaluates the subject's  
 3088 request using policies contained in ACL Resources.

3089 Resources named in the ACL policy can be fully qualified or partially qualified. Fully qualified  
 3090 Resource references include the device identifier in the href Property that identifies the remote  
 3091 Resource Server that hosts the Resource. Partially qualified references mean that the local  
 3092 Resource Server hosts the Resource. If a fully qualified Resource reference is given, the  
 3093 Intermediary enforcing access shall have a secure channel to the Resource Server and the  
 3094 Resource Server shall verify the Intermediary is authorized to act on its behalf as a Resource  
 3095 access enforcement point.

3096 Resource Servers should include references to Device and ACL Resources where access  
3097 enforcement is to be applied. However, access enforcement logic shall not depend on these  
3098 references for access control processing as access to Server Resources will have already been  
3099 granted.

3100 Local ACL Resources identify a Resource Owner service that is authorized to instantiate and modify  
3101 this Resource. This prevents non-terminating dependency on some other ACL Resource.  
3102 Nevertheless, it should be desirable to grant access rights to ACL Resources using an ACL  
3103 Resource.

3104 An ACE2 entry is considered "currently valid" if the validity period of the ACE2 entry includes the  
3105 time of the request. The validity period in the ACE2 may be a recurring time period (e.g., daily from  
3106 1:00-2:00). Matching the Resource(s) specified in a request to the "resource" Property of the ACE2  
3107 is defined in clause 12.2. For example, one way they can match is if the Resource URI in the  
3108 request exactly matches one of the Resource references in the ACE2 entries.

3109 A request will match an ACE2 if any of the following are true:

3110 1) The ACE2 "subject" Property is of type "oic.sec.didtype" has a UUID value that matches the  
3111 "deviceuuid" Property associated with the secure session;

3112 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the "resources" Property of the ACE2  
3113 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

3114 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

3115 2) The ACE2 "subject" Property is of type "oic.sec.conntype" and has the wildcard value that  
3116 matches the currently established connection type;

3117 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the "resources" Property of the ACE2  
3118 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

3119 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

3120 3) When Client authentication uses a certificate credential;

3121 AND one of the "roleid" values contained in the role certificate matches the "roleid" Property of  
3122 the ACE2 "oic.sec.roletype";

3123 AND the role certificate public key matches the public key of the certificate used to establish  
3124 the current secure session;

3125 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the array elements of the "resources"  
3126 Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

3127 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

3128 4) When Client authentication uses a certificate credential;

3129 AND the CoAP payload query string of the request specifies a role, which is member of the set  
3130 of roles contained in the role certificate;

3131 AND the roleid values contained in the role certificate matches the "roleid" Property of the ACE2  
3132 "oic.sec.roletype";

3133 AND the role certificate public key matches the public key of the certificate used to establish  
3134 the current secure session;

3135 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the "resources" Property of the ACE2  
3136 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

3137 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

3138 5) When Client authentication uses a symmetric key credential;

3139 AND one of the "roleid" values associated with the symmetric key credential used in the secure  
3140 session, matches the "roleid" Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.roletype";

3141 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the array elements of the "resources"  
3142 Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

3143 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

3144 6) When Client authentication uses a symmetric key credential;

3145 AND the CoAP payload query string of the request specifies a role, which is contained in the  
3146 "oic.r.cred.creds.roleid" Property of the current secure session;

3147 AND CoAP payload query string of the request specifies a role that matches the "roleid"  
3148 Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.roletype";

3149 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the array elements of the "resources"  
3150 Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

3151 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

3152 A request is granted if ANY of the 'matching' ACE2 entries contain the permission to allow the  
3153 request. Otherwise, the request is denied.

3154 There is no way for an ACE2 entry to explicitly deny permission to a Resource. Therefore, if one  
3155 Device with a given role should have slightly different permissions than another Device with the  
3156 same role, they must be provisioned with different roles.

3157 The Server is required to verify that any hosted Resource has authorized access by the Client  
3158 requesting access. The "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource is co-located on the Resource host so that the  
3159 Resource request processing should be applied securely and efficiently. See Annex A for an  
3160 example.

### 3161 **13.6 Access Manager ACL Resource [Deprecated]**

3162 This clause is intentionally left blank.

### 3163 **13.7 Signed ACL Resource [Deprecated]**

3164 This clause is intentionally left blank.

### 3165 **13.8 Provisioning Status Resource**

3166 The "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource maintains the Device provisioning status. Device provisioning should  
3167 be Client-directed or Server-directed. Client-directed provisioning relies on a Client device to  
3168 determine what, how and when Server Resources should be instantiated and updated. Server-  
3169 directed provisioning relies on the Server to seek provisioning when conditions dictate. Furthermore,  
3170 the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource should be provisioned at ownership transfer with credentials  
3171 necessary to open a secure connection with appropriate support service.

3172 "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is defined in Table 38.

3173 **Table 38 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/pstat	Provisioning Status	oic.r.pstat	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource for managing Device provisioning status	Configuration

3174 Table 39 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/pstat".

**Table 39 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Device Onboarding State	dos	oic.sec.dostype	N/A	Yes	RW		Device Onboarding State
Is Device Operational	isop	Boolean	T F	Yes	R	RESET	Server shall set to FALSE
					R	RFOTM	Server shall set to FALSE
					R	RFPRO	Server shall set to FALSE
					R	RFNOP	Server shall set to TRUE
					R	SRESET	Server shall set to FALSE
Current Mode	cm	oic.sec.dpmttype	bitmask	Yes	R		Current Mode
Target Mode	tm	oic.sec.dpmttype	bitmask	Yes	RW		Target Mode
Operational Mode	om	oic.sec.pomttype	bitmask	Yes	R	RESET	Server shall set to manufacturer default.
					RW	RFOTM	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
					RW	RFPRO	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	RFNOP	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	SRESET	Set by DOTS.
Supported Mode	sm	oic.sec.pomttype	bitmask	Yes	R	All states	Supported provisioning services operation modes
Device UUID	deviceuuid	String	uuid	Yes	RW	All states	[DEPRECATED] A uuid that identifies the Device to which the status applies
Resource Owner ID	rowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	R	RESET	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" )
					RW	RFOTM	The DOTS should configure the rowneruuid Property when a successful owner transfer session is established.
					R	RFPRO	n/a
					R	RFNOP	n/a
					RW	SRESET	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should verify and if needed, update the Resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the rowneruuid does not refer to a valid DOTS the Server shall transition to RESET.

**Table 40 – Properties of the ".oic.sec.dostype" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandator y	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Device Onboarding State	s	UINT16	enum (0=RESET, 1=RFOTM, 2=RFPRO, 3=RFNOP, 4=SRESET	Y	R	RESET	The Device is in a hard reset state.
					RW	RFOTM	Set by DOTS after successful OTM to RFPRO.
					RW	RFPRO	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	RFNOP	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	SRESET	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
Pending state	p	Boolean	T   F	Y	R	All States	FALSE (0) – "s" state changes are complete. Since Device is not able to respond when the value is TRUE, other values of this property are DEPRECATED.

3179 In all Device states:

- 3180 – The Device permits an authenticated and authorised Client to change the Device state of a
- 3181 Device by updating the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource to
- 3182 the desired value. The allowed Device state transitions are defined in Figure 22.
- 3183 – Prior to updating the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource, the
- 3184 Client configures the Device to meet entry conditions for the new Device state. The SVR
- 3185 definitions define the entity (Client or Server) expected to perform the specific SVR
- 3186 configuration change to meet the entry conditions. Once the Client has configured the aspects
- 3187 for which the Client is responsible, it can update the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the
- 3188 "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource. The Server then makes any changes for which the Server is
- 3189 responsible, including updating required SVR values, and set the "s" Property of the "dos"
- 3190 Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource to the new value.

3191 When Device state is RESET:

- 3192 – All SVR content is removed and reset to manufacturer default values.
- 3193 – The default manufacturer Device state is RESET.
- 3194 – NCRs are reset to manufacturer default values.
- 3195 – NCRs shall not be accessible.
- 3196 – After successfully processing RESET the SRM transitions to RFOTM by setting the "s" Property
- 3197 of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource to 1 (RFOTM).

3198 When Device state is RFOTM:

- 3199 – NCRs shall not be accessible.
- 3200 – Before OTM is successful, the the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat"
- 3201 Resource is read-only by unauthenticated requestors
- 3202 – After the OTM is successful, the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat"
- 3203 Resource is read-write by authorized requestors.
- 3204 – The negotiated Device OC is used to create an authenticated session over which the DOTS
- 3205 directs the Device state to transition to RFPRO.

- 3206 – If an authenticated session cannot be established the ownership transfer session should be  
3207 disconnected and SRM sets back the Device state to RESET.
- 3208 – Ownership transfer session, especially Random PIN OTM, should not exceed 60 seconds. If  
3209 the SRM asserts the OTM failed, the ownership transfer session should be disconnected, and  
3210 the Device should transition to RESET ("/pstat.dos.s"=0 (RESET)).
- 3211 – The DOTS UPDATES the "devowneruuid" Property in the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to a non-  
3212 nil UUID value. The DOTS (or other authorized client) can update it multiple times while in  
3213 RFOTM. It is not updatable while in other device states except when the Device state returns  
3214 to RFOTM through RESET.
- 3215 – The DOTS can have additional provisioning tasks to perform while in RFOTM. When done, the  
3216 DOTS UPDATES the "owned" Property in the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to "true".
- 3217 – After successful OTM, the DOTS triggers the transition to RFPRO and the "s" Property of the  
3218 "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is set to 2 (RFPRO).
- 3219 When Device state is RFPRO:
- 3220 – The "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is read-only by  
3221 unauthorized requestors and read-write by authorized requestors.
- 3222 – NCRs shall not be accessible, except for Easy Setup Resources, if supported.
- 3223 – An authorized Client may provision SVRs as needed for normal functioning in RFNOP.
- 3224 – An authorized Client may perform consistency checks on SVRs to determine which shall be re-  
3225 provisioned.
- 3226 – Failure to successfully provision SVRs may trigger a state change to RESET. For example, if  
3227 the Device has already transitioned from SRESET but consistency checks continue to fail.
- 3228 – The authorized Client sets the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource  
3229 to 3 (RFNOP).
- 3230 When Device state is RFNOP:
- 3231 – The "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is read-only by  
3232 unauthorized requestors and read-write by authorized requestors.
- 3233 – NCRs, SVRs and core Resources are accessible following normal access processing.
- 3234 – When additional provisioning is necessary, the Device may be transitioned to RFPRO by an  
3235 authorized Client. Only the Device owner should transition to SRESET or RESET.
- 3236 When Device state is SRESET:
- 3237 – NCRs shall not be accessible. The integrity of NCRs may be suspect but the SRM doesn't  
3238 attempt to access or reference them.
- 3239 – SVR integrity is not guaranteed, but access to some SVR Properties is necessary. These  
3240 include "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource,  
3241 "creds":[{"subjectuuid":<devowneruuid>},...] Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource and  
3242 "pstat.dos.s" "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource.
- 3243 – The certificates that identify and authorize the Device owner are sufficient to re-create  
3244 minimalist "/oic/sec/cred" and "/oic/sec/doxm" Resources enabling Device owner control of  
3245 SRESET. If the SRM can't establish these Resources, then it will transition to RESET.
- 3246 – An authorized Client performs SVR consistency checks. The authorized Client can provision  
3247 SVRs as needed to ensure they are available for continued provisioning in RFPRO or for normal  
3248 functioning in RFNOP.
- 3249 – The authorized Device owner can avoid entering RESET and RFOTM by UPDATING  
3250 "pstat.dos.s" with RFPRO or RFNOP values.

3251 – ACLs on SVR are presumed to be invalid. Access authorization is granted according to Device  
 3252 owner privileges only.

3253 – The SRM asserts a Client-directed operational mode (e.g. "/pstat.om"=4).

3254 The provisioning mode type is a 16-bit mask enumerating the various Device provisioning modes.  
 3255 "{ProvisioningMode}" should be used in this document to refer to an instance of a provisioning  
 3256 mode without selecting any particular value.

3257 "oic.sec.dpmttype" is defined in Table 41.

3258 **Table 41 – Definition of the "oic.sec.dpmttype" Property**

Type Name	Type URN	Description
Device Provisioning Mode	oic.sec.dpmttype	Device provisioning mode is a 16-bit bitmask describing various provisioning modes

3259 Table 42 and Table 43 define the values of "oic.sec.dpmttype".

3260 **Table 42 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.dpmttype" Property (Low-Byte)**

Value	Device Mode	Description
bx0000,0001 (1)	Deprecated	
bx0000,0010 (2)	Deprecated	
bx0000,0100 (4)	Deprecated	
bx0000,1000 (8)	Deprecated	
bx0001,0000 (16)	Deprecated	
bx0010,0000 (32)	Deprecated	
bx0100,0000 (64)	Initiate Software Version Validation	Software version validation requested/pending (1) Software version validation complete (0) Requires software download to verify integrity of software package
bx1000,0000 (128)	Initiate Secure Software Update	Secure software update requested/pending (1) Secure software update complete (0)

3261 **Table 43 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.dpmttype" Property (High-Byte)**

Value	Device Mode	Description
bx0000,0001 (1)	Initiate Software Availability Check	Checks if new software is available on remote endpoint. Does not require to download software. Methods used are out of bound.
Bits 2-8	<Reserved>	Reserved for later use

3262 The provisioning operation mode type is an 8-bit mask enumerating the various provisioning  
 3263 operation modes.

3264 "oic.sec.pomtype" is defined in Table 44.

3265 **Table 44 – Definition of the "oic.sec.pomtype" Property**

Type Name	Type URN	Description
Device Provisioning OperationMode	oic.sec.pomtype	Device provisioning operation mode is a 8-bit bitmask describing various provisioning operation modes

3266 Table 45 defines the values of "oic.sec.pomtype".

**Table 45 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.pomtype" Property**

Value	Operation Mode	Description
bx0000,0001 (1)	Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services	Deprecated
bx0000,0010 (2)	Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service	Deprecated
bx0000,0100 (4)	Client-directed provisioning	Device supports provisioning service control of this Device's provisioning operations. This bit is always TRUE.
bx0000,1000(8) – bx1000,0000(128)	<Reserved>	Reserved for later use
bx1111,11xx	<Reserved>	Reserved for later use

### 3268 13.9 Certificate Signing Request Resource

3269 The "/oic/sec/csr" Resource is used by a Device to provide its desired identity, public key to be  
 3270 certified, and a proof of possession of the corresponding private key in the form of a IETF RFC  
 3271 2986 PKCS#10 Certification Request. If the Device supports certificates (i.e. the "sct" Property of  
 3272 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource has a 1 in the 0x8 bit position), the Device shall have a "/oic/sec/csr"  
 3273 Resource.

3274 "/oic/sec/csr" Resource is defined in Table 46.

3275

**Table 46 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/csr" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/csr	Certificate Signing Request	oic.r.csr	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	The CSR Resource contains a Certificate Signing Request for the Device's public key.	Configuration

3276 Table 47 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/csr".

3277

**Table 47 – Properties of the "oic.r.csr" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Certificate Signing Request	csr	String	R	Yes	Contains the signed CSR encoded according to the encoding Property
Encoding	encoding	String	R	Yes	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the csr Property "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded certificate signing request

3278 The Device chooses which public key to use, and may optionally generate a new key pair for this  
 3279 purpose.

3280 In the CSR, the Common Name component of the Subject Name shall contain a string of the format  
 3281 "uuid:X" where X is the Device's requested UUID in the format defined by IETF RFC 4122. The  
 3282 Common Name, and other components of the Subject Name, may contain other data. If the Device  
 3283 chooses to include additional information in the Common Name component, it shall delimit it from  
 3284 the UUID field by white space, a comma, or a semicolon.

3285 If the Device does not have a pre-provisioned key pair to use, but is capable and willing to generate  
 3286 a new key pair, the Device may begin generation of a key pair as a result of a RETRIEVE of this  
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3287 Resource. If the Device cannot immediately respond to the RETRIEVE request due to time required  
3288 to generate a key pair, the Device shall return an "operation pending" error. This indicates to the  
3289 Client that the Device is not yet ready to respond, but will be able at a later time. The Client should  
3290 retry the request after a short delay.

### 3291 **13.10 Roles Resource**

3292 The "roles" Resource maintains roles that have been asserted with role certificates, as described  
3293 in clause 10.4.2. Asserted roles have an associated public key, i.e., the public key in the role  
3294 certificate. Servers shall only grant access to the roles information associated with the public key  
3295 of the Client. The roles Resource should be viewed as an extension of the (D)TLS session state.  
3296 See 10.4.2 for how role certificates are validated.

3297 The roles Resource shall be created by the Server upon establishment of a secure (D)TLS session  
3298 with a Client, if is not already created. The roles Resource shall only expose a secured OCF  
3299 Endpoint in the "/oic/res" response. A Server shall retain the roles Resource at least as long as the  
3300 (D)TLS session exists. A Server shall retain each certificate in the roles Resource at least until the  
3301 certificate expires or the (D)TLS session ends, whichever is sooner. The requirements of clause  
3302 10.3 and 10.4.2 to validate a certificate's time validity at the point of use always apply. A Server  
3303 should regularly inspect the contents of the roles Resource and purge contents based on a policy  
3304 it determines based on its resource constraints. For example, expired certificates, and certificates  
3305 from Clients that have not been heard from for some arbitrary period of time could be candidates  
3306 for purging.

3307 The OCF namespace ("oic.role.\*") is restricted to OCF-defined roles. "oic.role.owner" is an OCF-  
3308 defined Role that is intended to provide Resource Owner privileges to multiple Clients in a scalable  
3309 way. Servers shall grant access to perform all supported operations in the current Device state  
3310 (see clause 8) on all supported SVRs regardless of ACL configuration the Clients asserting  
3311 "oic.role.owner" Role. Servers shall reject assertion of any Role, which starts with "oic.role.", but  
3312 is not one of the following Roles:

3313 – "oic.role.owner"

3314 The "roles" Resource is implicitly created by the Server upon establishment of a (D)TLS session.  
3315 In more detail, the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations on the roles Resource shall  
3316 behave as follows. Unlisted operations are implementation specific and not reliable.

3317 1) A RETRIEVE request shall return all previously asserted roles associated with the currently  
3318 connected and authenticated Client's identity. RETRIEVE requests with a "credid" query  
3319 parameter is not supported; all previously asserted roles associated with the currently  
3320 connected and authenticated Client's identity are returned.

3321 2) An UPDATE request that includes the "roles" Property shall replace or add to the Properties  
3322 included in the array as follows:

3323 a) If either the "publicdata" or the "optionaldata" are different than the existing entries in the  
3324 "roles" array, the entry shall be added to the "roles" array with a new, unique "credid" value.

3325 b) If both the "publicdata" and the "optionaldata" match an existing entry in the "roles" array,  
3326 the entry shall be considered to be the same. The Server shall reply with a 2.04 Changed  
3327 response and a duplicate entry shall not be added to the array.

3328 c) The "credid" Property is optional in an UPDATE request and if included, it may be ignored  
3329 by the Server. The Server shall assign a unique "credid" value for every entry of the "roles"  
3330 array.

3331 3) A DELETE request without a "credid" query parameter shall remove all entries from the  
3332 "/oic/sec/roles" Resource array corresponding to the currently connected and authenticated  
3333 Client's identity.

3334 4) A DELETE request with a "credid" query parameter shall remove only the entries of the  
 3335 "/oic/sec/roles" Resource array corresponding to the currently connected and authenticated  
 3336 Client's identity and where the corresponding "credid" matches the entry.

3337 NOTE The "/oic/sec/roles" Resource's use of the DELETE operation is not in accordance with the OCF Interfaces  
 3338 defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1.

3339 See clause 8 for restrictions on the states in which this Resource may be modified.

3340 "/oic/sec/roles" Resource is defined in Table 48.

3341 **Table 48 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/roles	Roles	oic.r.roles	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource containing roles that have previously been asserted to this Server	Security

3342 Table 49 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/roles".

3343 **Table 49 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Roles	roles	oic.sec.cred	array	RW	Yes	List of roles previously asserted to this Server

3344 Because "/oic/sec/roles" shares the "oic.sec.cred" schema with "/oic/sec/cred", "subjectuuid" is a required Property.  
 3345 However, "subjectuuid" is not used in a role certificate. Therefore, a Device may ignore the "subjectuuid" Property if the  
 3346 Property is contained in an UPDATE request to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource.

3347 **13.11 Auditable Events List Resource**

3348 **13.11.1 Auditable Events List Resource general**

3349 The "/oic/sec/ael" Resource maintains a list of logged Auditable Events. Every OCF Device logs  
 3350 AEEs filtered according to the values of the "categoryfilter" and "priorityfilter" Properties of  
 3351 "/oic/sec/ael" Resource. All Devices shall have a "/oic/sec/ael" Resource to maintain AEEs. The  
 3352 new AEE shall be added to the "events" Property of "/oic/sec/ael" Resource as the last entry in the  
 3353 array. A Device shall store all AEEs of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource in non-volatile memory. A Device  
 3354 shall be able to store at least 1 AEE.

3355 The "categoryfilter" Property determines what categories of AEEs are to be logged. The  
 3356 "categoryfilter" Property is an integer value which is a composition of bitmasks. A Device shall log  
 3357 all AEEs filtered by this value. If the "categoryfilter" is either set to 0xff or is not set, then the Device  
 3358 shall log AEEs of all categories. Refer to Table 51 for more details.

3359 The "priorityfilter" Property determines the lowest priority of AEE to be logged. A smaller value  
 3360 means higher priority. The AEEs whose "priority" Property values are equal to or smaller than this  
 3361 value shall be logged. If the "priorityfilter" Property is either set to the highest priority or is not set,  
 3362 then the Device shall log all AEEs. No matter what value is set to "priorityfilter", an AEE of CRIT  
 3363 (== 0) "priority" shall always be logged. Refer to Table 51 for more details.

3364 When an AEE is added, the "usedspace" Property shall be updated to reflect the total storage used  
 3365 by all logged events. When the reserved storage for AEEs is full, the oldest AEE shall be purged.

3366 A Device logs a new AEE as follows:

3367 5) If a new AEE is not filtered by "categoryfilter" and "priorityfilter", then it is dropped.

```
3368 /* c-like pseudo code */
3369 If ((categoryfilter & new_aee->category) && (priorityfilter >= new_aee->priority))
```

```

3370     {
3371         addAEE(new_aee);
3372     }
3373     else
3374     {
3375         free(new_aee);
3376     }

```

3377 6) If the value of "usedspace" Property is equal to, or the sum of the "usedspace" Property value  
3378 and the size of the new AEE is bigger than the value of the "maxspace" Property of "/oic/sec/ael"  
3379 Resource, then:

3380 a) Remove the oldest AEE continuously while the sum of the "usedspace" Property value and  
3381 the size of the new AEE is bigger than the "maxspace" Property value.

```

3382 /* c-like pseudo code */
3383 Int addAEE(AEEtype *new_aee)
3384 {
3385     While ((usespace + new_aee->size) > maxspace)
3386     {
3387         /* purgeAEE() returns the size of purged AEE */
3388         sizeOfPurgedAEE = purgeAEE();
3389         usedspace -= sizeOfPurgedAEE;
3390     }
3391     ...
3392     ...
3393     ...
3394     ...
3395 }

```

3396 7) Add the new AEE to the "events" array Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource as the last entry  
3397 in the array.

3398 8) Increase the value of the "usedspace" Property by the size of the new AEE.

3399 In order to provide a mechanism which allows management of the "events" array Property, the  
3400 RETRIEVE and UPDATE operations on the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall behave as follows:

3401 9) A RETRIEVE operation shall return the full Resource representation.

3402 10) An UPDATE operation may set the "categoryfilter" and/or "priorityfilter" Properties.

3403 The "/oic/sec/ael" Resource is defined in Table 50.

3404 **Table 50 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/ael	Auditable Event List	oic.r.ael	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource for storing AEEs	Security

3405

3406 Table 51 defines the Properties of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource.

3407 **Table 51 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
AEE list	"events"	"array"		Yes	RESET	R	The Device clears

			Array of "oic.sec.aee" entries		RFOTM RFPRO RFNOP SRESET	R	This list stores AEEs whose "category" Property value is filtered by "categoryfilter" Property and "priority" Property value is equal or less than the value of "priorityfilter" Property.
current used storage size	"usedspace"	"integer"	>= 0 (default: 0)	Yes	RESET	R	The Device sets to 0
					RFOTM	R	Current used space for logged AEEs. The Device updates this Property whenever new AEEs are logged.
					RFPRO		
					RFNOP		
SRESET							
maximum allowed storage size for AEEs	"maxspace"	"integer"	> 0	Yes		R	This means the maximum allowable storage size for AEEs that can be stored in "events" list. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
unit for storage size	"unit"	"string"	enum ["Kbyte", "Byte"] (default: "Byte")	No		R	The unit for "usedspace" and "maxspace" Properties. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
Categories of AEE to be logged	"categoryfilter"	"integer"	bitmask (default: 0xff)	Yes	RESET	R	The Device sets to the manufacturer default value
					RFOTM	RW	This value decides what categories of AEEs are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 0x01 (Access Control)</li> <li>• 0x02 (Onboarding)</li> <li>• 0x04 (Device)</li> <li>• 0x08 (Authentication)</li> <li>• 0x10 (SVR Modification)</li> <li>• 0x20 (Cloud)</li> <li>• 0x40 (Communication)</li> <li>• 0x80 (Reserved)</li> </ul> e.g.) if "categoryfilter" == 0xff: log all events of all categories e.g.) if "categoryfilter" == 0x03: log all events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories
					RFPRO		
					RFNOP	R	
					SRESET	RW	
Minimum priority of AEEs to be logged	"priorityfilter"	"integer"	enum [0, 1, 2, 3, 4] (default: 4)	Yes	RESET	R	Device sets to manufacturer default value
					RFOTM	RW	The AEEs whose "priority" values are equal to or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each value: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 0 (CRIT)</li> <li>• 1 (ERR)</li> <li>• 2 (WARN)</li> <li>• 3 (INFO)</li> <li>• 4 (DEBUG)</li> </ul> e.g.) if "priorityfilter" is set to DEBUG (==4) all AEEs will be logged
					RFPRO		
					RFNOP	R	
					SRESET	RW	

							e.g.) if "priorityfilter" is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) SEEs will be logged
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	---

3408 Table 52 defines the Properties of the "oic.sec.aee" type.

3409 **Table 52 – "oic.sec.aee" data type definition**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Device State	Description
Auditable Event Identifier	"aaid"	"string"	N/A	R	Yes	-	Identity of the logged event
Category of AEE	"category"	"integer"	enum [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128]	R	Yes	-	The category of this AEE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 0x01 (Access Control)</li> <li>• 0x02 (Onboarding)</li> <li>• 0x04 (Device)</li> <li>• 0x08 (Authentication)</li> <li>• 0x10 (SVR Modification)</li> <li>• 0x20 (Cloud)</li> <li>• 0x40 (Communication)</li> <li>• 0x80 (Reserved)</li> </ul>
Priority of AEE	"priority"	"integer"	enum [0, 1, 2, 3, 4]	R	Yes	-	The priority of this AEE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 0 (CRIT)</li> <li>• 1 (ERR)</li> <li>• 2 (WARN)</li> <li>• 3 (INFO)</li> <li>• 4 (DEBUG)</li> </ul>
Time stamp	"timestamp"	"string"	date-time (RFC3339 clause 5.6)	R	Yes	-	The time when the AEE occurred
Event message	"message"	"string"	N/A	R	Yes	-	The description of the logged AEE.
Auxiliary info	"auxiliaryinfo"	"array"	Array of strings	R	Yes	-	Supplementary information for the "message" Property e.g.) URI of specific Resource in ACE2

3410 OCF-defined AEEs are listed in Table 54, and each such AEE has its own values for the "category"  
3411 and "priority" Properties.

3412 The "timestamp" Property follows a full-date and partial-time format of RFC3339. Every new AEE  
3413 shall have a later timestamp than the latest previously logged AEE.

3414 The "auxiliaryinfo" Property provides supplementary info which is not covered by the description in  
3415 "message" Property. For example, the URI of specific Resource in ACE2 could be "auxiliaryinfo"  
3416 for "Access Denied" AEE. Please see Table 54 "List of Auditable Events".

3417 **13.12 Security Virtual Resources (SVRs) and Access Policy**

3418 The SVRs expose the security-related Properties of the Device.

3419 Granting access requests (RETRIEVE, UPDATE, DELETE, etc.) for these SVRs to unauthenticated  
3420 (anonymous) Clients could create privacy or security concerns.

3421 For example, when the Device onboarding State is RFOTM, it is necessary to grant requests for  
 3422 the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to anonymous requesters, so that the Device can be discovered and  
 3423 onboarded by an OBT. Subsequently, it might be preferable to deny requests for the  
 3424 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to anonymous requesters, to preserve privacy.

3425 **13.13 SVRs, discoverability and OCF Endpoints**

3426 All implemented SVRs shall be "discoverable" (reference ISO/IEC 30118-1, Policy Parameter  
 3427 clause 7.8.2.1.2).

3428 All implemented discoverable SVRs shall expose a Secure OCF Endpoint (e.g. CoAPS) (reference  
 3429 ISO/IEC 30118-1, clause 10).

3430 The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall expose an Unsecure OCF Endpoint (e.g. CoAP) in RFOTM  
 3431 (reference ISO/IEC 30118-1, clause 10).

3432 **13.14 Additional privacy consideration for Core Resources**

3433 Unique immutable identifiers are a privacy consideration due to their potential for being used as a  
 3434 tracking mechanism. These include the following Resources and Properties:

- 3435 – "/oic/d" Resource containing the "piid" Property.
- 3436 – "/oic/p" Resource containing the "pi" Property.

3437 These identifiers are unique values that are visible at various times throughout the Device lifecycle  
 3438 by anonymous requestors. This implies any Client Device, including those with malicious intent,  
 3439 are able to reliably obtain identifiers useful for building a log of activity correlated with a specific  
 3440 Platform and Device.

3441 The "di" Property in the "/oic/d" Resource shall mirror that of the "deviceuuid" Property of the  
 3442 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. The DOTS should provision an ACL policy that restricts access to the  
 3443 "/oic/d" Resource such that only authenticated Clients are able to obtain the "di" Property of "/oic/d"  
 3444 Resource. See clause 13.1 for deviceuuid Property lifecycle requirements.

3445 Servers should expose a temporary, non-repeated, "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Resource Value upon  
 3446 entering RESET. Servers shall expose a persistent value via the "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Property  
 3447 when the DOTS sets "devowneruuid" Property to a non-nil-UUID value. The DOTS should provision  
 3448 an ACL policy on the "/oic/d" Resource such that only authenticated Clients are able to obtain the  
 3449 "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Resource

3450 Servers should expose a temporary, non-repeated, "pi" Property value upon entering RESET.  
 3451 Servers shall expose a persistent value via the "pi" Property of the "/oic/p" Resource when the  
 3452 DOTS sets "devowneruuid" Property to a non-nil-UUID value. The DOTS should provision an ACL  
 3453 policy on the "/oic/p" Resource such that only authenticated Clients are able to obtain the "pi"  
 3454 Property.

3455 Table 53 depicts Core Resource Properties Access Modes given various Device States.

3456 **Table 53 – Core Resource Properties Access Modes given various Device States**


Resource Type	Property title	Property name	Value type	Access Mode		Behaviour
oic.wk.p	Platform ID	pi	oic.types-schema.uuid	All States	R	Server exposes a temporary random UUID when in RESET.

oic.wk.d	Permanent Immutable ID	piid	oic.types-schema.uuid	All States	R	Server exposes a temporary random UUID when in RESET.
oic.wk.d	Device Identifier	di	oic.types-schema.uuid	All states	R	/d di mirrors the value contained in "/doxm" "deviceuuid" in all device states.

3457 **13.15 Easy Setup Resource Device state**

3458 This clause only applies to a new Device that uses Easy Setup for ownership transfer as defined  
 3459 in OCF Wi-Fi Easy Setup. Easy Setup has no impact to new Devices that have a different way of  
 3460 connecting to the network i.e. DOTS and AMS don't use a Soft AP to connect to non-Easy Setup  
 3461 Devices.

3462 Figure 29 shows an example of Soft AP and Easy Setup Resource in different Device states.



3463  
 3464 **Figure 29 – Example of Soft AP and Easy Setup Resource in different Device states**

3465 Device enters RFOTM, Soft AP may be accessible in RFOTM and RFPRO.

3466 While it is reasonable for an End User to expect that power cycling a new Device will turn on the  
 3467 Soft AP for Easy Setup during the initial setup, since that is potentially how it behaved on first boot,  
 3468 it is a security risk to make this the default behaviour of a device that remains unenrolled beyond  
 3469 a reasonable period after first boot.

3470 Therefore, the Soft AP for Easy Setup has several requirements to improve security:

- 3471 – Time availability of Easy Setup Soft AP should be minimised, and shall not exceed 30 minutes  
 3472 after Device factory reset, RESET or first power boot, or when an End User initiates the Soft  
 3473 AP for Easy Setup.
- 3474 – If a new Device tried and failed to complete Easy Setup Enrolment immediately following the  
 3475 first boot, or after a factory reset, it may turn the Easy Setup Soft AP back on automatically for  
 3476 another 30 minutes upon being power cycled, provided that the power cycle occurs within 3  
 3477 hours of first boot or the most recent factory reset. If the End User has initiated the Easy Setup  
 3478 Soft AP directly without a factory reset, it is not necessary to turn it back on if it was on  
 3479 immediately prior to power cycle, because the End User obviously knows how to initiate the  
 3480 process manually.

3481 – After 3 hours from first boot or factory reset without successfully enrolling the device, the Soft  
3482 AP should not turn back on for Easy Setup until another factory reset occurs, or the End User  
3483 initiates the Easy Setup Soft AP directly.

3484 – Easy Setup Soft AP may stay enabled during RFNOP, until the Mediator instructs the new  
3485 Device to connect to the Enroller.

3486 – The Easy Setup Soft AP shall be disabled when the new Device successfully connects to the  
3487 Enroller.

3488 – Once a new Device has successfully connected to the Enroller, it shall not turn the Easy Setup  
3489 Soft AP back on for Easy Setup Enrolment again unless the Device is factory reset, or the End  
3490 User initiates the Easy Setup Soft AP directly.

3491 – Just Works OTM shall not be enabled on Devices which support Easy Setup.

3492 – The Soft AP shall be secured (e.g. shall not expose an open AP).

3493 – The Soft AP shall support a passphrase for connection by the Mediator, and the passphrase  
3494 shall be between and 8 and 64 ASCII printable characters. The passphrase may be printed on  
3495 a label, sticker, packaging etc., and may be entered by the End User into the Mediator device.

3496 – The Soft AP should not use a common passphrase across multiple Devices. Instead, the  
3497 passphrase may be sufficiently unique per device, to prevent guessing of the passphrase by an  
3498 attacker with knowledge of the Device type, model, manufacturer, or any other information  
3499 discoverable through Device's exposed interfaces.

3500 The Enrollee shall support WPA2 security (i.e. shall list WPA2 in the "swat" Property of the  
3501 "/example/WiFiConfResURI" Resource), for potential selection by the Mediator in connecting the  
3502 Enrollee to the Enroller. The Mediator should select the best security available on the Enroller, for  
3503 use in connecting the Enrollee to the Enroller.

3504 The Enrollee may not expose any interfaces (e.g. web server, debug port, NCRs, etc.) over the  
3505 Soft AP, other than SVRs, and Resources required for Wi-Fi Easy Setup.

3506 The "/example/EasySetupResURI" Resource should not be discoverable in RFOTM or SRESET.  
3507 After ownership transfer process is completed with the DOTS, and the Device enters in RFPRO,  
3508 the "/example/EasySetupResURI" may be Discoverable.

3509 The OTM CoAPS session may be used by Mediator for connection over Soft AP for ownership  
3510 transfer and initial Easy Setup provisioning. SoftAP or regular network connection may be used by  
3511 AMS for "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource provisioning in RFPRO. The CoAPS session authentication and  
3512 encryption is already defined in the Security spec.

3513 In RFPRO, AMS is expected to configure ACL2 Resource on the Device with ACE2 for following  
3514 Resources to be only configurable by the Mediator with permission to UPDATE or RETRIEVE  
3515 access:

3516 – "/example/EasySetupResURI"  
3517 – "/example/WifiConfResURI"  
3518 – "/example/DevConfResURI"

3519 An ACE2 granting RETRIEVE or UPDATE access to the Easy Setup Resource

```

3520 {
3521     "subject": { "uuid": "<insert-UUID-of-Mediator>" },
3522     "resources": [
3523         { "href": "/example/EasySetupResURI" },
3524         { "href": "/example/WiFiConfResURI" },
3525         { "href": "/example/DevConfResURI" },
3526     ],

```

3527 "permission": 6 // RETRIEVE (2) or UPDATE and RETRIEVE(6)  
 3528 }

3529 ACE2 may be re-configured after Easy Setup process. These ACE2s should be installed prior to  
 3530 the Mediator performing any RETRIEVE/UPDATE operations on these Resources.

3531 In RFPRO or RFNOP, the Mediator should discover /EasySetupResURI Resources and UPDATE  
 3532 these Resources. The Mediator may UPDATE /EasySetupResURI Resources in RFNOP Device  
 3533 state.

3534 A Mediator shall be hosted on an OCF Device.

3535 **13.16 List of Auditable Events**

3536 Whenever a Device detects an occurrence of any of the Auditable Events in Table 54, then the  
 3537 Device shall log an AEE using the corresponding "category", "priority" and "auxiliaryinfo" Properties  
 3538 defined in Table 54. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property shall contain the entries in the "auxiliaryinfo"  
 3539 column of Table 54 in the order specified in the table with each bullet contained in a separate array  
 3540 entry. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property may contain additional entries for further information following  
 3541 the entries for mandatory information. The "aeid" Property shall include the corresponding  
 3542 Auditable Event Identifier from Table 54.

3543 **Table 54 – List of mandatory Auditable Events and corresponding Property values**

Auditable Event Identifier ("aeid")	Auditable Event Description	Example "message"	"category"	"priority"	"auxiliaryinfo"
AC-1	A Device received a request from an authenticated Client with valid URI path, valid interface and valid operation for that Resource, but for which access was denied.	"Access Denied"	0x01 (Access Control)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Client IP address &amp; port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxxx</li> <li>Client UUID in UUID format (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")</li> <li>Resource URI (e.g. "/oic/sec/ael")</li> <li>Requested CRUDN operation (e.g. "CREATE")</li> <li>Server security state (e.g. "RFNOP")</li> <li>Asserted roles by Client (e.g. "oic.role.owner"), or "No roles asserted" if there are none</li> </ul>
AUTH-1	The Device encountered an error during a DTLS handshaking procedure due to a credential validation failure.	"DTLS handshake failed due to a credential validation failure"	0x08 (Authentication)	1 (ERR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Client IP address &amp; port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxxx</li> </ul>
COMM-1	The Device received a CoAP request which contained unexpected /unsupported CoAP header parameters or unexpected/unsupported CoAP options.	"Unexpected CoAP Command"	0x40 (COMM)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Client IP address &amp; port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxxx</li> <li>Hex-encoded CoAP header in format [xx:xx:xx:xx]</li> <li>Hex-encoded CoAP options except payload (empty if not present)</li> </ul>

3544 Whenever a Device detects an occurrence of any of the Auditable Events in Table 55, then the  
 3545 Device should log an AEE using the corresponding "category", "priority" and "auxiliaryinfo"  
 3546 Properties defined in Table 55. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property shall contain the entries in the  
 3547 "auxiliaryinfo" column of Table 55 in the order specified in the table with each bullet contained in a  
 3548 separate array entry. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property may contain additional entries for further

3549 information following the entries for mandatory information. The "aeid" Property shall include the  
 3550 corresponding Auditable Event Identifier from Table 55.

3551 **Table 55 – List of recommended Auditable Events and corresponding Property values**

Auditable Event Identifier	Auditable Event Description	Example "message"	"category"	"priority"	"auxiliaryinfo"
SVR-1	The Device's attempted to use one of its credentials, and detected that the credential is expired	"My credential is expired"	0x10 (SVR Modification)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• credid</li> <li>• Credential expiration value</li> </ul>
SVR-2	The Device could not validate the role certificate being asserted	"Role assertion failed"	0x10 (SVR Modification)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Client IP address &amp; port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxx x</li> </ul>

3552

3553 **13.17 Security Domain Information Resource**

3554 The "/oic/sec/sdi" Resource contains the information that identifies the OCF Security Domain to  
 3555 which the Device belongs. OCF Security Domains are uniquely identifiable.

3556 This Resource is optional to implement. When it is exposed by a Device, an OCF Onboarding Tool  
 3557 (OBT) is expected to provision a random UUID and a Security Domain Name for the OCF Security  
 3558 Domain. These two fields are provisioned to a Device during the onboarding process.

3559 "oic.r.sdi" Resource Type is defined in Table 56.

3560 **Table 56 –Definition of the "oic.r.sdi" Resource Type**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
"/oic/sec/sdi"	Security Domain Information	"oic.r.sdi"	"oic.if.baseline" "oic.if.rw"	Resource containing Security Domain information	Configuration

3561 Table 57 defines the Properties of "oic.r.sdi".

3562 **Table 57 – Properties of the "oic.r.sdi" Resource Type**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Security Domain UUID	"uuid"	string	"uuid"	Yes	R	RESET	A UUID that identifies the Security Domain, set by DOTS during onboarding.
					RW	RFOTM	
					R	RFPRO	
					R	RFNOP	
					R	SRESET	
Security Domain Name	"name"	string	N/A	Yes	R	RESET	Human-friendly name for the Security Domain, set by DOTS during onboarding.
					RW	RFOTM	
					RW	RFPRO	
					R	RFNOP	
					RW	SRESET	
Privacy Flag	"priv"	boolean	N/A	Yes	R	RESET	Flag to indicate whether the Security Domain Information is copied to "/oic/res", and thus whether it is publicly visible or private.
					RW	RFOTM	
					RW	RFPRO	
					R	RFNOP	
					RW	SRESET	

3563 The purpose of the "priv" Property is to control whether information about a Device's OCF Security  
 3564 Domain is exposed during multicast discoveries.

3565 If the "priv" Property is set to "false", then the "/oic/res" Resource shall expose its "sduuid" and  
 3566 "sdname" Properties with values copied from the "uuid" and "name" Properties of the "/oic/sec/sdi"  
 3567 Resource, respectively.

3568 If the "priv" Property is set to "true", then the "/oic/res" Resource shall not expose its "sduuid" and  
 3569 "sdname" Properties.

## 3570 **14 Security hardening guidelines/execution environment security**

### 3571 **14.1 Preamble**

3572 This is an informative clause. Many TGs in OCF have security considerations for their protocols  
3573 and environments. These security considerations are addressed through security mechanisms  
3574 specified in the security documents for OCF. However, effectiveness of these mechanisms depends  
3575 on security robustness of the underlying hardware and software Platform. This clause defines the  
3576 components required for execution environment security.

### 3577 **14.2 Execution environment elements**

#### 3578 **14.2.1 Execution environment elements general**

3579 Execution environment within a computing Device has many components. To perform security  
3580 functions in a robustness manner, each of these components has to be secured as a separate  
3581 dimension. For instance, an execution environment performing AES cannot be considered secure  
3582 if the input path entering keys into the execution engine is not secured, even though the partitions  
3583 of the CPU, performing the AES encryption, operate in isolation from other processes. Different  
3584 dimensions referred to as elements of the execution environment are listed below.

- 3585 – (Secure) Storage
- 3586 – (Secure) Execution engine
- 3587 – (Trusted) Input/output paths
- 3588 – (Secure) Time Source/clock
- 3589 – (Random) number generator
- 3590 – (Approved) cryptographic algorithms
- 3591 – Hardware Tamper (protection)

3592 **NOTE** Software security practices (such as those covered by Open Web Application Security Project) are outside  
3593 scope of this document, as development of secure code is a practice to be followed by the open source development  
3594 community. This document will however address the underlying Platform assistance required for executing software.  
3595 Examples are secure boot and secure software upgrade.

3596 Each of the elements above are described in the clauses 14.2.2, 14.2.3, 14.2.4, 14.2.5, 14.2.6,  
3597 14.2.7.

#### 3598 **14.2.2 Secure storage**

##### 3599 **14.2.2.1 Secure storage general**

3600 Secure storage refers to the physical method of housing sensitive or confidential data ("Sensitive  
3601 Data"). Such data could include but not be limited to symmetric or asymmetric private keys,  
3602 certificate data, OCF Security Domain access credentials, or personal user information. Sensitive  
3603 Data requires that its integrity be maintained, whereas Critical Sensitive Data requires that both its  
3604 integrity and confidentiality be maintained.

3605 It is strongly recommended that IoT Device makers provide reasonable protection for Sensitive  
3606 Data so that it cannot be accessed by unauthorized Devices, groups or individuals for either  
3607 malicious or benign purposes. In addition, since Sensitive Data is often used for authentication and  
3608 encryption, it must maintain its integrity against intentional or accidental alteration.

3609 A partial list of Sensitive Data is outlined in Table 58:

**Table 58 – Examples of sensitive data**

<b>Data</b>	<b>Integrity protection</b>	<b>Confidentiality protection</b>
Owner PSK (Symmetric Keys)	Yes	Yes
Service provisioning keys	Yes	Yes
Asymmetric Private Keys	Yes	Yes
Certificate Data and Signed Hashes	Yes	Not required
Public Keys	Yes	Not required
Access credentials (e.g. SSID, passwords, etc.)	Yes	Yes
ECDH/ECDH Dynamic Shared Key	Yes	Yes
Root CA Public Keys	Yes	Not required
Device and Platform IDs	Yes	Not required
Easy Setup Resources	Yes	Yes
Access Token	Yes	Yes

3611 Exact method of protection for secure storage is implementation specific, but typically combinations  
3612 of hardware and software methods are used.

#### 3613 **14.2.2.2 Hardware secure storage**

3614 Hardware secure storage is recommended for use with critical Sensitive Data such as symmetric  
3615 and asymmetric private keys, access credentials, and personal private data. Hardware secure  
3616 storage most often involves semiconductor-based non-volatile memory ("NVRAM") and includes  
3617 countermeasures for protecting against unauthorized access to Critical Sensitive Data.

3618 Hardware-based secure storage not only stores Sensitive Data in NVRAM, but also provides  
3619 protection mechanisms to prevent the retrieval of Sensitive Data through physical and/or electronic  
3620 attacks. It is not necessary to prevent the attacks themselves, but an attempted attack should not  
3621 result in an unauthorized entity successfully retrieving Sensitive Data.

3622 Protection mechanisms should provide JIL Moderate protection against access to Sensitive Data  
3623 from attacks that include but are not limited to:

- 3624 1) Physical decapping of chip packages to optically read NVRAM contents
- 3625 2) Physical probing of decapped chip packages to electronically read NVRAM contents
- 3626 3) Probing of power lines or RF emissions to monitor voltage fluctuations to discern the bit patterns  
3627 of Critical Sensitive Data
- 3628 4) Use of malicious software or firmware to read memory contents at rest or in transit within a  
3629 microcontroller
- 3630 5) Injection of faults that induce improper Device operation or loss or alteration of Sensitive Data

#### 3631 **14.2.2.3 Software storage**

3632 It is generally NOT recommended to rely solely on software and unsecured memory to store  
3633 Sensitive Data even if it is encrypted. Critical Sensitive Data such as authentication and encryption  
3634 keys should be housed in hardware secure storage whenever possible.

3635 Sensitive Data stored in volatile and non-volatile memory shall be encrypted using acceptable  
3636 algorithms to prevent access by unauthorized parties through methods described in 14.2.2.2.

3637 **14.2.2.4 Additional security guidelines and best practices**

3638 Some general practices that can help ensure that Sensitive Data is not compromised by various  
3639 forms of security attacks:

- 3640 1) FIPS Random Number Generator ("RNG") – Insufficient randomness or entropy in the RNG  
3641 used for authentication challenges can substantially degrade security strength. For this reason,  
3642 it is recommended that a FIPS 800-90A-compliant RNG with a certified noise source be used  
3643 for all authentication challenges.
- 3644 2) Secure download and boot – To prevent the loading and execution of malicious software, where  
3645 it is practical, it is recommended that Secure Download and Secure Boot methods that  
3646 authenticate a binary's source as well as its contents be used.
- 3647 3) Deprecated algorithms – Algorithms included but not limited to the list below are considered  
3648 unsecure and shall not be used for any security-related function:
  - 3649 a) SHA-1
  - 3650 b) MD5
  - 3651 c) RC4
  - 3652 d) RSA 1024
- 3653 4) Encrypted transmission between blocks or components – Even if critical Sensitive Data is  
3654 stored in Secure Storage, any use of that data that requires its transmission out of that Secure  
3655 Storage should be encrypted to prevent eavesdropping by malicious software within an  
3656 MCU/MPU.
- 3657 5) It is recommended to avoid using wildcard in Subject Id ("\*"), when setting up "/oic/sec/cred"  
3658 Resource entries, since this opens up an identity spoofing opportunity.
- 3659 6) Device vendor understands that it is the Device vendor's responsibility to ensure the Device  
3660 meets security requirements for its intended uses. As an example, IoTivity is a reference  
3661 implementation intended to be used as a basis for a product, but IoTivity has not undergone  
3662 3rd party security review, penetration testing, etc. Any Device based on IoTivity should undergo  
3663 appropriate penetration testing and security review prior to sale or deployment.
- 3664 7) Device vendor agrees to publish the expected support lifetime for the Device to OCF and to  
3665 consumers. Changes should be made to a public and accessible website. Expectations should  
3666 be clear as to what will be supported and for how long the Device vendor expects to support  
3667 security updates to the software, operating system, drivers, networking, firmware and hardware  
3668 of the device.
- 3669 8) Device vendor has not implemented test or debug interfaces on the Device which are operable  
3670 or which can be enabled which might present an attack vector on the Device which circumvents  
3671 the interface-level security or access policies of the Device.
- 3672 9) Device vendor understands that if an application running on the Device has access to  
3673 cryptographic elements such as the private keys or Ownership Credential, then those elements  
3674 have become vulnerable. If the Device vendor is implementing a Bridge, an OBT, or a Device  
3675 with access to the Internet beyond the local network, the execution of critical functions should  
3676 take place within a Trusted or Secure Execution Environment (TEE/SEE).
- 3677 10) Any PINs or fixed passphrases used for onboarding, Wi-Fi Easy Setup, SoftAP management or  
3678 access, or other security-critical function, should be sufficiently unique (do not duplicate  
3679 passphrases. The creation of these passphrases or PINS should not be algorithmically  
3680 deterministic nor should they use insufficient entropy in their creation.
- 3681 11) Ensure that there are no remaining "VENDOR\_TODO" items in the source code.
- 3682 12) If the implementation of this document uses the "Just Works" onboarding method, understand  
3683 that there is a man-in-the-middle vulnerability during the onboarding process where a malicious  
3684 party could intercept messages between the device being onboarded and the OBT and could  
3685 persist, acting as an intermediary with access to message traffic, during the lifetime of that

3686 onboarded device. The recommended best practice would be to use an alternate ownership  
3687 transfer method (OTM) instead of "Just Works".

3688 13) It is recommended that at least one static and dynamic analysis tool<sup>1</sup> be applied to any  
3689 proposed major production release of the software before its release, and any vulnerabilities  
3690 resolved.

### 3691 **14.2.3 Secure execution engine**

3692 Execution engine is the part of computing Platform that processes security functions, such as  
3693 cryptographic algorithms or security protocols (e.g. DTLS). Securing the execution engine requires  
3694 the following

3695 – Isolation of execution of sensitive processes from unauthorized parties/ processes. This  
3696 includes isolation of CPU caches, and all of execution elements that needed to be considered  
3697 as part of trusted (crypto) boundary.

3698 – Isolation of data paths into and out of execution engine. For instance, both unencrypted but  
3699 sensitive data prior to encryption or after decryption, or cryptographic keys used for  
3700 cryptographic algorithms, such as decryption or signing. See clause 14.2.4 for more details.

### 3701 **14.2.4 Trusted input/output paths**

3702 Platform implementations should only expose information, network interfaces, ports and other  
3703 functions that are necessary for the correct functioning of the Platform. It is also strongly  
3704 recommended that Vendors configure a Platform to expose only a fixed set of explicitly documented  
3705 open network ports and/or port ranges.

### 3706 **14.2.5 Secure clock**

3707 Many security functions depend on time-sensitive credentials. Examples are time stamped  
3708 Kerberos tickets, OAUTH tokens, X.509 certificates, OSCP response, software upgrades, etc. Lack  
3709 of secure source of clock can mean an attacker can modify the system clock and fool the validation  
3710 mechanism. Thus an SEE needs to provide a secure source of time that is protected from tampering.  
3711 Trustworthiness from security robustness standpoint is not the same as accuracy. Protocols such  
3712 as NTP can provide rather accurate time sources from the network, but are not immune to attacks.  
3713 A secure time source on the other hand can be off by seconds or minutes depending on the time-  
3714 sensitivity of the corresponding security mechanism. Secure time source can be external as long  
3715 as it is signed by a trusted source and the signature validation in the local Device is a trusted  
3716 process (e.g. backed by secure boot).

### 3717 **14.2.6 Selecting cryptographic algorithms**

3718 When an implementation adds additional cryptographic algorithms on top of those define in this  
3719 specification, then those shall be only publicly-vetted, peer-reviewed (e.g. NIST-approved) and  
3720 non-deprecated.

### 3721 **14.2.7 Hardware tamper protection**

3722 Various levels of hardware tamper protection exist. We borrow FIPS 140-2 terminology (not  
3723 requirements) regarding tamper protection for cryptographic module

3724 – Production-grade (lowest level): this means components that include conformal sealing coating  
3725 applied over the module's circuitry to protect against environmental or other physical damage.  
3726 This does not however require zeroization of secret material during physical maintenance. This  
3727 definition is borrowed from FIPS 140-2 security level 1.

3728 – Tamper evident/proof (mid-level), This means the Device shows evidence (through covers,  
3729 enclosures, or seals) of an attempted physical tampering. This definition is borrowed from FIPS  
3730 140-2 security level 2.

---

<sup>1</sup> A general discussion of analysis tools can be found here: <https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/se-static/>

3731 – Tamper resistance (highest level), this means there is a response to physical tempering that  
3732 typically includes zeroization of sensitive material on the module. This definition is borrowed  
3733 from FIPS 140-2 security level 3.

3734 It is difficult of specify quantitative certification test cases for accreditation of these levels. Content  
3735 protection regimes usually talk about different tools (widely available, specialized and professional  
3736 tools) used to circumvent the hardware protections put in place by manufacturing. If needed, OCF  
3737 can follow that model, if and when OCF engage in distributing sensitive key material (e.g. PKI) to  
3738 its members.


### 3739 14.3 Secure Boot

#### 3740 14.3.1 Concept of software module authentication

3741 In order to ensure that all components of a Device are operating properly and have not been  
3742 tampered with, it is best to ensure that the Device is booted properly. There may be multiple stages  
3743 of boot. The end result is an application running on top an operating system that takes advantage  
3744 of memory, CPU and peripherals through drivers.

3745 The general concept is that each software module is invoked only after cryptographic integrity  
3746 verification is complete. The integrity verification relies on the software module having been hashed  
3747 (e.g. SHA\_1, SHA\_256) and then signed with a cryptographic signature algorithm with (e.g. RSA),  
3748 with a key that only a signing authority has access to.

3749 Figure 30 depicts software module authentication.




3750 **Figure 30 – Software module authentication**

3751 After the data is signed with the signer’s signing key (a private key), the verification key (the public  
3752 key corresponding to the private signing key) is provided for later verification. For lower level  
3753 software modules, such as bootloaders, the signatures and verification keys are inserted inside  
3754 tamper proof memory, such as one-time programmable memory or TPM. For higher level software  
3755 modules, such as application software, the signing is typically performed according to the PKCS#7  
3756 format IETF RFC 2315, where the signed data format includes both indications for signature


3757 algorithm, hash algorithm as well as the signature verification key (or certificate). Secure boot does  
3758 not require use of PKCS#7 format.

3759 Figure 31 depicts verification software module.



3760 **Figure 31 – Verification software module**

3761 As shown in Figure 32 the verification module first decrypts the signature with the verification key  
3762 (public key of the signer). The verification module also calculates a hash of the data and then  
3763 compares the decrypted signature (the original) with the hash of data (actual) and if the two values  
3764 match, the software module is authentic.



3765 **Figure 32 – Software module authenticity**

### 3766 14.3.2 Secure Boot process

3767 Depending on the Device implementation, there may be several boot stages. Typically, in a PC/  
3768 Linux type environment, the first step is to find and run the BIOS code (first-stage bootloader) to  
3769 find out where the boot code is and then run the boot code (second-stage boot loader). The second  
3770 stage bootloader is typically the process that loads the operating system (Kernel) and transfers the  
3771 execution to the where the Kernel code is. Once the Kernel starts, it may load external Kernel  
3772 modules and drivers.

3773 When performing a secure boot, it is required that the integrity of each boot loader is verified before  
3774 executing the boot loader stage. As mentioned, while the signature and verification key for the  
3775 lowest level bootloader is typically stored in tamper-proof memory, the signature and verification  
3776 key for higher levels should be embedded (but attached in an easily accessible manner) in the data  
3777 structures software.

3778 **14.3.3 Robustness requirements**

3779 **14.3.3.1 Robustness general**

3780 To qualify as high robustness secure boot process, the signature and hash algorithms shall be one  
3781 of the approved algorithms, the signature values and the keys used for verification shall be stored  
3782 in secure storage and the algorithms shall run inside a secure execution environment and the keys  
3783 shall be provided the SEE over trusted path.

3784 **14.3.3.2 Next steps**

3785 Develop a list of approved algorithms and data formats

3786 **14.4 Attestation**

3787 **14.5 Software Update**

3788 **14.5.1 Overview**

3789 The Device lifecycle does not end at the point when a Device is shipped from the manufacturer;  
3790 the distribution, retailing, purchase, installation/onboarding, regular operation, maintenance and  
3791 end-of-life stages for the Device remain outstanding. It is possible for the Device to require update  
3792 during any of these stages, although the most likely times are during onboarding, regular operation  
3793 and maintenance. The manufacturer shall have a defined policy available to OCF Security Domain  
3794 Owner (e.g. via a website link) covering handling of any device vulnerabilities, including the  
3795 software update information (e.g. if and how such updates are provided). This policy shall also  
3796 cover any post end-of-life or end-of-service vulnerabilities. The aspects of the software include, but  
3797 are not limited to, firmware, operating system, networking stack, application code, drivers, etc.

3798 **14.5.2 Recognition of current differences**

3799 Different manufacturers approach software update utilizing a collection of tools and strategies:  
3800 over-the-air or wired USB connections, full or partial replacement of existing software, signed and  
3801 verified code, attestation of the delivery package, verification of the source of the code, package  
3802 structures for the software, etc.

3803 It is recommended that manufacturers review their processes and technologies for compliance with  
3804 industry best-practices that a thorough security review of these takes place and that periodic review  
3805 continue after the initial architecture has been established.

3806 This document applies to software updates as recommended to be implemented by OCF Devices;  
3807 it does not have any bearing on the above-mentioned alternative proprietary software update  
3808 mechanisms. The described steps are being triggered by an OCF Client, the actual implementation  
3809 of the steps and how the software package is downloaded and upgraded is vendor specific.

3810 The triggers that can be invoked from OCF clients can:

- 3811 1) Check if new software is available
- 3812 2) Download and verify the integrity of the software package
- 3813 3) Install the verified software package

3814 The triggers are not sequenced; each trigger can be invoked individually.

3815 The state of the transitions of software update is in Figure 33.




Figure 33 – State transitioning diagram for software download

Table 59 – Description of the software update bits

Bit	TM property	CM property
Bit 9	Initiate Software Availability Check	New Software Available
Bit 7	Initiate Software Version Validation	Valid Software Available
Bit 8	Initiate Secure Software Update	Upgrading

#### 14.5.2.1 Checking availability of new software

Setting the Initiate Software Availability Check bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property (see Table 39 of clause 13.8) indicates a request to initiate the process to check if new software is available, e.g. the process whereby the Device checks if a newer software version is available on the external endpoint. Once the Device has determined if an newer software version is available, it sets the Initiate Software Availability Check bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Property to 1 (TRUE), indicating that new software is available or to 0 (FALSE) if no newer software version is available, See also Table 59 where the bits in property TM indicates that the action is initiated and the CM bits are indicating the result of the action. The Device receiving this trigger is not downloading and not validating the software to determine if new software is available. The version check is determined by the current software version and the software version on the external endpoint. The determination if a software package is newer is vendor defined.

#### 14.5.3 Software Version Validation

Setting the Initiate Software Version Validation bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property (see Table 39 of 13.8) indicates a request to initiate the software version validation process, the process whereby the Device validates the software (including firmware, operating system, Device drivers, networking stack, etc.) against a trusted source to see if, at the conclusion of the check, the software update process will need to be triggered (see clause 14.5.4). When the Initiate Software Version Validation bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 1 (TRUE) by a sufficiently privileged Client, the Device sets the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Initiate Software Version Validation bit to 0 and initiates a software version check. Once the Device has determined if a valid software is available, it sets the Initiate Software Version Validation bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Property to 1 (TRUE) if an update is available or 0 (FALSE) if no update is available. To signal completion of the Software Version Validation process, the Device sets the Initiate Software Version Validation bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property back to 0 (FALSE). If the Initiate Software Version Validation bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 0 (FALSE) by a Client, it has no effect on the validation process. The Software Version Validation process can download the software from the external endpoint to verify the integrity of the software package.

#### 14.5.4 Software Update

The software of a Device shall be updatable.

3850 Setting the Initiate Secure Software Update bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property (see Table 39 of  
3851 clause 13.8) indicates a request to initiate the software update process. When the Initiate Secure  
3852 Software Update bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 1 (TRUE) by a sufficiently privileged Client, the  
3853 Device sets the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Initiate Software Version Validation bit to 0 and initiates a  
3854 software update process. Once the Device has completed the software update process, it sets the  
3855 Initiate Secure Software Update bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Property to 1 (TRUE) if/when the  
3856 software was successfully updated or 0 (FALSE) if no update was performed. To signal completion  
3857 of the Secure Software Update process, the Device sets the Initiate Secure Software Update bit in  
3858 the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property back to 0 (FALSE). If the Initiate Secure Software Update bit of  
3859 "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 0 (FALSE) by a Client, it has no effect on the update process.

#### 3860 **14.5.4.1 State of Device after software update**

3861 The state of all Resources implemented in the Device should be the same as after boot, meaning  
3862 that the software update is not resetting user data and retaining a correct state.

3863 User data of a Device is defined as:

- 3864 – Retain the SVR states, e.g. the on boarded state, registered clients.
- 3865 – Retain all created Resources
- 3866 – Retain all stored data of a Resource
  - 3867 – For example the preferences stored for the brewing Resource ("oic.r.brewing").

#### 3868 **14.5.5 Recommended usage**

3869 The Initiate Secure Software Update bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" should only be set by a Client after  
3870 the Initiate Software Version Validation check is complete.

3871 The process of updating Device software may involve state changes that affect the Device  
3872 Operational State ("/oic/sec/pstat.dos"). Devices with an interest in the Device(s) being updated  
3873 should monitor "/oic/sec/pstat.dos" and be prepared for pending software update(s) to affect Device  
3874 state(s) prior to completion of the update.

3875 The Device itself may indicate that it is autonomously initiating a software version check/update or  
3876 that a check/update is complete by setting the "pstat.tm" and "pstat.cm" Initiate Software Version  
3877 Validation and Secure Software Update bits when starting or completing the version check or  
3878 update process. As is the case with a Client-initiated update, Clients can be notified that an  
3879 autonomous version check or software update is pending and/or complete by observing pstat  
3880 Resource changes.

3881 The "oic.r.softwareupdate" Resource Type specifies additional features to control the software  
3882 update process see core specification.

### 3883 **14.6 Non-OCF Endpoint interoperability**

#### 3884 **14.7 Security levels**

3885 Security Levels are a way to differentiate Devices based on their security criteria. This need for  
3886 differentiation is based on the requirements from different verticals such as industrial and health  
3887 care and may extend into smart home. This differentiation is distinct from Device classification  
3888 (e.g. IETF RFC 7228)

3889 These categories of security differentiation may include, but is not limited to:

- 3890 1) Security Hardening
- 3891 2) Identity Attestation
- 3892 3) Certificate/Trust
- 3893 4) Onboarding Technique
- 3894 5) Regulatory Compliance

- 3895 a) Data at rest
- 3896 b) Data in transit
- 3897 6) Cipher Suites – Crypto Algorithms & Curves
- 3898 7) Key Length
- 3899 8) Secure Boot/Update
- 3900 In the future security levels can be used to define interoperability.

3901 The following applies to the OCF Security Specification 1.1:

3902 The current document does not define any other level beyond Security Level 0. All Devices will be  
3903 designated as Level 0. Future versions may define additional levels.

3904 Additional comments:

- 3905 – The definition of a given security level will remain unchanged between versions of the document.
- 3906 – Devices that meet a given level may, or may not, be capable of upgrading to a higher level.
- 3907 – Devices may be evaluated and re-classified at a higher level if it meets the requirements of the  
3908 higher level (e.g. if a Device is manufactured under the 1.1 version of the document, and a later  
3909 document version defines a security level 1, the Device could be evaluated and classified as  
3910 level 1 if it meets level 1 requirements).
- 3911 – The security levels may need to be visible to the End User.

## 3912 **14.8 Security Profiles**

### 3913 **14.8.1 Security Profiles general**

3914 Security Profiles are a way to differentiate OCF Devices based on their security criteria. This need  
3915 for differentiation is based on the requirements from different verticals such as industrial and health  
3916 care and may extend into smart home. This differentiation is distinct from device classification (e.g.  
3917 IETF RFC 7228)

3918 These categories of security differentiation may include, but is not limited to:

- 3919 1) Security Hardening and assurances criteria
- 3920 2) Identity Attestation
- 3921 3) Certificate/Trust
- 3922 4) Onboarding Technique
- 3923 5) Regulatory Compliance
- 3924 a) Data at rest
- 3925 b) Data in transit
- 3926 6) Cipher Suites – Crypto Algorithms & Curves
- 3927 7) Key Length
- 3928 8) Secure Boot/Update

3929 Each Security Profile definition shall specify the version or versions of the OCF Security  
3930 Specification(s) that form a baseline set of normative requirements. The profile definition may  
3931 include security requirements that supersede baseline requirements (not to relax security  
3932 requirements).

3933 Security Profiles have the following properties:

- 3934 – A given profile definition is not specific to the version of the document that defines it. For  
3935 example, the profile may remain constant for subsequent OCF Security Specification versions.

- 3936 – A specific OCF Device and platform combination may be used to satisfy the security profile.
- 3937 – Profiles may have overlapping criteria; hence it may be possible to satisfy multiple profiles
- 3938 simultaneously.
- 3939 – An OCF Device that satisfied a profile initially may be re-evaluated at a later time and found to
- 3940 satisfy a different profile (e.g. if a device is manufactured under the 1.1 version of the document,
- 3941 and a later document version defines a security profile Black, the device could be evaluated
- 3942 and classified as profile Black if it meets profile Black requirements).
- 3943 – A machine-readable representation of compliance results specifically describing profiles
- 3944 satisfied may be used to facilitate OCF Device onboarding. (e.g. a manufacturer certificate or
- 3945 manifest may contain security profiles attributes).

3946 **14.8.2 Identification of Security Profiles (Normative)**

3947 **14.8.2.1 Security Profiles in prior documents**

3948 OCF Devices conforming to versions of the OCF Security Specifications where Security Profiles

3949 Resource was not defined may be presumed to satisfy the "sp-baseline-v0" profile (defined in

3950 14.8.3.3) or may be regarded as unspecified. If Security Profile is unspecified, the Client may use

3951 the OCF Security Specification version to characterize expected security behaviour.

3952 **14.8.2.2 Security Profile Resource definition**

3953 The "/oic/sec/sp" Resource is used by the OCF Device to show which OCF Security Profiles the

3954 OCF Device is capable of supporting and which are authorized for use by the OCF Security Domain

3955 owner. Properties of the Resource identify which OCF Security Profile is currently operational. The

3956 ocfSecurityProfileOID value type shall represent OID values and may reference an entry in the form

3957 of strings (UTF-8).

3958 "/oic/sec/sp" Resource is defined in Table 60.

3959 **Table 60 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/sp	Security Profile Resource Definition	oic.r.sp	oic.if.baselin e, oic.if.rw	Resource specifying supported and current security profile(s)	Discoverable

3960 Table 61 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/sp" Resource.

3961 **Table 61 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Supported Security Profiles	supportedprofiles	ocfSecurityProfileOID	array	RW	Yes	Array of supported Security Profiles (e.g. ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0","1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0"])
SecurityProfile	currentprofile	ocfSecurityProfileOID	N/A	RW	Yes	Currently active Security Profile (e.g. "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0")

3962 The following OIDs are defined to uniquely identify Security Profiles. Future Security Profiles or

3963 changes to existing Security Profiles may result in a new ocfSecurityProfileOID.

```

3964 id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
3965 private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
3966
3967 id-ocfSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 0 }
3968
3969 id-ocfSecurityProfile ::= { id-ocfSecurity 0 }

```

```

3970
3971     sp-undefined ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 0 }
3972     --The Security Profile is not specified
3973     sp-baseline ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 1 }
3974     --This specifies the OCF Baseline Security Profile(s)
3975     sp-black ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 2 }
3976     --This specifies the OCF Black Security Profile(s)
3977     sp-blue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 3 }
3978     --This specified the OCF Blue Security Profile(s)
3979     sp-purple ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 4 }
3980     --This specifies the OCF Purple Security Profile(s)
3981
3982     --versioned Security Profiles
3983     sp-undefined-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID (id-sp-undefined 0)
3984     --v0 of unspecified security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.0"
3985     sp-baseline-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-baseline 0}
3986     --v0 of baseline security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
3987     sp-black-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-black 0}
3988     --v0 of black security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"
3989     sp-blue-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-blue 0}
3990     --v0 of blue security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0"
3991     sp-purple-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-purple 0}
3992     --v0 of purple security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0"
3993
3994     ocfSecurityProfileOID ::= UTF8String
3995

```

### 3996 **14.8.3 Security Profiles**

#### 3997 **14.8.3.1 Security Profiles general**

3998 The Security Profiles Resource shall be pre-populated with manufacturer default values (Refer to  
3999 the Security Profile clauses for additional details).

4000 The OCF Conformance criteria may require vendor attestation that establishes the expected  
4001 environment in which the OCF Device is hosted (Refer to the Security Profile clauses for specific  
4002 requirements).

#### 4003 **14.8.3.2 Security Profile Unspecified (sp-undefined-v0)**

4004 The Security Profile "sp-undefined-v0" is reserved for future use.

#### 4005 **14.8.3.3 Security Profile Baseline v0 (sp-baseline-v0)**

4006 The Security Profile "sp-baseline-v0" is defined for all OCF Security Specification versions where  
4007 the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource is defined. All Devices shall include the "sp-baseline-v0" OID in the  
4008 "supportedprofiles" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource.

4009 It indicates the OCF Device satisfies the normative security requirements for this document.

4010 When a device supports the baseline profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-  
4011 baseline-v0, represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", and may contain other  
4012 profiles.

4013 When a manufacturer makes sp-baseline-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to  
4014 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-baseline-v0.

#### 4015 **14.8.3.4 Security Profile Black (sp-black-v0)**

##### 4016 **14.8.3.4.1 Black Profile general**

4017 The need for Security Profile Black v0 is to support devices and manufacturers who wish to certify  
4018 their devices meeting this specific set of security criteria. A Device may satisfy the Black  
4019 requirements as well as requirements of other profiles, the Black Security Profile is not necessarily

4020 mutually exclusive with other Security Profiles unless those requirements conflict with the explicit  
4021 requirements of the Black Security Profile.

#### 4022 **14.8.3.4.2 Devices targeted for Security Profile Black v0**

4023 Security Profile Black devices could include any device a manufacturer wishes to certify at this  
4024 profile, but healthcare devices and industrial devices with additional security requirements are the  
4025 initial target. Additionally, manufacturers of devices at the edge of the network (or fog), or devices  
4026 with exceptional profiles of trust bestowed upon them, may wish to certify at this profile; these types  
4027 of devices may include, but are not limited to the following:

- 4028 – Bridges (Mapping devices between ecosystems handling virtual devices from different  
4029 ecosystems)
- 4030 – Resource Directories (Devices trusted to manage OCF Security Domain Resources)
- 4031 – Remote Access (Devices which have external access but can also act within the OCF Security  
4032 Domain)
- 4033 – Healthcare Devices (Devices with specific requirements for enhanced security and privacy)
- 4034 – Industrial Devices (Devices with advanced management, security and attestation requirements)

#### 4035 **14.8.3.4.3 Requirements for certification at Security Profile Black (normative)**

4036 Every device with "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource designating a Security  
4037 Profile of "sp-black-v0", as defined in clause 14.8.2, shall support each of the following:

- 4038 – Onboarding via OCF Rooted Certificate Chain, including PKI chain validation
- 4039 – Support for AES 128 encryption for data at rest and in transit.
- 4040 – Hardening minimums: manufacturer assertion of secure credential storage
- 4041 – In enumerated item #10 "The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource should contain credential(s) if required  
4042 by the selected OTM" is changed to require the credential be stored: "The "/oic/sec/cred"  
4043 Resource shall contain credential(s)."
- 4044 – The OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF Compliance Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.4) in its  
4045 certificate and the extension's 'securityProfile' field shall contain sp-black-v0 represented by  
4046 the ocfSecurityProfileOID string, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0".

4047 When a device supports the black profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-black-  
4048 v0, represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0", and may contain other profiles.

4049 When a manufacturer makes sp-black-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to  
4050 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-black-v0.

4051 The OCF Rooted Certificate Chain and PKI Is defined by and structured within a framework  
4052 described in the supporting documents:

- 4053 – Certificate Profile (See 9.4.2)
- 4054 – Certificate Policy (see Certificate Policy document:  
4055 <https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF%20Certificate%20Policy.pdf>)

#### 4056 **14.8.3.5 Security Profile Blue v0 (sp-blue-v0)**

##### 4057 **14.8.3.5.1 Blue Profile general**

4058 The Security Profile Blue is used when manufacturers issue platform certificates for platforms  
4059 containing manufacturer-embedded keys. Compatibility with interoperable trusted platforms is  
4060 anticipated using certificate extensions defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). OCF  
4061 Security Domain owners evaluate manufacturer supplied certificates and attributed data to  
4062 determine an appropriate OCF Security Profile that is configured for OCF Devices at onboarding.  
4063 OCF Devices may satisfy multiple OCF Security Profiles. The OCF Security Domain owner may  
4064 configure deployments using the Security Profile as OCF Security Domain partitioning criteria.

4065 Certificates issued to Blue Profile Devices shall be issued by a CA conforming to the CA Vetting  
4066 Criteria defined by OCF.

#### 4067 **14.8.3.5.2 Platforms and Devices for Security Profile Blue v0**

4068 The OCF Security Profile Blue anticipates an ecosystem where platform vendors may differ from  
4069 OCF Device vendor and where platform vendors may implement trusted platforms that may conform  
4070 to industry standards defining trusted platforms. The OCF Security Profile Blue specifies  
4071 mechanisms for linking platforms with OCF Device(s) and for referencing quality assurance criteria  
4072 produced by OCF conformance operations. The OCF Security Domain owner evaluates these data  
4073 when an OCF Device is onboarded into the OCF Security Domain. Based on this evaluation the  
4074 OCF Security Domain owner determines which Security Profile may be applied during OCF Device  
4075 operation. All OCF Device types may be considered for evaluation using the OCF Security Profile  
4076 Blue.

#### 4077 **14.8.3.5.3 Requirements for certification at Security Profile Blue v0**

4078 The OCF Device satisfies the Blue profile v0 (sp-blue-v0) when all of the security normative for this  
4079 document version are satisfied and the following additional criteria are satisfied.

4080 OCF Blue profile defines the following OCF Device quality assurances:

- 4081 – The OCF Conformance criteria shall require vendor attestation that the conformant OCF Device  
4082 was hosted on one or more platforms that satisfies OCF Blue platform security assurances and  
4083 platform security and privacy functionality requirements.
- 4084 – The OCF Device achieving OCF Blue Security Profile compliance will be registered by OCF and  
4085 published by OCF in a machine readable format.
- 4086 – The OCF Blue Security Profile compliance registry may be digitally signed by an OCF owned  
4087 signing key.
- 4088 – The OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF Compliance Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.4) in its  
4089 certificate and the extension's 'securityProfile' field shall contain sp-blue-v0 represented by the  
4090 ocfSecurityProfileOID string, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0".
- 4091 – The OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF CPL Attributes Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.7) in  
4092 its certificate.
- 4093 – The DOTS is expected to perform a lookup of the certification status of the OCF Device using  
4094 the OCF CPL Attributes Extension values and verify that the sp-blue-v0 OID is listed in the  
4095 extension's "securityprofiles" field.

4096 OCF Blue profile defines the following OCF Device security functionality:

- 4097 – OCF Device(s) shall be hosted on a platform where a cryptographic and secure storage  
4098 functions are hardened by the platform.
- 4099 – OCF Device(s) hosted on a platform shall expose accompanying manufacturer credentials using  
4100 the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource where the "credusage" Property contains the value  
4101 "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert".
- 4102 – OCF Device(s) that are hosted on a TCG-defined trusted platform should use an IEEE802.1AR  
4103 IDevID and should verify the "TCG Endorsement Key Credential". All TCG-defined  
4104 manufacturer credentials may be identified by the "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert" value of the  
4105 "credusage" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. They may be used in response to  
4106 selection of the "oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert" owner transfer method.
- 4107 – OCF Device(s) shall use AES128 equivalent minimum protection for transmitted data. (See  
4108 NIST SP 800-57).
- 4109 – OCF Device(s) shall use AES128 equivalent minimum protection for stored data. (See NIST SP  
4110 800-57).

- 4111 – OCF Device(s) should use AES256 equivalent minimum protection for stored data. (See NIST  
4112 SP 800-57).
- 4113 – OCF Device(s) should protect the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource using the platform provided secure  
4114 storage.
- 4115 – OCF Device(s) shall protect trust anchors (aka policy defining trusted CAs and pinned  
4116 certificates) using platform provided secure storage.
- 4117 – OCF Device(s) should check certificate revocation status for locally issued certificates.
- 4118 – The DOTS is expected to check certificate revocation status for all certificates in manufacturer  
4119 certificate path(s) if available. If a certificate is revoked, certificate validation fails and the  
4120 connection is refused. The DOTS may disregard revocation status results if unavailable.

4121 OCF Blue profile defines the following platform security assurances:

- 4122 – Platforms implementing cryptographic service provider (CSP) functionality and secure storage  
4123 functionality should be evaluated with a minimum FIPS140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL  
4124 Level 2.
- 4125 – Platforms implementing trusted platform functionality should be evaluated with a minimum  
4126 Common Criteria EAL Level 1.

4127 OCF Blue profile defines the following platform security and privacy functionality:

- 4128 – The Platform shall implement cryptographic service provider (CSP) functionality.
- 4129 – Platform CSP functionality shall include cryptographic algorithms, random number generation,  
4130 secure time.
- 4131 – The Platform shall implement AES128 equivalent protection for transmitted data. (See NIST SP  
4132 800-57).
- 4133 – The Platform shall implement AES128 and AES256 equivalent protection for stored data. (See  
4134 NIST SP 800-57).
- 4135 – Platforms hosting OCF Device(s) should implement a platform identifier following IEEE802.1AR  
4136 or Trusted Computing Group(TCG) specifications.
- 4137 – Platforms based on Trusted Computing Group (TCG) platform definition that host OCF Device(s)  
4138 should supply TCG-defined manufacture certificates; also known as "TCG Endorsement Key  
4139 Credential" (which complies with IETF RFC 5280) and "TCG Platform Credential" (which  
4140 complies with IETF RFC 5755).

4141 When a device supports the blue profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-blue-v0,  
4142 represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0", and may contain other profiles.

4143 When a manufacturer makes sp-blue-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to  
4144 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-blue-v0.

4145 During onboarding, while the device state is RFOTM, the DOTS may update the "currentprofile"  
4146 Property to one of the other values found in the "supportedprofiles" Property.

#### 4147 **14.8.3.6 Security Profile Purple v0 (sp-purple-v0)**

4148 Every device with the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource designating "sp-purple-v0", as defined in clause  
4149 14.8.2 shall support following minimum requirements

- 4150 – Hardening minimums: secure credential storage, software integrity validation, secure update.
- 4151 – If a Certificate is used, the OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF Compliance Extension  
4152 (clause 9.4.2.2.4) in its certificate and the extension's 'securityProfile' field shall contain sp-  
4153 purple-v0 represented by the ocfSecurityProfileOID string, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0"
- 4154 – The OCF Device shall include a X.509v3 OCFPLAttributes Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.7) in its  
4155 End-Entity Certificate when manufacturer certificate is used.

4156 Security Profile Purple has following optional security hardening requirements that the device may  
4157 additionally support.

4158 – Hardening additions: secure boot, hardware backed secure storage

4159 – The OCF Device shall include a X.509v3 OCFSecurityClaims Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.6) in its  
4160 End-Entity Certificate and it shall include corresponding OIDs to the hardening additions  
4161 implemented and attested by the vendor. If there is no additional support for hardening  
4162 requirements, X.509v3 OCFSecurityClaims Extension shall be omitted.

4163 For software integrity validation, OCF Device(s) shall provide the integrity validation mechanism  
4164 for security critical executables such as cryptographic modules or secure service applications, and  
4165 they should be validated before the execution. The key used for validating the integrity should be  
4166 explicitly trusted by the validating software module and stored outside of the software to be updated.

4167 For secure update, OCF Device(s) shall be able to update its firmware in a secure manner.

4168 For secure boot, OCF Device(s) shall implement the BIOS code (first-stage bootloader on ROM) to  
4169 be executed by the processor on power-on, and secure boot parameters to be provisioned by  
4170 tamper-proof memory. Also OCF Device(s) shall provide software module authentication for the  
4171 security critical executables and stop the boot process if any integrity of them is compromised.

4172 For hardware backed secure storage, OCF Device(s) shall store sensitive data in non-volatile  
4173 memory ("NVRAM") and prevent the retrieval of sensitive data through physical and/or electronic  
4174 attacks.

4175 More details on security hardening guidelines for software integrity validation, secure boot, secure  
4176 update, and hardware backed secure storage are described in 14.3, 14.5 and 14.2.2.2.

4177 Certificates issued to Purple Profile Devices shall be issued by a CA conforming to the CA Vetting  
4178 Criteria defined by OCF.

4179 When a device supports the purple profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-purple-  
4180 v0, represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0", and may contain other profiles.

4181 When a manufacturer makes sp-purple-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to  
4182 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-purple-v0.

## 4183 **15 Device Type Specific requirements**

### 4184 **15.1 Bridging security**

#### 4185 **15.1.1 Universal requirements for Bridging to another Ecosystem**

4186 The Bridge shall go through OCF ownership transfer as any other onboarder would.

4187 The software of a Bridge shall be field updatable. (This requirement need not be tested but can be  
4188 certified via a vendor declaration.)

4189 Each VOD shall be onboarded by an OCF OBT. Each Virtual Bridged Device should be provisioned  
4190 as appropriate in the Bridged Protocol. In other words, VODs and Virtual Bridged Devices are  
4191 treated the same way as physical Devices. They are entities that have to be provisioned in their  
4192 network.

4193 Each VOD shall implement the behaviour required by ISO/IEC 30118-1 and this document. Each  
4194 VOD shall perform authentication, access control, and encryption according to the security settings  
4195 it received from the OCF OBT. Each Virtual Bridged Device shall implement the security  
4196 requirements of the Bridged Protocol.

4197 In addition, in order to be considered secure from an OCF perspective, the Bridge Platform shall  
4198 use appropriate ecosystem-specific security options for communication between the Virtual Bridged  
4199 Devices instantiated by the Bridge and Bridged Devices. This security shall include mutual  
4200 authentication, and encryption and integrity protection of messages in the bridged ecosystem.

4201 A VOD may authenticate itself to the DOTS using the Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM (see  
4202 clause 7.3.6) with the Manufacturer Certificate and corresponding private key of the Bridge which  
4203 instantiated that VOD.

4204 A VOD may authenticate itself to the OCF Cloud using the Manufacturer Certificate and  
4205 corresponding private key of the Bridge which instantiated that VOD.

4206 A Bridge and the VODs created by that Bridge shall operate as independent Devices, with the  
4207 following exceptions:

- 4208 – If a Bridge creates a VOD while the Bridge is in an Unowned State, then the VOD shall be  
4209 created in an Unowned State.
- 4210 – An Unowned VOD shall not accept DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor  
4211 any other requests, including discovery requests, while the Bridge (that created that VOD) is  
4212 Unowned.
- 4213 – At any time when a Bridge is transitioning from Owned to Unowned State, all Unowned VODs  
4214 (created by that Bridge prior to the transition) shall drop any existing TLS and/or DTLS  
4215 connections.
- 4216 – At any time when a Bridge is transitioning from Unowned to Owned State, the Bridge shall  
4217 trigger all Unowned VODs (created by that Bridge prior to the transition) to become accessible  
4218 in RFOTM, with internal state as if the VOD has just transitioned from RESET to RFOTM.
- 4219 – If a Bridge creates a VOD while the Bridge is in an Owned State, then the VOD shall become  
4220 accessible in RFOTM, with internal state as if the VOD has just transitioned from RESET to  
4221 RFOTM.

4222 Table 62 intends to clarify this behaviour.

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**Table 62 – Dependencies of VOD Behaviour on Bridge state, as clarification of accompanying text**

Bridge state	Additional dependencies on VOD behaviour	
	VOD is Unowned (either just created, or created previously)	VOD is Owned
From unboxing Bridge until just prior to the end of transition of Bridge from Unowned to Owned	No accepting DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor any other requests, including discovery requests	Not applicable
At end of transition from Unowned to Owned	VOD becomes accessible in RFOTM following Bridge's transition. Internal state as if just transitioned from RESET.	As per normal Device
Owned	As per normal Device	As per normal Device
At Start of transition from Owned to Unowned	Drop any established TLS/DTLS connections, even if already partway through Device ownership	As per normal Device
Start of transition from Owned to Unowned, until just prior to the end of transition from Unowned to Owned.	No accepting DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor any other requests, including discovery requests	As per normal Device

4225 The "vods" Property of the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource on a Bridge reflects the details of all currently  
 4226 Owned VODs which have been created by that Bridge since the most recent hardware reset (if any)  
 4227 of the Bridge Platform (which removes all the created VODs), regardless of whether the VODs have  
 4228 the same owner as the Bridge or not. The entries in the "vods" Property are added and removed  
 4229 according to the following criteria:

- 4230 – Whenever a VOD created by a Bridge transitions from being Unowned to being Owned, then  
 4231 an entry for that VOD shall be added to the "vods" Property of the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource of  
 4232 that Bridge.
- 4233 – Whenever a VOD created by a Bridge transitions from being Owned to being Unowned, then  
 4234 entry for that VOD shall be removed from the "vods" Property of the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource of  
 4235 that Bridge. If that Bridge is currently in Unowned state, then the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource is not  
 4236 accessible, and the entry for that VOD shall be removed from the "vods" Property before or  
 4237 during the transition of that Bridge to the Owned state.
- 4238 – All other modifications of the list are not allowed.

4239 A Bridge shall only expose a secure OCF Endpoint for the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource.

4240 **15.1.2 Additional security requirements specific to Bridged protocols**

4241 **15.1.2.1 Additional security Requirements specific to the AllJoyn protocol**

4242 For AllJoyn translator, an authenticated and authorized Client shall be able to block the  
 4243 communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't communicate securely with  
 4244 the Bridge, by using the Bridge Device's "oic.r.securemode" Resource specified in ISO/IEC 30118-  
 4245 3

4246 **15.1.2.2 Additional security requirements specific to the Bluetooth LE protocol**

4247 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't  
 4248 communicate securely with the Bridge.

4249 **15.1.2.3 Additional security requirements specific to the oneM2M protocols**

4250 The Bridge shall implement oneM2M application access control as defined in the oneM2M Release  
 4251 3 Specifications.

4252 An Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't  
 4253 communicate securely with the Bridge.

4254 **15.1.2.4 Additional security requirements specific to the U+ protocol**  
4255 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't  
4256 communicate securely with the Bridge.

4257 **15.1.2.5 Additional security requirements specific to the Z-Wave protocol**  
4258 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't  
4259 communicate securely with the Bridge.

4260 **15.1.2.6 Additional security requirements specific to the Zigbee protocol**  
4261 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't  
4262 communicate securely with the Bridge.

4263 **15.1.2.7 Additional security requirements specific to the EnOcean Radio protocol**  
4264 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't  
4265 communicate securely with the Bridge.

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4287 **16 Alternative in-transit protection mechanisms**

4288 **16.1 Introduction to in-transit protection mechanisms**

4289 In addition to the DTLS protection mechanisms for device-to-device communication specified in  
4290 clause 9.4.7 and clause 11.2, and TLS protection specified in OCF Cloud Security Specification,  
4291 OCF supports the following in-transit protection mechanisms:

- 4292 – End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages using OSCORE, specified in clause 16.2.
- 4293 – Simple Secure Multicast, specified in clause 16.3

4294 **16.2 End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages using OSCORE**

4295 **16.2.1 Introduction to End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages using OSCORE**

4296 End-to-End Security of Unicast Messages is accomplished by applying a layer of in-transit  
4297 protection above the transport layer Security (provided by DTLS or TLS) and below the resource-  
4298 access authorization layer, using Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)  
4299 IETF RFC 8613.

4300 Relative to an exchange of an OCF CRUDN Request message and OCF CRUDN Response  
4301 message:

- 4302 – The Device acting as a Client (that is, sending an OCF CRUDN Request message and receiving  
4303 the corresponding OCF CRUDN Response message) acts as an OSCORE client. Within the  
4304 scope of clause 16.2, all Clients are assumed to support OSCORE and perform OSCORE client  
4305 processing.
- 4306 – The Device acting as a Server (that is, receiving an OCF CRUDN Request message and  
4307 sending one or more corresponding OCF CRUDN Response messages) acts as an OSCORE  
4308 server. Within the scope of clause 16.2, all Servers are assumed to support OSCORE and  
4309 perform OSCORE server processing.

4310 Clause 16.2.4 specifies the supported mechanism for establishing an OSCORE Security Context  
4311 between two Devices. For each Device, an authorized Client (e.g. OBT) provisions the OSCORE  
4312 Security Context parameters to a credential entry of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. The  
4313 "subjectuuid" of that credential entry identifies the other Device that shares that OSCORE Security  
4314 Context (similar to how a DTLS endpoint associates each DTLS PSK session with the Device UUID  
4315 of the other DTLS endpoint).

4316 **16.2.2 OSCORE ID Namespace Prefix**

4317 Clause 16.2.4 specifies one mechanism for establishing an OSCORE Security Context between  
4318 two Devices. Different mechanisms have different entities responsible for managing the selection  
4319 of OSCORE Sender ID and OSCORE Recipient ID. There is value in preventing Devices having  
4320 multiple OSCORE Security Contexts with identical Recipient IDs: this simplifies processing and  
4321 avoids inefficiencies.

4322 If a set of one or more coordinated entities (e.g. a group of OBTs) assigns a set of OSCORE  
4323 Recipient IDs to OSCORE Security Contexts on a Device, then that set of entities is responsible  
4324 for avoiding duplicate OSCORE Recipient IDs. However, two non-coordinated entities assigning  
4325 OSCORE Recipient IDs might assign identical OSCORE Recipient IDs if there is no predefined  
4326 agreement on assignment of OSCORE Recipient IDs.

4327 For this reason, the first byte of the OSCORE Sender ID and OSCORE Recipient ID use a OSCORE  
4328 Identifier Namespace Prefix. The Table Y is the authoritative definition of the assigned OSCORE  
4329 Identifier Namespace Prefix values.

**Table 63 – OSCORE Identifier Namespace Prefix**

Value	Interpretation	Applicable clauses
0x00	Reserved for future use	
0x01	Directly provisioned OSCORE Security Context	16.2.4
0x02	Simple Secure Multicast	16.3
0x03-0x0F	Reserved for future use	

4331 **16.2.3 OSCORE protection and verification of unicast OCF CRUDN messages**

4332 All OSCORE message processing requirements in clause 8 in IETF RFC 8613 apply.

4333 NOTE 1: Clause 8 in IETF RFC 8613 requires the Client keep the association of the request Token (see IETF RFC 7252)  
4334 with the Security Context and Partial IV of the request, in order to be able to find the Security Context and compute the  
4335 OSCORE Additional Authenticated Data when verifying the response.

4336 If a Client has an established OSCORE Security Context associated with a Server, then the  
4337 following call flow applies whenever the Client sends unicast OCF CRUDN request targeting  
4338 Resources hosted on the Server. The Client may send multiple OSCORE requests to multiple  
4339 Servers

4340 1) The Client shall apply the OSCORE request protection processing to OCF CRUDN requests  
4341 targeting Resources hosted on the Server as specified in clause 8.1 in IETF RFC 8613, using  
4342 the OSCORE Security Context. See ISO/IEC 30118-1 for details on setting the Proxy-URI  
4343 option.

4344 The Client sends the OSCORE request message to the Server (optionally via OCF Proxies).  
4345 The OSCORE request message shall be delivered over secure transports: Device-to-Device  
4346 communication is secured as specified in clause 9.4.7; Device to Cloud communication is  
4347 secured as specified in OCF Cloud Specification and OCF Cloud Security Specification; and  
4348 Cloud-to-Cloud communication is secured as specified in OCF Cloud API for Cloud Services  
4349 Specification.

4350 2) The Server receives a unicast OSCORE request message. The Server shall apply the OSCORE  
4351 request verification and decryption processing in clause 8.2 of IETF RFC 8613 with the  
4352 following clarifications:

4353 a) At Step 2 in clause 8.2 of IETF RFC 8613

4354 i) If either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, the Server shall  
4355 respond with error response message (e.g. "Bad Option") including an Outer Max-Age  
4356 option with value zero.

4357 ii) The Server attempts to retrieve the OSCORE Security Contexts associated with the  
4358 Recipient ID in the 'kid' parameter. If the Server fails to retrieve a OSCORE Security  
4359 Context with OSCORE Recipient ID corresponding to the 'kid' parameter received, then  
4360 the Server shall respond with an error response message (e.g. "Unauthorized")  
4361 including an Outer Max-Age option with value zero.

4362 b) At step 6 in clause 8.2 of IETF RFC 8613, if the decryption failed then the Server shall  
4363 respond with an error response message (e.g. "Bad Request") including an Outer Max-Age  
4364 option with value zero.

4365 c) If a Server exposes one or more observable Resources, then the Server shall support  
4366 receiving OSCORE request messages using the Observe option.

4367 3) The Server shall process the OCF CRUDN request message (encapsulated in the OSCORE  
4368 request message) resulting in OCF CRUDN response message(s). The Server shall treat the  
4369 value of "subjectuuid" in the credential entry which contains the OSCORE Security Context  
4370 used to verify and decrypt the OSCORE request message in Step 2 as Client's Device UUID  
4371 for access control processing. The Server shall treat the connection type as "auth-crypt" for  
4372 access control processing.

4373 NOTE 2: Multiple OCF CRUDN response messages are only sent in scenarios where the OCF CRUDN Request message  
4374 is an Observe Request message.

4375 4) The Server shall apply the OSCORE response protection processing of clause 8.3 of IETF RFC  
4376 8613 to each OCF CRUDN response message, using the OSCORE Security Context used to  
4377 successfully decrypt the OSCORE request (in Step 2 of the present clause).  
4378 At Step 3 in clause 8.3 of IETF RFC 8613, the Server shall compute the AEAD nonce as  
4379 described in clause 5.2 of IETF RFC 8613 by applying the following steps:

4380 a) Encode the Partial IV (OSCORE Sender Sequence Number in network byte order) and  
4381 increment the OSCORE Sender Sequence Number by one.

4382 b) Compute the OSCORE AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV.

4383 The Server shall support sending the OCF CRUDN response messages using the Observe  
4384 option in OSCORE response messages. If an OCF CRUDN response message uses the  
4385 Observe option, then the OSCORE response message shall include an Outer Max-Age option  
4386 with value zero. The Server sends the OSCORE response message to the Client (optionally via  
4387 OCF Proxies). As with the OSCORE request message, the OSCORE response message shall  
4388 be delivered over secure transports - see Step 1 for details.

4389 The Server shall update the value of the "ssn" Property in the matching credential entry of the  
4390 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource to reflect the next value of the OSCORE Sender Sequence Number  
4391 to be sent to a corresponding Endpoint.

4392 NOTE 3: If a Client retrieves the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource over the OSCORE channel, the OSCORE Sender Sequence  
4393 Number in the header of the OSCORE message is expected to match the "ssn" value within the Resource representation.

4394 5) The Client receives the OSCORE response message. The Client uses the Token (see IETF  
4395 RFC 7252) in this response message to determine the corresponding OCF CRUDN request  
4396 message, the OSCORE Security Context and Partial IV in Step 1 of the present clause; see  
4397 Note 1. The Client shall apply OSCORE response protection processing of clause 8.3 of IETF  
4398 RFC 8613 using this OSCORE Security Context and Partial IV. The Client should ignore a  
4399 success response to an OSCORE-protected request if the response is not an OSCORE  
4400 response message (indicated by the presence of the OSCORE option).

#### 4401 **16.2.4 Direct provisioning of an OSCORE Security Context**

4402 This is a mechanism for establishing an OSCORE Security Context for communication between  
4403 two Endpoints. All configurable parameters of the OSCORE Security Context are either:

- 4404 – fixed to the OSCORE-specified default value, or
- 4405 – directly provisioned by an authorized Client (e.g. OBT) to a credential entry of the  
4406 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource of the two Endpoints.

4407 The following OSCORE Security Context parameters shall use the default values defined in clause  
4408 3.2 of IETF RFC 8613 (this information is not configured by the OBT):

- 4409 – AEAD Algorithm,
- 4410 – HKDF,
- 4411 – Replay Window,
- 4412 – Master Salt,
- 4413 – ID Context.

4414 The following OSCORE Security Context parameters and associated Device UUID shall be  
4415 provisioned to a credential entry of "/oic/sec/cred" of the Device:

- 4416 – The "subjectuud" shall be set to the deviceUUID of the other Endpoint to be associated with  
4417 the OSCORE Security Context.
- 4418 – The "credtype" shall be set to the value specified for a directly provisioned OSCORE Security  
4419 Context in Table 22, clause 13.3.1.

- 4420 – The "privatedata" Property of the credential entry shall be set to the 256-bit secret generated  
4421 by the provisioning client (e.g. OBT). This value shall be used as the OSCORE Master Secret.  
4422 Two Endpoints provisioned using this mechanism can communicate securely only if provisioned  
4423 with identical values for the OSCORE Master Secret.
- 4424 – The OSCORE Configuration parameters ("oscore") Property shall be present, and shall include  
4425 the following Properties:
  - 4426 – The OSCORE Sender ID of the OSCORE Security Context is in the "senderid" Property.  
4427 That value shall be set to the hexadecimal representation of a 56-bit value selected by the  
4428 provisioning Client (e.g. OBT). When using the mechanism described in the present clause,  
4429 the first byte of this value is expected to have the value assigned in Table 63 for a directly  
4430 provisioned OSCORE Security Context.
  - 4431 – The OSCORE Recipient ID of the OSCORE Security Context is in the "recipientid" Property.  
4432 That value shall be set to the hexadecimal representation of a 56-bit value selected by the  
4433 provisioning Client (e.g. OBT). The first byte of this value is expected to have the value  
4434 assigned in Table 63 for a directly provisioned OSCORE Security Context.


4435 NOTE: The values for the OSCORE Sender ID and OSCORE Recipient ID of the OSCORE Security Context for one  
4436 Device are provisioned as the values for the OSCORE Recipient ID and OSCORE Sender ID of the OSCORE Security  
4437 Context for the other Device respectively.

4438 On Device powering down, for each such credential entry, the Device shall write the value of  
4439 corresponding OSCORE Sender Sequence Number as "ssn" Property to non-volatile memory. In  
4440 event of a crash, devices should apply Appendix B.1.1 of IETF RFC 8613.

### 4441 16.3 Simple Secure Multicast

#### 4442 16.3.1 Introduction to Simple Secure Multicast

4443 The communication model is that one (1) Client communicates to a group of Servers with a single  
4444 UPDATE request, as shown in Figure 34. Each Server receives the UPDATE request at approximately the same time  
4445 and can execute the UPDATE request at approximately the same time. As example of this kind of communication is sending an "on"  
4446 command to a group of lights, all lights that are member of that group turn on at approximately the same time. Sending UPDATE  
4447 requests to a group of devices can be achieved on IP by means of sending messages to a  
4448 predefined URL on a multicast address.  
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**Figure 34 – Simple Multicast requests**

4452 Security of SSM is accomplished by applying an application layer of in-transit protection and below  
4453 the resource-access authorization layer, using OSCORE IETF RFC 8613.

4454 Relative to an exchange of an UPDATE non-confirmable message:

4455 – The Device acting as a Client (that is, sending an UPDATE request message) acts as an  
4456 OSCORE client. Within the scope of clause 16.3 the single Client is assumed to support  
4457 OSCORE and perform OSCORE client processing.

4458 – The Device acting as a Server (that is, receiving an UPDATE request message) acts as an  
4459 OSCORE server. Within the scope of clause 16.3, all Servers are assumed to support OSCORE  
4460 and perform OSCORE server processing.

4461 Clause 16.3.2 details the assumptions and prerequisites for correct functioning of SSM. Clause  
4462 16.3.3 describes the process for encapsulating an UPDATE request message into an SSM Request  
4463 at the Client of an SSM Group, and subsequent extraction of an UPDATE request message from  
4464 an SSM Request at the Server of an SSM Group. Clause 16.3.4 specifies how a Client generates  
4465 an OSCORE Common Context and OSCORE Sender Context from an SSM Client Context and  
4466 specifies how a Server generates an OSCORE Common Context and OSCORE Recipient Context  
4467 from an SSM Server Context.

### 4468 **16.3.2 Assumptions and prerequisites for Simple Secure Multicast**

4469 As shown in the following example, any Server of the SSM Group can generate an SSM Request  
4470 which other Servers in the SSM Group will interpret as being securely sent by the Client of the  
4471 SSM Group, for the purposes of privilege escalation. The security of SSM relies on the assumption  
4472 that no Server in the SSM Group attempts to generate an SSM Request using the credentials for  
4473 the SSM Group. SSM should only be used in scenarios where the Security Domain Owner is  
4474 confident that this is a valid assumption.

4475 SSM Requests are delivered to SSM-capable Servers via the All OCF Nodes multicast address  
4476 defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1. As specified in ISO/IEC 30118-1, all Servers subscribe to this multicast  
4477 address to facilitate discovery of "oic/res", and consequently all Servers can receive SSM Requests  
4478 delivered in this manner. A Server that supports the reception of SSM Requests for one or more  
4479 Resources that it hosts shall populate the All OCF nodes multicast address in the "eps" Parameter  
4480 of the Resource Links of those Resources in the "oic/res" discovery response.

4481 The configured Client is aware of Multicast enabled Servers by means of detecting the multicast  
4482 enabled resources in the Device discovery "oic/res" responses. The Client also knows how to  
4483 create the multicast request to that resource, by means of the Introspection Device Data hosted on  
4484 the Device. Therefore, the Client is able to send an UPDATE request to the multicast enabled  
4485 Resources.

4486 The Client of an SSM Group cannot form SSM Requests for the SSM Group until the Client is  
4487 provisioned with the SSM Client Context for the SSM Group. Likewise, each Server in an SSM  
4488 Group cannot process SSM Requests for the SSM Group until the Server is provisioned with the  
4489 SSM Server Context for the SSM Group. The SSM Client Context and SSM Server Context are  
4490 provisioned by an OBT as specified in OCF Onboarding Tool Specification. Clause 16.3.4 specifies  
4491 how the OSCORE Sender Context at a Client is derived from an SSM Client Context, and how the  
4492 OSCORE Recipient Context at a Server is derived from an SSM Server Context.

4493 The UPDATE request encapsulated in an SSM Request includes a local URI path for a target  
4494 Resource. A Server in the SSM Group for whom the request is intended, will process the request  
4495 using the Resource at this local URI path, if such a Resource exists and the Resource matches the  
4496 Resource Type and OCF Interface in the request. The SSM feature is designed with the  
4497 assumption that the local URI path, Resource Type and supported OCF Interfaces on the intended  
4498 Servers are consistent; but the SSM feature does not specify how such consistency is achieved.

4499 The UPDATE request message itself is expected to contain information in such way that the Server  
4500 can determine if the received UPDATE request message is intended for the Server, but the  
4501 specification of this information is not part of the SSM feature.

### 4502 **16.3.3 OSCORE protection and verification of Simple Secure Multicast Requests**

4503 All OSCORE message processing requirements in clauses 8.1 and 8.2 in IETF RFC 8613 apply.

4504 If a Client has an established SSM Client Context associated with an SSM Group, then the following  
4505 call flow applies whenever the Client sends a multicast non-confirmable UPDATE request targeting  
4506 multicast enabled Resources hosted on one or more Servers of the SSM Group.

4507 1) The Client shall apply the OSCORE request protection processing to the UPDATE request as  
4508 specified in clause 8.1 in IETF RFC 8613, using the OSCORE Security Context derived from  
4509 the SSM Client Context as specified in clause 16.3.4. See ISO/IEC 30118-1 for details on  
4510 setting the Proxy-URI option.

4511 The Client shall send the resulting OSCORE request message to the predefined All OCF Nodes  
4512 multicast address. Dependent on the deployment scenario the different scopes as defined in  
4513 clause 12.2.9 of ISO/IEC 30118-1 can be used.

4514 2) All Servers subscribed to the predefined multicast address receive a copy of the OSCORE  
4515 request message. Each Server supporting SSM which receives the OSCORE request message  
4516 shall apply the OSCORE request verification and decryption processing in clause 8.2 of IETF  
4517 RFC 8613 with the following clarifications:

4518 a) At Step 2 in clause 8.2 of IETF RFC 8613

4519 i) If either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, the Server shall  
4520 ignore the message and shall not respond.

4521 ii) The Server attempts to retrieve the SSM Server Contexts with "recipientID" matching  
4522 the 'kid' parameter. If the Server fails to retrieve an SSM Server Context with  
4523 "recipientID" matching the 'kid' parameter received, then the Server shall ignore the  
4524 message and shall not respond.

4525 b) At step 6 in clause 8.2 of IETF RFC 8613, if the decryption failed then the Server shall  
4526 ignore the message and shall not respond.

4527 3) If any of the following criteria are met, then the CRUDN request message shall be silently  
4528 discarded, and a response shall not be sent:

4529 – The operation of the CRUDN request is not the non-confirmable UPDATE operation on a  
4530 multicast address.

4531 – The UPDATE request message is not intended for the Server – see clause 16.3.2 for further  
4532 details.

4533 – There is no Resource hosted on the Server at the local URI path in the UPDATE request  
4534 message.

4535 4) The Server shall process the UPDATE request message (encapsulated in the OSCORE request  
4536 message). The Server shall treat the value of "subjectuuid" in the credential entry which  
4537 contains the OSCORE Security Context used to verify and decrypt the OSCORE request  
4538 message in Step 2 as Client's Device UUID for access control processing. The Server shall  
4539 treat the connection type as "auth-crypt" for access control processing. The Server shall not  
4540 send a response.

4541 The mechanism outlined is for sending a message in a send and forget mode, i.e. sending a  
4542 message to a group of Servers, where each Server does not acknowledge the receipt. Since  
4543 multicast requests are typically unreliable (e.g. non-confirmable messages) the best practice is to  
4544 send the same UPDATE request more than once in a short time frame. This is sufficient since the  
4545 multicast communication has in most cases a unicast variant for the same UPDATE request.

4546 Notification (see clause 11.3 of ISO/IEC 30118-1) may be used to verify if the actual UPDATE  
4547 request has been executed. If a subset of the group of Servers did not receive the UPDATE request,  
4548 unicast (confirmable) messages can be used to complete the desired overall state of the system.

#### 4549 **16.3.4 Creating OSCORE Security Context for Simple Secure Multicast**

4550 The present clause specifies how

- 4551 – a Client of an SSM Group creates a OSCORE Security Context from a SSM Client Context  
4552 provisioned to a credential entry of the Client.
- 4553 – a Server of an SSM Group creates a OSCORE Security Context from a SSM Server Context  
4554 provisioned to a credential entry of the Server.

4555 All configurable parameters of the OSCORE Security Context are either:

- 4556 – fixed to the OSCORE-specified default value, or
- 4557 – directly provisioned by an OBT to a credential entry of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.

4558 The following parameters of the OSCORE Security Context used for encryption by the Client of an  
4559 SSM Group shall be set to the default values defined in clause 3.2 of IETF RFC 8613 (this  
4560 information is not configured by the OBT):

- 4561 – AEAD Algorithm,
- 4562 – HKDF,
- 4563 – Master Salt,
- 4564 – ID Context.

4565 The following parameters of the OSCORE Security Context parameters used for encryption by the  
4566 Client of an SSM Group are derived from the SSM Client Context provisioned to a credential entry  
4567 of "/oic/sec/cred" of the Client:

- 4568 – The "subjectuid" may be any schema compliant value. This Property serves no purpose when  
4569 used in an SSM Client Context.
- 4570 – The credential entry is identified as an SSM Client Context when the "credtype" matches the  
4571 value specified for a SSM Client Context in Table 22, clause 13.3.1.
- 4572 – The "privatedata" Property contains a 256-bit value which shall be used as the OSCORE Master  
4573 Secret.
- 4574 – The OSCORE Configuration parameters ("oscore") Property is present, and includes the  
4575 following Properties:
  - 4576 – The "senderid" Property shall be used as the OSCORE Sender ID of the OSCORE Security  
4577 Context. The "recipientid" Property value shall be interpreted as the hexadecimal  
4578 representation of a 56-bit value. The first byte of this value is expected to have the value  
4579 assigned in Table Y for Simple Secure Multicast.
  - 4580 – The "desc" Property is not used in security processing. This Property is described in clause  
4581 9.3.9.

4582 On the Device shutting down, for each such credential entry, the Device shall write the value of  
4583 corresponding OSCORE Sender Sequence Number as "ssn" Property to non-volatile memory. In  
4584 event of a crash, devices should apply Appendix B.1.1 of IETF RFC 8613.

4585 The following parameters of the OSCORE Security Context used by a Server of an SSM Group for  
4586 verification and decryption shall be set to the default values defined in clause 3.2 of IETF RFC  
4587 8613 (this information is not configured by the OBT):

- 4588 – AEAD Algorithm,
- 4589 – HKDF,

- 4590 – Replay Window,
- 4591 – Master Salt,
- 4592 – ID Context.

4593 The following parameters of the OSCORE Security Context parameters used by a Server of an  
4594 SSM Group for verification and decryption are derived from the SSM Server Context provisioned  
4595 to a credential entry of "/oic/sec/cred" of the Server:

- 4596 – The "subjectuid" is used for access control processing as described in Step 4 of clause 16.3.3.
- 4597 – The credential entry is identified as an SSM Server Context when the "credtype" matches to  
4598 the value specified for an SSM Server Context in Table 22, clause 13.3.1.
- 4599 – The "privatedata" Property of the credential entry contains a 256-bit value which shall be used  
4600 as the OSCORE Master Secret.
- 4601 – The OSCORE Configuration parameters ("oscore") Property is present, and includes the  
4602 following Properties:
  - 4603 – The "recipientid" Property shall be used as the OSCORE Recipient ID of the OSCORE Security  
4604 Context. The "recipientid" Property value shall be interpreted as the hexadecimal representation  
4605 of a 56-bit value. The first byte of this value is expected to have the value assigned in Table Y  
4606 for Simple Secure Multicast.
  - 4607 – The "desc" Property is not used in security processing. This Property is described in clause  
4608 9.3.9.

Annex A  
(Informative)  
Access Control Examples

4609  
4610  
4611

4612 Figure A-1 shows how an "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource could be configured to enforce an example  
4613 access policy on the Server.

```
4614 {  
4615     "aclist2": [  
4616         {  
4617             // Subject with ID ...01 should access two named Resources with access mode "CRUDN" (Create, Retrieve, Update,  
4618             Delete and Notify)  
4619             "subject": {"uuid": "XXXX-...-XX01"},  
4620             "resources": [  
4621                 {"href": "/oic/sh/light/1"},  
4622                 {"href": "/oic/sh/temp/0"}  
4623             ],  
4624             "permission": 31, // 31 dec = 0b0001 1111 which maps to ---N DURC  
4625             "validity": [  
4626                 // The period starting at 18:00:00 UTC, on January 1, 2015 and  
4627                 // ending at 07:00:00 UTC on January 2, 2015  
4628                 "period": ["20150101T180000Z/20150102T070000Z"],  
4629                 // Repeats the {period} every week until the last day of Jan. 2015.  
4630                 "recurrence": ["RRULE:FREQ=WEEKLY;UNTIL=20150131T070000Z"]  
4631             ],  
4632             "aceid": 1  
4633         }  
4634     ],  
4635     // An ACL provisioning and management service should be identified as  
4636     // the resource owner  
4637     "rowneruid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"  
4638 }  
4639
```

**Figure A-1 – Example "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource**

4640  
4641  
4642

**Annex B  
(Informative)  
Execution environment security profiles**

4643 Given that IoT verticals and Devices will not be of uniform capabilities, a one-size-fits all security  
4644 robustness requirements meeting all IOT applications and services will not serve the needs of OCF,  
4645 and security profiles of varying degree of robustness (trustworthiness), cost and complexity have  
4646 to be defined. To address a large ecosystem of vendors, the profiles can only be defined as  
4647 requirements and the exact solutions meeting those requirements are specific to the vendors' open  
4648 or proprietary implementations, and thus in most part outside scope of this document.

4649 To align with the rest of OCF documents, where Device classifications follow IETF RFC 7228  
4650 (Terminology for constrained node networks) methodology, we limit the number of security profiles  
4651 to a maximum of 3 (see Table B.1). However, our understanding is OCF capabilities criteria for  
4652 each of 3 classes will be more fit to the current IoT chip market than that of IETF.

4653 Given the extremely low level of resources at class 0, our expectation is that class 0 Devices are  
4654 either capable of no security functionality or easily breakable security that depend on environmental  
4655 (e.g. availability of human) factors to perform security functions. This means the class 0 will not be  
4656 equipped with an SEE.

4657

**Table B.1 – OCF Security Profile**

<b>Platform class</b>	<b>SEE</b>	<b>Robustness level</b>
0	No	N/A
1	Yes	Low
2	Yes	High

4658 NOTE This analysis acknowledges that these Platform classifications do not take into consideration of possibility of  
4659 security co-processor or other hardware security capability that augments classification criteria (namely CPU speed,  
4660 memory, storage).

4661  
4662  
4663

## Annex C (normative) Resource Type definitions

### 4664 C.1 List of Resource Type definitions

4665 Table C.1 contains the list of defined security Resources in this document.

4666 **Table C.1 – Alphabetized list of security Resources**

Friendly Name (informative)	Resource Type (rt)	Clause
Access Control List 2	oic.r.acl2	C.2
Auditable Event List	oic.r.ael	C.9
Certificate Signing Request	oic.r.csr	C.4
Credential	oic.r.cred	C.3
Device owner transfer method	oic.r.doxm	C.5
Device Provisioning Status	oic.r.pstat	C.6
Roles	oic.r.roles	C.7
Security Profile	oic.r.sp	C.8
Security Domain Information	oic.r.sdi	C.10

### 4667 C.2 Access Control List-2

#### 4668 C.2.1 Introduction

4669 This Resource specifies the local access control list.  
4670 When used without query parameters, all the ACE entries are returned.  
4671 When used with a query parameter, only the ACEs matching the specified  
4672 parameter are returned.  
4673

#### 4674 C.2.2 Well-known URI

4675 /oic/sec/acl2

#### 4676 C.2.3 Resource type

4677 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.acl2".

#### 4678 C.2.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
4679 {  
4680   "swagger": "2.0",  
4681   "info": {  
4682     "title": "Access Control List-2",  
4683     "version": "2019-01-11",  
4684     "license": {  
4685       "name": "OCF Data Model License",  
4686       "url":  
4687         "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI  
4688         CENSE.md",  
4689       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights  
4690       reserved."  
4691     },  
4692     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"  
4693   },  
4694   "schemes": ["http"],  
4695   "consumes": ["application/json"],  
4696   "produces": ["application/json"],  
4697   "paths": {
```

```

4698     "/oic/sec/acl2" : {
4699         "get": {
4700             "description": "This Resource specifies the local access control list.\nWhen used without
4701 query parameters, all the ACE entries are returned.\nWhen used with a query parameter, only the ACEs
4702 matching the specified\nparameter are returned.\n",
4703             "parameters": [
4704                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
4705                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/ace-filtered"}
4706             ],
4707             "responses": {
4708                 "200": {
4709                     "description": "",
4710                     "x-example":
4711                         {
4712                             "rt" : ["oic.r.acl2"],
4713                             "aclist2": [
4714                                 {
4715                                     "aceid": 1,
4716                                     "subject": {
4717                                         "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4718                                         "role": "SOME_STRING"
4719                                     },
4720                                     "resources": [
4721                                         {
4722                                             "href": "/light"
4723                                         },
4724                                         {
4725                                             "href": "/door"
4726                                         }
4727                                     ],
4728                                     "permission": 24
4729                                 },
4730                                 {
4731                                     "aceid": 2,
4732                                     "subject": {
4733                                         "uuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4734                                     },
4735                                     "resources": [
4736                                         {
4737                                             "href": "/light"
4738                                         },
4739                                         {
4740                                             "href": "/door"
4741                                         }
4742                                     ],
4743                                     "permission": 24
4744                                 },
4745                                 {
4746                                     "aceid": 3,
4747                                     "subject": {"conntype": "anon-clear"},
4748                                     "resources": [
4749                                         {
4750                                             "href": "/light"
4751                                         },
4752                                         {
4753                                             "href": "/door"
4754                                         }
4755                                     ],
4756                                     "permission": 16,
4757                                     "validity": [
4758                                         {
4759                                             "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
4760                                             "recurrence": [ "DSTART:XXXXX",
4761 "RRULE:FREQ=DAILY;UNTIL=20180131T140000Z;BYMONTH=1" ]
4762                                         },
4763                                         {
4764                                             "period": "20160101T180000Z/PT5H30M",
4765                                             "recurrence": [ "RRULE:FREQ=DAILY;UNTIL=20180131T140000Z;BYMONTH=1" ]
4766                                         }
4767                                     ]
4768                                 }
4769                             ]
4770                         }
4771                 }
4772             }
4773         }
4774     },

```

```

4770         "rowneruuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014"
4771     },
4772     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Acl2" }
4773 },
4774 "400": {
4775     "description": "The request is invalid."
4776 }
4777 },
4778 },
4779 "post": {
4780     "description": "Updates the ACL Resource with the provided ACEs.\n\nACEs provided in the
4781 update with aceids not currently in the ACL\nResource are added.\n\nACEs provided in the update with
4782 aceid(s) already in the ACL completely\nreplace the ACE(s) in the ACL Resource.\n\nACEs provided in
4783 the update without aceid properties are added and\nassigned unique aceids in the ACL Resource.\n",
4784     "parameters": [
4785         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
4786         { "$ref": "#/parameters/ace-filtered" },
4787     ],
4788     "name": "body",
4789     "in": "body",
4790     "required": true,
4791     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Acl2-Update" },
4792     "x-example":
4793     {
4794         "aclist2": [
4795             {
4796                 "aceid": 1,
4797                 "subject": {
4798                     "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4799                     "role": "SOME_STRING"
4800                 },
4801                 "resources": [
4802                     {
4803                         "href": "/light"
4804                     },
4805                     {
4806                         "href": "/door"
4807                     }
4808                 ],
4809                 "permission": 24
4810             },
4811             {
4812                 "aceid": 3,
4813                 "subject": {
4814                     "uuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4815                 },
4816                 "resources": [
4817                     {
4818                         "href": "/light"
4819                     },
4820                     {
4821                         "href": "/door"
4822                     }
4823                 ],
4824                 "permission": 24
4825             }
4826         ],
4827         "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4828     }
4829 },
4830 ],
4831 "responses": {
4832     "400": {
4833         "description": "The request is invalid."
4834     },
4835     "201": {
4836         "description": "The ACL entry is created."
4837     },
4838     "204": {
4839         "description": "The ACL entry is updated."
4840     }
4841 }

```

```

4842     },
4843     "delete": {
4844         "description": "Deletes ACL entries.\nWhen DELETE is used without query parameters, all the
4845 ACE entries are deleted.\nWhen DELETE is used with a query parameter, only the ACEs matching
4846 the\nspecified parameter are deleted.\n",
4847         "parameters": [
4848             {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
4849             {"$ref": "#/parameters/ace-filtered"}
4850         ],
4851         "responses": {
4852             "200": {
4853                 "description": "The matching ACEs or the entire ACL Resource has been successfully
4854 deleted."
4855             },
4856             "400": {
4857                 "description": "The request is invalid."
4858             }
4859         }
4860     }
4861 },
4862 },
4863 "parameters": {
4864     "interface": {
4865         "in": "query",
4866         "name": "if",
4867         "type": "string",
4868         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
4869     },
4870     "ace-filtered": {
4871         "in": "query",
4872         "name": "aceid",
4873         "required": false,
4874         "type": "integer",
4875         "description": "Only applies to the ACE with the specified aceid.",
4876         "x-example": 2112
4877     }
4878 },
4879 "definitions": {
4880     "Acl2": {
4881         "properties": {
4882             "owneruuid": {
4883                 "description": "The value identifies the unique Resource owner\nFormat pattern according
4884 to IETF RFC 4122.",
4885                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
4886 9]{12}$",
4887                 "type": "string"
4888             },
4889             "rt": {
4890                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
4891                 "items": {
4892                     "maxLength": 64,
4893                     "type": "string",
4894                     "enum": [ "oic.r.acl2" ]
4895                 },
4896                 "minItems": 1,
4897                 "readOnly": true,
4898                 "type": "array"
4899             },
4900             "aclist2": {
4901                 "description": "Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.",
4902                 "items": {
4903                     "properties": {
4904                         "aceid": {
4905                             "description": "An identifier for the ACE that is unique within the ACL. In cases
4906 where it isn't supplied in an update, the Server will add the ACE and assign it a unique value.",
4907                             "minimum": 1,
4908                             "type": "integer"
4909                         },
4910                         "permission": {
4911                             "description": "Bitmask encoding of CRUDN permission\nThe encoded bitmask indicating
4912 permissions.",
4913                             "x-detail-desc": [

```

```

4914         "0 - No permissions",
4915         "1 - Create permission is granted",
4916         "2 - Read, observe, discover permission is granted",
4917         "4 - Write, update permission is granted",
4918         "8 - Delete permission is granted",
4919         "16 - Notify permission is granted"
4920     ],
4921     "maximum": 31,
4922     "minimum": 0,
4923     "type": "integer"
4924 },
4925 "resources": {
4926     "description": "References the application's Resources to which a security policy
4927 applies.",
4928     "items": {
4929         "description": "Each Resource must have at least one of these properties set.",
4930         "properties": {
4931             "href": {
4932                 "description": "When present, the ACE only applies when the href matches\nThis
4933 is the target URI, it can be specified as a Relative Reference or fully-qualified URI.",
4934                 "format": "uri",
4935                 "maxLength": 256,
4936                 "type": "string"
4937             },
4938             "wc": {
4939                 "description": "A wildcard matching policy.",
4940                 "pattern": "^[~+]*$",
4941                 "type": "string"
4942             }
4943         },
4944         "type": "object"
4945     },
4946     "type": "array"
4947 },
4948 "subject": {
4949     "anyOf": [
4950         {
4951             "description": "This is the Device identifier.",
4952             "properties": {
4953                 "uuid": {
4954                     "description": "A UUID Device ID\nFormat pattern according to IETF RFC
4955 4122.",
4956                     "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-
4957 fA-F0-9]{12}$",
4958                     "type": "string"
4959                 }
4960             },
4961             "required": [
4962                 "uuid"
4963             ],
4964             "type": "object"
4965         },
4966         {
4967             "description": "Security role specified as an <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL
4968 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
4969             "properties": {
4970                 "authority": {
4971                     "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A
4972 NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
4973                     "type": "string"
4974                 },
4975                 "role": {
4976                     "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
4977                     "type": "string"
4978                 }
4979             },
4980             "required": [
4981                 "role"
4982             ],
4983             "type": "object"
4984         },
4985     ]

```

```

4986         "properties": {
4987             "conntype": {
4988                 "description": "This property allows an ACE to be matched based on the
4989 connection or message type.",
4990                 "x-detail-desc": [
4991                     "auth-crypt - ACE applies if the Client is authenticated and the data
4992 channel or message is encrypted and integrity protected",
4993                     "anon-clear - ACE applies if the Client is not authenticated and the data
4994 channel or message is not encrypted but may be integrity protected"
4995                 ],
4996                 "enum": [
4997                     "auth-crypt",
4998                     "anon-clear"
4999                 ],
5000                 "type": "string"
5001             }
5002         },
5003         "required": [
5004             "conntype"
5005         ],
5006         "type": "object"
5007     }
5008 ]
5009 },
5010 "validity": {
5011     "description": "validity is an array of time-pattern objects.",
5012     "items": {
5013         "description": "The time-pattern contains a period and recurrence expressed in
5014 RFC5545 syntax.",
5015         "properties": {
5016             "period": {
5017                 "description": "String represents a period using the RFC5545 Period.",
5018                 "type": "string"
5019             },
5020             "recurrence": {
5021                 "description": "String array represents a recurrence rule using the RFC5545
5022 Recurrence.",
5023                 "items": {
5024                     "type": "string"
5025                 },
5026                 "type": "array"
5027             }
5028         },
5029         "required": [
5030             "period"
5031         ],
5032         "type": "object"
5033     },
5034     "type": "array"
5035 }
5036 },
5037 "required": [
5038     "aceid",
5039     "resources",
5040     "permission",
5041     "subject"
5042 ],
5043 "type": "object"
5044 },
5045 "type": "array"
5046 },
5047 "n": {
5048     "$ref":
5049 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5050 schema.json#/definitions/n"
5051 },
5052 "id": {
5053     "$ref":
5054 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5055 schema.json#/definitions/id"
5056 },
5057 "if" : {

```

```

5058         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5059         "items": {
5060             "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
5061             "type": "string"
5062         },
5063         "minItems": 1,
5064         "readOnly": true,
5065         "type": "array"
5066     }
5067 },
5068     "type" : "object",
5069     "required": ["acllist2", "rowneruuid"]
5070 },
5071     "Acl2-Update" : {
5072         "properties": {
5073             "rowneruuid" : {
5074                 "description": "The value identifies the unique Resource owner\n Format pattern according
5075 to IETF RFC 4122.",
5076                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5077 9]{12}$",
5078                 "type": "string"
5079             },
5080             "acllist2" : {
5081                 "description": "Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.",
5082                 "items": {
5083                     "properties": {
5084                         "aceid": {
5085                             "description": "An identifier for the ACE that is unique within the ACL. In cases
5086 where it isn't supplied in an update, the Server will add the ACE and assign it a unique value.",
5087                             "minimum": 1,
5088                             "type": "integer"
5089                         },
5090                         "permission": {
5091                             "description": "Bitmask encoding of CRUDN permission\nThe encoded bitmask indicating
5092 permissions.",
5093                             "x-detail-desc": [
5094                                 "0 - No permissions",
5095                                 "1 - Create permission is granted",
5096                                 "2 - Read, observe, discover permission is granted",
5097                                 "4 - Write, update permission is granted",
5098                                 "8 - Delete permission is granted",
5099                                 "16 - Notify permission is granted"
5100                             ],
5101                             "maximum": 31,
5102                             "minimum": 0,
5103                             "type": "integer"
5104                         },
5105                         "resources": {
5106                             "description": "References the application's Resources to which a security policy
5107 applies.",
5108                             "items": {
5109                                 "description": "Each Resource must have at least one of these properties set.",
5110                                 "properties": {
5111                                     "href": {
5112                                         "description": "When present, the ACE only applies when the href matches\nThis
5113 is the target URI, it can be specified as a Relative Reference or fully-qualified URI.",
5114                                         "format": "uri",
5115                                         "maxLength": 256,
5116                                         "type": "string"
5117                                     },
5118                                     "wc": {
5119                                         "description": "A wildcard matching policy.",
5120                                         "x-detail-desc": [
5121                                             "+ - Matches all discoverable Resources",
5122                                             "- - Matches all non-discoverable Resources",
5123                                             "* - Matches all Resources"
5124                                         ],
5125                                         "enum": [
5126                                             "+",
5127                                             "-",
5128                                             "*"
5129                                         ]
5130                                     }
5131                                 }
5132                             }
5133                         }
5134                     }
5135                 }
5136             }
5137         }
5138     }
5139 }

```

```

5130         "type": "string"
5131     },
5132 },
5133     "type": "object"
5134 },
5135     "type": "array"
5136 },
5137     "subject": {
5138         "anyOf": [
5139             {
5140                 "description": "This is the Device identifier.",
5141                 "properties": {
5142                     "uuid": {
5143                         "description": "A UUID Device ID\n Format pattern according to IETF RFC
5144 4122.",
5145                         "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-
5146 fA-F0-9]{12}$",
5147                         "type": "string"
5148                     }
5149                 },
5150                 "required": [
5151                     "uuid"
5152                 ],
5153                 "type": "object"
5154             },
5155             {
5156                 "description": "Security role specified as an <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL
5157 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5158                 "properties": {
5159                     "authority": {
5160                         "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A
5161 NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5162                         "type": "string"
5163                     },
5164                     "role": {
5165                         "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
5166                         "type": "string"
5167                     }
5168                 },
5169                 "required": [
5170                     "role"
5171                 ],
5172                 "type": "object"
5173             },
5174             {
5175                 "properties": {
5176                     "conntype": {
5177                         "description": "This property allows an ACE to be matched based on the
5178 connection or message type.",
5179                         "x-detail-desc": [
5180                             "auth-crypt - ACE applies if the Client is authenticated and the data
5181 channel or message is encrypted and integrity protected",
5182                             "anon-clear - ACE applies if the Client is not authenticated and the data
5183 channel or message is not encrypted but may be integrity protected"
5184                         ],
5185                         "enum": [
5186                             "auth-crypt",
5187                             "anon-clear"
5188                         ],
5189                         "type": "string"
5190                     }
5191                 },
5192                 "required": [
5193                     "conntype"
5194                 ],
5195                 "type": "object"
5196             }
5197         ]
5198     },
5199     "validity": {
5200         "description": "validity is an array of time-pattern objects.",
5201         "items": {

```

```

5202         "description": "The time-pattern contains a period and recurrence expressed in
5203 RFC5545 syntax.",
5204         "properties": {
5205             "period": {
5206                 "description": "String represents a period using the RFC5545 Period.",
5207                 "type": "string"
5208             },
5209             "recurrence": {
5210                 "description": "String array represents a recurrence rule using the RFC5545
5211 Recurrence.",
5212                 "items": {
5213                     "type": "string"
5214                 },
5215                 "type": "array"
5216             }
5217         },
5218         "required": [
5219             "period"
5220         ],
5221         "type": "object"
5222     },
5223     "type": "array"
5224 }
5225 },
5226 "required": [
5227     "resources",
5228     "permission",
5229     "subject"
5230 ],
5231 "type": "object"
5232 },
5233 "type": "array"
5234 }
5235 },
5236 "type" : "object"
5237 }
5238 }
5239 }
5240

```

### 5241 C.2.5 Property definition

5242 Table C-1 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.acl2" Resource Type.

5243 **Table C-1 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.acl2".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	The value identifies the unique Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
aclist2	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.

rowneruuid	string	No	Read Write	The value identifies the unique Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
aclist2	array: see schema	No	Read Write	Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.

5244 **C.2.6 CRUDN behaviour**

5245 Table C-2 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.acl2" Resource Type.

5246 **Table C-2 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.acl2".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post	delete	observe

5247 **C.3 Credential**

5248 **C.3.1 Introduction**

5249 This Resource specifies credentials a Device may use to establish secure communication.

5250 Retrieves the credential data.

5251 When used without query parameters, all the credential entries are returned.

5252 When used with a query parameter, only the credentials matching the specified  
5253 parameter are returned.

5254

5255 Note that write-only credential data will not be returned.

5256

5257 **C.3.2 Well-known URI**

5258 /oic/sec/cred

5259 **C.3.3 Resource type**

5260 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.cred".

5261 **C.3.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition**

```
5262 {
5263   "swagger": "2.0",
5264   "info": {
5265     "title": "Credential",
5266     "version": "2020-10-19",
5267     "license": {
5268       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
5269       "url":
5270 "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
5271 CENSE.md",
5272       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019, 2020 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
5273 reserved."
5274     },
5275     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
5276   },
5277   "schemes": ["http"],
5278   "consumes": ["application/json"],
5279   "produces": ["application/json"],
5280   "paths": {
5281     "/oic/sec/cred": {
5282       "get": {
5283         "description": "This Resource specifies credentials a Device may use to establish secure
5284 communication.\nRetrieves the credential data.\nWhen used without query parameters, all the
5285 credential entries are returned.\nWhen used with a query parameter, only the credentials matching
```

```

5286 the specified\nparameter are returned.\n\nNote that write-only credential data will not be
5287 returned.\n",
5288     "parameters": [
5289         {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
5290         {"$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-credid"},
5291         {"$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-subjectuuid"}
5292     ],
5293     "responses": {
5294         "200": {
5295             "description": "",
5296             "x-example": {
5297                 "rt": ["oic.r.cred"],
5298                 "creds": [
5299                     {
5300                         "credid": 55,
5301                         "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
5302                         "roleid": {
5303                             "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
5304                             "role": "SOME_STRING"
5305                         },
5306                         "credtype": 32,
5307                         "publicdata": {
5308                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5309                             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5310                         },
5311                         "privatedata": {
5312                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.raw",
5313                             "data": "RAW-ENCODED-VALUE",
5314                             "handle": 4
5315                         },
5316                         "optionaldata": {
5317                             "revstat": false,
5318                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5319                             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5320                         },
5321                         "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
5322                         "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
5323                     },
5324                     {
5325                         "credid": 56,
5326                         "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
5327                         "roleid": {
5328                             "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
5329                             "role": "SOME_STRING"
5330                         },
5331                         "credtype": 1,
5332                         "publicdata": {
5333                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5334                             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5335                         },
5336                         "privatedata": {
5337                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
5338                             "data": "BASE-64-ENCODED-VALUE",
5339                             "handle": 4
5340                         },
5341                         "optionaldata": {
5342                             "revstat": false,
5343                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5344                             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5345                         },
5346                         "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
5347                         "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
5348                     }
5349                 ]
5350             },
5351             "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
5352         },
5353         "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Cred" }
5354     },
5355     "400": {
5356         "description": "The request is invalid."
5357     }

```

```

5358     },
5359   },
5360   "post": {
5361     "description": "Updates the credential Resource with the provided
5362 credentials.\n\nCredentials provided in the update with credid(s) not currently in the\ncredential
5363 Resource are added.\n\nCredentials provided in the update with credid(s) already in the\ncredential
5364 Resource completely replace the creds in the credential\nResource.\n\nCredentials provided in the
5365 update without credid(s) properties are\nadded and assigned unique credid(s) in the credential
5366 Resource.\n",
5367     "parameters": [
5368       { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
5369       {
5370         "name": "body",
5371         "in": "body",
5372         "required": true,
5373         "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Cred-Update" },
5374         "x-example":
5375           {
5376             "creds": [
5377               {
5378                 "credid": 55,
5379                 "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
5380                 "roleid": {
5381                   "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
5382                   "role": "SOME_STRING"
5383                 },
5384                 "credtype": 32,
5385                 "publicdata": {
5386                   "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5387                   "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5388                 },
5389                 "privatedata": {
5390                   "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.raw",
5391                   "data": "RAW-ENCODED-VALUE",
5392                   "handle": 4
5393                 },
5394                 "optionaldata": {
5395                   "revstat": false,
5396                   "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5397                   "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5398                 },
5399                 "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
5400                 "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
5401               },
5402               {
5403                 "credid": 56,
5404                 "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
5405                 "roleid": {
5406                   "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
5407                   "role": "SOME_STRING"
5408                 },
5409                 "credtype": 1,
5410                 "publicdata": {
5411                   "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5412                   "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5413                 },
5414                 "privatedata": {
5415                   "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
5416                   "data": "BASE-64-ENCODED-VALUE",
5417                   "handle": 4
5418                 },
5419                 "optionaldata": {
5420                   "revstat": false,
5421                   "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5422                   "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
5423                 },
5424                 "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
5425                 "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
5426               }
5427             ],
5428             "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
5429           }
5430       }
5431     ]
5432   }

```

```

5430     }
5431   ],
5432   "responses": {
5433     "400": {
5434       "description": "The request is invalid."
5435     },
5436     "201": {
5437       "description": "The credential entry is created."
5438     },
5439     "204": {
5440       "description": "The credential entry is updated."
5441     }
5442   }
5443 },
5444 "delete": {
5445   "description": "Deletes credential entries.\nWhen DELETE is used without query parameters,
5446 all the cred entries are deleted.\nWhen DELETE is used with a query parameter, only the entries
5447 matching\nthe query parameter are deleted.\n",
5448   "parameters": [
5449     {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
5450     {"$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-credid"},
5451     {"$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-subjectuuid"}
5452   ],
5453   "responses": {
5454     "400": {
5455       "description": "The request is invalid."
5456     },
5457     "204": {
5458       "description": "The specific credential(s) or the the entire credential Resource has
5459 been successfully deleted."
5460     }
5461   }
5462 }
5463 },
5464 "parameters": {
5465   "interface": {
5466     "in": "query",
5467     "name": "if",
5468     "type": "string",
5469     "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
5470   },
5471   "cred-filtered-credid": {
5472     "in": "query",
5473     "name": "credid",
5474     "required": false,
5475     "type": "integer",
5476     "description": "Only applies to the credential with the specified credid.",
5477     "x-example": 2112
5478   },
5479   "cred-filtered-subjectuuid": {
5480     "in": "query",
5481     "name": "subjectuuid",
5482     "required": false,
5483     "type": "string",
5484     "description": "Only applies to credentials with the specified subject UUID.",
5485     "x-example": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
5486   }
5487 },
5488 },
5489 "definitions": {
5490   "Cred": {
5491     "properties": {
5492       "rowneruuid": {
5493         "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5494         "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5495 9]{12}$",
5496         "type": "string"
5497       },
5498       "rt": {
5499         "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
5500         "items": {
5501           "maxLength": 64,

```

```

5502         "type": "string",
5503         "enum": ["oic.r.cred"]
5504     },
5505     "minItems": 1,
5506     "readOnly": true,
5507     "type": "array",
5508     "uniqueItems": true
5509 },
5510 "n": {
5511     "$ref":
5512 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5513 schema.json#/definitions/n"
5514 },
5515 "id": {
5516     "$ref":
5517 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5518 schema.json#/definitions/id"
5519 },
5520 "creds": {
5521     "description": "List of credentials available at this Resource.",
5522     "items": {
5523         "properties": {
5524             "credid": {
5525                 "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
5526                 "type": "integer"
5527             },
5528             "credtype": {
5529                 "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCredential Types - Cred
5530 type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing\n1 - Symmetric pair-wise key\n2 -
5531 Symmetric group key\n4 - Asymmetric signing key\n8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate\n16 -
5532 PIN or password\n32 - Asymmetric encryption key. \n128 - SSM Client\n256 - SSM Server",
5533                 "maximum": 256,
5534                 "minimum": 0,
5535                 "type": "integer"
5536             },
5537             "credusage": {
5538                 "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
5539 type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
5540 Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolecert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
5541 Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
5542                 "enum": [
5543                     "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
5544                     "oic.sec.cred.cert",
5545                     "oic.sec.cred.rolecert",
5546                     "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
5547                     "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
5548                 ],
5549                 "type": "string"
5550             },
5551             "crms": {
5552                 "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
5553                 "items": {
5554                     "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
5555 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
5556 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
5557 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
5558 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
5559                     "enum": [
5560                         "oic.sec.crm.pro",
5561                         "oic.sec.crm.psk",
5562                         "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
5563                         "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
5564                         "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
5565                     ],
5566                     "type": "string"
5567                 },
5568                 "type": "array",
5569                 "uniqueItems": true
5570             },
5571             "optionaldata": {
5572                 "description": "Credential Type dependent. Credential revocation status
5573 information\n1, 2, 4, 32, 64: revocation status information\n8: Revocation information",

```

```

5574         "properties": {
5575             "data": {
5576                 "description": "The encoded structure.",
5577                 "type": "string"
5578             },
5579             "encoding": {
5580                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5581 the optdata.",
5582                 "x-detail-desc": [
5583                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5584                 ],
5585                 "enum": [
5586                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5587                 ],
5588                 "type": "string"
5589             },
5590             "revstat": {
5591                 "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
5592                 "type": "boolean"
5593             }
5594         },
5595         "required": [
5596             "revstat"
5597         ],
5598         "type": "object"
5599     },
5600     "period": {
5601         "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
5602         "type": "string"
5603     },
5604     "privatedata": {
5605         "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
5606 contents.",
5607         "properties": {
5608             "data": {
5609                 "description": "The encoded value.",
5610                 "maxLength": 3072,
5611                 "type": "string"
5612             },
5613             "encoding": {
5614                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5615 the privdata.",
5616                 "x-detail-desc": [
5617                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded private key.",
5618                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Encoding for Base64 encoded PSK.",
5619                     "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
5620 referenced using a handle.",
5621                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
5622                 ],
5623                 "enum": [
5624                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5625                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
5626                     "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
5627                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
5628                 ],
5629                 "type": "string"
5630             },
5631             "handle": {
5632                 "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
5633                 "type": "integer"
5634             }
5635         },
5636         "required": [
5637             "encoding"
5638         ],
5639         "type": "object"
5640     },
5641     "publicdata": {
5642         "description": "Credential Type dependent. Public credential information\n1:2:
5643 ticket, public SKDC values\n4, 32: Public key value\n8: A chain of one or more certificate",
5644         "properties": {
5645             "data": {

```

```

5646         "description": "The encoded value.",
5647         "maxLength": 3072,
5648         "type": "string"
5649     },
5650     "encoding": {
5651         "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
the pubdata.",
5652         "x-detail-desc": [
5653             "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5654         ],
5655         "enum": [
5656             "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5657         ],
5658         "type": "string"
5659     },
5660     },
5661     },
5662     "type": "object"
5663 },
5664 "oscore": {
5665     "description": "Contains parameters for use with credentials intended for use with
5666 OSCORE. See type definition for \"oic.sec.oscoretype\",
5667     "properties": {
5668         "senderid": {
5669             "description": "OSCORE Sender ID for this OSCORE Security Context",
5670             "type": "string"
5671         },
5672         "recipientid": {
5673             "description": "OSCORE Recipient ID for this OSCORE Security Context",
5674             "type": "string"
5675         },
5676         "ssn": {
5677             "description": "OSCORE Sender Sequence Number SSN1 being stored in nonvolatile
5678 memory to handle the loss of mutable security context parameters",
5679             "type": "integer",
5680             "readOnly": true
5681         },
5682         "desc": {
5683             "description": "Human readable description of the usage of this OSCORE Security
5684 Context",
5685             "type": "string"
5686         }
5687     },
5688     "type": "object"
5689 },
5690 "roleid": {
5691     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
5692 <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5693     "properties": {
5694         "authority": {
5695             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
5696 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5697             "type": "string"
5698         },
5699         "role": {
5700             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
5701             "type": "string"
5702         }
5703     },
5704     "required": [
5705         "role"
5706     ],
5707     "type": "object"
5708 },
5709 "subjectuuid": {
5710     "anyOf": [
5711         {
5712             "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\
5713 for wildcard identity.",
5714             "pattern": "^\\*$",
5715             "type": "string"
5716         },
5717         {

```

```

5718         "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5719         "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
5720 F0-9]{12}$",
5721         "type": "string"
5722     }
5723 ]
5724 }
5725 },
5726 "type": "object"
5727 },
5728 "type": "array"
5729 },
5730 "if": {
5731     "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5732     "items": {
5733         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
5734         "type": "string"
5735     },
5736     "minItems": 2,
5737     "readOnly": true,
5738     "type": "array"
5739 }
5740 },
5741 "type": "object",
5742 "required": ["creds", "rowneruuid"]
5743 },
5744 "Cred-Update": {
5745     "properties": {
5746         "rowneruuid": {
5747             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5748             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5749 9]{12}$",
5750             "type": "string"
5751         },
5752         "creds": {
5753             "description": "List of credentials available at this Resource.",
5754             "items": {
5755                 "properties": {
5756                     "credid": {
5757                         "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
5758                         "type": "integer"
5759                     },
5760                     "credtype": {
5761                         "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCredential Types - Cred
5762 type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing\n1 - Symmetric pair-wise key\n2 -
5763 Symmetric group key\n4 - Asymmetric signing key\n8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate\n16 -
5764 PIN or password\n32 - Asymmetric encryption key. \n 128 - SSM Client\n256 - SSM Server",
5765                         "maximum": 256,
5766                         "minimum": 0,
5767                         "type": "integer"
5768                     },
5769                     "credusage": {
5770                         "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
5771 type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
5772 Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolcert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
5773 Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
5774                         "enum": [
5775                             "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
5776                             "oic.sec.cred.cert",
5777                             "oic.sec.cred.rolcert",
5778                             "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
5779                             "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
5780                         ],
5781                         "type": "string"
5782                     },
5783                     "crms": {
5784                         "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
5785                         "items": {
5786                             "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
5787 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
5788 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
5789 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution

```

```

5790 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
5791     "enum": [
5792         "oic.sec.crm.pro",
5793         "oic.sec.crm.psk",
5794         "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
5795         "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
5796         "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
5797     ],
5798     "type": "string"
5799 },
5800 "type": "array"
5801 },
5802 "optionaldata": {
5803     "description": "Credential Type dependent. Credential revocation status
5804 information\n1, 2, 4, 32, 64: revocation status information\n8: Revocation information",
5805     "properties": {
5806         "data": {
5807             "description": "The encoded structure.",
5808             "type": "string"
5809         },
5810         "encoding": {
5811             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5812 the optdata.",
5813             "x-detail-desc": [
5814                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5815             ],
5816             "enum": [
5817                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5818             ],
5819             "type": "string"
5820         },
5821         "revstat": {
5822             "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
5823             "type": "boolean"
5824         }
5825     },
5826     "required": [
5827         "revstat"
5828     ],
5829     "type": "object"
5830 },
5831 "period": {
5832     "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
5833     "type": "string"
5834 },
5835 "privatedata": {
5836     "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
5837 contents.",
5838     "properties": {
5839         "data": {
5840             "description": "The encoded value.",
5841             "maxLength": 3072,
5842             "type": "string"
5843         },
5844         "encoding": {
5845             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5846 the privdata.",
5847             "x-detail-desc": [
5848                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded private key.",
5849                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Encoding for Base64 encoded PSK.",
5850                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
5851 referenced using a handle.",
5852                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
5853             ],
5854             "enum": [
5855                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5856                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
5857                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
5858                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
5859             ],
5860             "type": "string"
5861         },

```

```

5862         "handle": {
5863             "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
5864             "type": "integer"
5865         }
5866     },
5867     "required": [
5868         "encoding"
5869     ],
5870     "type": "object"
5871 },
5872 "publicdata": {
5873     "description": "Credential Type dependent. Public credential information\n1:2:
ticket, public SKDC values\n4, 32: Public key value\n8: A chain of one or more certificate",
5874     "properties": {
5875         "data": {
5876             "description": "The encoded value.",
5877             "maxLength": 3072,
5878             "type": "string"
5879         },
5880     },
5881     "encoding": {
5882         "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
the pubdata.",
5883         "x-detail-desc": [
5884             "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5885         ],
5886         "enum": [
5887             "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5888         ],
5889         "type": "string"
5890     }
5891 },
5892 },
5893 "type": "object"
5894 },
5895 "oscore": {
5896     "description": "Contains parameters for use with credentials intended for use with
OSCORE. See type definition for \"oic.sec.oscoretype\"",
5897     "properties": {
5898         "senderid": {
5899             "description": "OSCORE Sender ID for this OSCORE Security Context",
5900             "type": "string"
5901         },
5902     },
5903     "recipientid": {
5904         "description": "OSCORE Recipient ID for this OSCORE Security Context",
5905         "type": "string"
5906     },
5907     "desc": {
5908         "description": "Human readable description of the usage of this OSCORE Security
Context",
5909         "type": "string"
5910     }
5911 },
5912 },
5913 "type": "object"
5914 },
5915 "roleid": {
5916     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
<Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5917     "properties": {
5918         "authority": {
5919             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
<Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5920             "type": "string"
5921         },
5922     },
5923     "role": {
5924         "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
5925         "type": "string"
5926     }
5927 },
5928 },
5929 "required": [
5930     "role"
5931 ],
5932 "type": "object"
5933 },

```

```

5934     "subjectuuid": {
5935         "anyOf": [
5936             {
5937                 "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\
5938 for wildcard identity.",
5939                 "pattern": "^\\*$",
5940                 "type": "string"
5941             },
5942             {
5943                 "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5944                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
5945 F0-9]{12}$",
5946                 "type": "string"
5947             }
5948         ]
5949     },
5950     "type": "object"
5951 },
5952 "type": "array"
5953 },
5954 "if": {
5955     "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5956     "items": {
5957         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
5958         "type": "string"
5959     },
5960     "minItems": 1,
5961     "readOnly": true,
5962     "type": "array"
5963 },
5964 },
5965 "type": "object"
5966 }
5967 }
5968 }
5969 }
5970

```

### 5971 C.3.5 Property definition

5972 Table C-3 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.cred" Resource Type.

5973 **Table C-3 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.cred".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
creds	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	List of credentials available at this Resource.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
rowneruuid	string	No	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.

creds	array: see schema	No	Read Write	List of credentials available at this Resource.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.

5974 **C.3.6 CRUDN behaviour**

5975 Table C-4 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.cred" Resource Type.

5976 **Table C-4 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.cred".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post	delete	observe

5977 **C.4 Certificate Signing Request**

5978 **C.4.1 Introduction**

5979 This Resource specifies a Certificate Signing Request.

5980

5981 **C.4.2 Well-known URI**

5982 /oic/sec/csr

5983 **C.4.3 Resource type**

5984 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.csr".

5985 **C.4.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition**

```

5986 {
5987   "swagger": "2.0",
5988   "info": {
5989     "title": "Certificate Signing Request",
5990     "version": "2015-08-19",
5991     "license": {
5992       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
5993       "url":
5994         "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
5995         CENSE.md",
5996       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
5997         reserved."
5998     },
5999     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
6000   },
6001   "schemes": ["http"],
6002   "consumes": ["application/json"],
6003   "produces": ["application/json"],
6004   "paths": {
6005     "/oic/sec/csr" : {
6006       "get": {
6007         "description": "This Resource specifies a Certificate Signing Request.\n",
6008         "parameters": [
6009           {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
6010         ],
6011         "responses": {
6012           "200": {
6013             "description": "",
6014             "x-example":
6015               {
6016                 "rt": ["oic.r.csr"],
6017                 "encoding" : "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6018                 "csr": "PEMENCODEDCSR"
6019               },
6020             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Csr" }

```

```

6021         },
6022         "404": {
6023             "description" : "The Device does not support certificates and generating CSRs."
6024         },
6025         "503": {
6026             "description" : "The Device is not yet ready to return a response. Try again later."
6027         }
6028     }
6029 }
6030 }
6031 },
6032 "parameters": {
6033     "interface" : {
6034         "in" : "query",
6035         "name" : "if",
6036         "type" : "string",
6037         "enum" : [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
6038     }
6039 },
6040 "definitions": {
6041     "Csr" : {
6042         "properties": {
6043             "rt" : {
6044                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
6045                 "items": {
6046                     "maxLength": 64,
6047                     "type": "string",
6048                     "enum": ["oic.r.csr"]
6049                 },
6050                 "minItems": 1,
6051                 "readOnly": true,
6052                 "type": "array"
6053             },
6054             "encoding": {
6055                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in CSR.",
6056                 "x-detail-desc": [
6057                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded CSR."
6058                 ],
6059                 "enum": [
6060                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
6061                 ],
6062                 "readOnly": true,
6063                 "type": "string"
6064             },
6065             "n": {
6066                 "$ref":
6067                 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6068                 schema.json#/definitions/n"
6069             },
6070             "id": {
6071                 "$ref":
6072                 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6073                 schema.json#/definitions/id"
6074             },
6075             "csr": {
6076                 "description": "Signed CSR in ASN.1 in the encoding specified by the encoding property.",
6077                 "maxLength": 3072,
6078                 "readOnly": true,
6079                 "type": "string"
6080             },
6081             "if": {
6082                 "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
6083                 "items": {
6084                     "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
6085                     "type": "string"
6086                 },
6087                 "minItems": 1,
6088                 "readOnly": true,
6089                 "type": "array"
6090             }
6091         },
6092         "type" : "object",

```

```

6093     "required": ["csr", "encoding"]
6094     }
6095   }
6096 }
6097

```

#### 6098 C.4.5 Property definition

6099 Table C-5 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.csr" Resource Type.

6100 **Table C-5 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.csr".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
encoding	string	Yes	Read Only	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in CSR.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
csr	string	Yes	Read Only	Signed CSR in ASN.1 in the encoding specified by the encoding property.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.

#### 6101 C.4.6 CRUDN behaviour

6102 Table C-6 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.csr" Resource Type.

6103 **Table C-6 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.csr".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get			observe

### 6104 C.5 Device Owner Transfer Method

#### 6105 C.5.1 Introduction

6106 This Resource specifies properties needed to establish a Device owner.

6107

#### 6108 C.5.2 Well-known URI

6109 /oic/sec/doxm

#### 6110 C.5.3 Resource type

6111 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.doxm".

#### 6112 C.5.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```

6113 {
6114   "swagger": "2.0",
6115   "info": {
6116     "title": "Device Owner Transfer Method",
6117     "version": "2020-10-19",
6118     "license": {

```

```

6119         "name": "OCF Data Model License",
6120         "url":
6121 "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
6122 CENSE.md",
6123         "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019, 2020 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
6124 reserved.",
6125     },
6126     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
6127 },
6128 "schemes": ["http"],
6129 "consumes": ["application/json"],
6130 "produces": ["application/json"],
6131 "paths": {
6132     "/oic/sec/doxm" : {
6133         "get": {
6134             "description": "This Resource specifies properties needed to establish a Device owner.\n",
6135             "parameters": [
6136                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
6137                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/owned"}
6138             ],
6139             "responses": {
6140                 "200": {
6141                     "description": "",
6142                     "x-example": {
6143                         "rt": ["oic.r.doxm"],
6144                         "oxms": [ 0, 2, 3 ],
6145                         "oxmsel": 0,
6146                         "sct": 16,
6147                         "owned": true,
6148                         "deviceuuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
6149                         "devowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
6150                         "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
6151                     },
6152                     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Doxm" }
6153                 },
6154                 "400": {
6155                     "description": "The request is invalid."
6156                 }
6157             }
6158         },
6159         "post": {
6160             "description": "Updates the DOXM Resource data.\n",
6161             "parameters": [
6162                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
6163                 {
6164                     "name": "body",
6165                     "in": "body",
6166                     "required": true,
6167                     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Doxm-Update" },
6168                     "x-example":
6169                     {
6170                         "oxmsel": 0,
6171                         "owned": true,
6172                         "deviceuuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
6173                         "devowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
6174                         "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
6175                     }
6176                 }
6177             ],
6178             "responses": {
6179                 "400": {
6180                     "description": "The request is invalid."
6181                 },
6182                 "204": {
6183                     "description": "The DOXM entry is updated."
6184                 }
6185             }
6186         }
6187     }
6188 },
6189 "parameters": {
6190     "interface" : {

```

```

6191     "in" : "query",
6192     "name" : "if",
6193     "type" : "string",
6194     "enum" : [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
6195   },
6196   "owned": {
6197     "in": "query",
6198     "name": "owned",
6199     "type": "boolean"
6200   }
6201 },
6202 "definitions": {
6203   "Doxm" : {
6204     "properties": {
6205       "rowneruid": {
6206         "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6207         "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{12}$",
6208         "type": "string"
6209       },
6210     },
6211     "oxms": {
6212       "description": "List of supported owner transfer methods.",
6213       "items": {
6214         "description": "The Device owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-
6215 boarding. Each value indicates a specific Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the
6216 Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 - Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method
6217 (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for the manufacturer certificate method
6218 (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap)
6219 (deprecated).",
6220         "type": "integer"
6221       },
6222       "readOnly": true,
6223       "type": "array"
6224     },
6225     "devowneruid": {
6226       "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6227       "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{12}$",
6228       "type": "string"
6229     },
6230     "deviceuuid": {
6231       "description": "The uuid formatted identity of the Device\nFormat pattern according to
6232 IETF RFC 4122.",
6233       "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{12}$",
6234       "type": "string"
6235     },
6236     "owned": {
6237       "description": "Ownership status flag.",
6238       "type": "boolean"
6239     },
6240     "n": {
6241       "$ref":
6242       "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6243 schema.json#/definitions/n"
6244     },
6245     "id": {
6246       "$ref":
6247       "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6248 schema.json#/definitions/id"
6249     },
6250     "oxmsel": {
6251       "description": "The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding\nThe Device
6252 owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific
6253 Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 -
6254 Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for
6255 the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap
6256 method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).",
6257       "type": "integer"
6258     },
6259     "sct": {
6260       "description": "Bitmask encoding of supported credential types\nCredential Types -
6261

```

```

6263 Cred type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
6264 Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate16 - PIN or
6265 password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
6266     "maximum": 511,
6267     "minimum": 0,
6268     "type": "integer",
6269     "readOnly": true
6270 },
6271 "rt": {
6272     "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
6273     "items": {
6274         "maxLength": 64,
6275         "type": "string",
6276         "enum": ["oic.r.doxm"]
6277     },
6278     "minItems": 1,
6279     "readOnly": true,
6280     "type": "array"
6281 },
6282 "if": {
6283     "description": "The OCF Interface set supported by this Resource.",
6284     "items": {
6285         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
6286         "type": "string"
6287     },
6288     "minItems": 2,
6289     "readOnly": true,
6290     "type": "array"
6291 }
6292 },
6293 "type" : "object",
6294 "required": ["oxms", "oxmsel", "sct", "owned", "deviceuuid", "devowneruuid", "rowneruuid"]
6295 },
6296 "Doxm-Update" : {
6297     "properties": {
6298         "rowneruuid": {
6299             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6300             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
6301 9]{12}$",
6302             "type": "string"
6303         },
6304         "devowneruuid": {
6305             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6306             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
6307 9]{12}$",
6308             "type": "string"
6309         },
6310         "deviceuuid": {
6311             "description": "The uuid formatted identity of the Device\nFormat pattern according to
6312 IETF RFC 4122.",
6313             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
6314 9]{12}$",
6315             "type": "string"
6316         },
6317         "owned": {
6318             "description": "Ownership status flag.",
6319             "type": "boolean"
6320         },
6321         "oxmsel": {
6322             "description": "The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding\nThe Device
6323 owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific
6324 Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 -
6325 Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for
6326 the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap
6327 method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).",
6328             "type": "integer"
6329         }
6330     },
6331     "type" : "object"
6332 }
6333 }

```

6334 }  
6335

### 6336 C.5.5 Property definition

6337 Table C-7 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.doxm" Resource Type.

6338 **Table C-7 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.doxm".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
oxms	array: see schema	Yes	Read Only	List of supported owner transfer methods.
devowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
deviceuuid	string	Yes	Read Write	The uuid formatted identity of the Device Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
owned	boolean	Yes	Read Write	Ownership status flag.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
oxmsel	integer	Yes	Read Write	The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding The Device owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific Owner Transfer method 0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw) 1 - Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp) 2 - Numeric OTM identifier for the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert) 3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).
sct	integer	Yes	Read Only	Bitmask encoding of supported credential types Credential Types - Cred type encoded as a bitmask. 0 - Empty credential used for testing 1 - Symmetric pair-wise key 2 - Symmetric key 4 - Symmetric group key

				Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate16 - PIN or password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The OCF Interface set supported by this Resource.
owneruuid	string		Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
devowneruuid	string		Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
deviceuuid	string		Read Write	The uuid formatted identity of the Device Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
owned	boolean		Read Write	Ownership status flag.
oxmsel	integer		Read Write	The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding The Device owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific Owner Transfer method 0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw) 1 - Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp) 2 - Numeric OTM identifier for the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert) 3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).

6339 **C.5.6 CRUDN behaviour**

6340 Table C-8 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.doxm" Resource Type.

6341 **Table C-8 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.doxm".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

## 6342 C.6 Device Provisioning Status

### 6343 C.6.1 Introduction

6344 This Resource specifies Device provisioning status.

6345

### 6346 C.6.2 Well-known URI

6347 /oic/sec/pstat

### 6348 C.6.3 Resource type

6349 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.pstat".

### 6350 C.6.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
6351 {
6352   "swagger": "2.0",
6353   "info": {
6354     "title": "Device Provisioning Status",
6355     "version": "2019-10-01",
6356     "license": {
6357       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
6358       "url":
6359         "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
6360         CENSE.md",
6361       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
6362         reserved."
6363     },
6364     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
6365   },
6366   "schemes": ["http"],
6367   "consumes": ["application/json"],
6368   "produces": ["application/json"],
6369   "paths": {
6370     "/oic/sec/pstat" : {
6371       "get": {
6372         "description": "This Resource specifies Device provisioning status.\n",
6373         "parameters": [
6374           {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
6375         ],
6376         "responses": {
6377           "200": {
6378             "description": "",
6379             "x-example":
6380               {
6381                 "rt": ["oic.r.pstat"],
6382                 "dos": {"s": 3, "p": true},
6383                 "isop": true,
6384                 "cm": 8,
6385                 "tm": 60,
6386                 "om": 2,
6387                 "sm": 7,
6388                 "rowneruuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014"
6389               },
6390             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Pstat" }
6391           },
6392           "400": {
6393             "description": "The request is invalid."
6394           }
6395         }
6396       },
6397       "post": {
6398         "description": "Sets or updates Device provisioning status data.\n",
6399         "parameters": [
6400           {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
6401           {
6402             "name": "body",
6403             "in": "body",
6404             "required": true,
```

```

6405         "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Pstat-Update" },
6406         "x-example":
6407             {
6408                 "dos": {"s": 3},
6409                 "tm": 60,
6410                 "om": 2,
6411                 "rowneruuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014"
6412             }
6413     },
6414 ],
6415     "responses": {
6416         "400": {
6417             "description": "The request is invalid."
6418         },
6419         "204": {
6420             "description": "The PSTAT entry is updated."
6421         }
6422     }
6423 }
6424 },
6425 },
6426 "parameters": {
6427     "interface": {
6428         "in": "query",
6429         "name": "if",
6430         "type": "string",
6431         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
6432     }
6433 },
6434 "definitions": {
6435     "Pstat": {
6436         "properties": {
6437             "rowneruuid": {
6438                 "description": "The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner\nFormat pattern
6439 according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6440                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
6441 9]{12}$",
6442                 "type": "string"
6443             },
6444             "rt": {
6445                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
6446                 "items": {
6447                     "maxLength": 64,
6448                     "type": "string",
6449                     "enum": [ "oic.r.pstat" ]
6450                 },
6451                 "minItems": 1,
6452                 "readOnly": true,
6453                 "type": "array"
6454             },
6455             "om": {
6456                 "description": "Current operational mode\nDevice provisioning operation may be server
6457 directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer
6458 and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning
6459 services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8
6460 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.",
6461                 "maximum": 7,
6462                 "minimum": 1,
6463                 "type": "integer"
6464             },
6465             "cm": {
6466                 "description": "Current Device provisioning mode\nDevice provisioning mode maintains a
6467 bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character
6468 in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2
6469 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management
6470 services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate
6471 Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.",
6472                 "maximum": 255,
6473                 "minimum": 0,
6474                 "type": "integer",
6475                 "readOnly": true
6476             }
6477         }
6478     }
6479 }

```

```

6477     "n": {
6478         "$ref":
6479         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6480         schema.json#/definitions/n"
6481     },
6482     "id": {
6483         "$ref":
6484         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6485         schema.json#/definitions/id"
6486     },
6487     "isop": {
6488         "description": "true indicates Device is operational.",
6489         "readOnly": true,
6490         "type": "boolean"
6491     },
6492     "tm": {
6493         "description": "Target Device provisioning mode\nDevice provisioning mode maintains a
6494         bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character
6495         in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2
6496         - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management
6497         services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate
6498         Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.",
6499         "maximum": 255,
6500         "minimum": 0,
6501         "type": "integer"
6502     },
6503     "sm": {
6504         "description": "Supported operational modes\nDevice provisioning operation may be server
6505         directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer
6506         and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning
6507         services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8
6508         - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.",
6509         "maximum": 7,
6510         "minimum": 1,
6511         "type": "integer",
6512         "readOnly": true
6513     },
6514     "dos": {
6515         "description": "Device on-boarding state\nDevice operation state machine.",
6516         "properties": {
6517             "p": {
6518                 "default": true,
6519                 "description": "'p' is TRUE when the 's' state is pending until all necessary changes
6520                 to Device Resources are complete.",
6521                 "readOnly": true,
6522                 "type": "boolean"
6523             },
6524             "s": {
6525                 "description": "The current or pending operational state.",
6526                 "x-detail-desc": [
6527                     "0 - RESET - Device reset state.",
6528                     "1 - RFOTM - Ready for Device owner transfer method state.",
6529                     "2 - RFPPO - Ready for Device provisioning state.",
6530                     "3 - RFNOP - Ready for Device normal operation state.",
6531                     "4 - SRESET - The Device is in a soft reset state."
6532                 ],
6533                 "maximum": 4,
6534                 "minimum": 0,
6535                 "type": "integer"
6536             }
6537         },
6538         "required": [
6539             "s"
6540         ],
6541         "type": "object"
6542     },
6543     "if" : {
6544         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
6545         "items": {
6546             "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
6547             "type": "string"
6548         },

```

```

6549         "minItems": 1,
6550         "readOnly": true,
6551         "type": "array"
6552     },
6553 },
6554 "type" : "object",
6555 "required": ["dos", "isop", "cm", "tm", "om", "sm", "rowneruuid"]
6556 },
6557 "Pstat-Update" : {
6558     "properties": {
6559         "rowneruuid": {
6560             "description": "The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner\nFormat pattern
6561 according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6562             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
6563 9]{12}$",
6564             "type": "string"
6565         },
6566         "om": {
6567             "description": "Current operational mode\nDevice provisioning operation may be server
6568 directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer
6569 and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning
6570 services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8
6571 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.",
6572             "maximum": 7,
6573             "minimum": 1,
6574             "type": "integer"
6575         },
6576         "tm": {
6577             "description": "Target Device provisioning mode\nDevice provisioning mode maintains a
6578 bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character
6579 in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2
6580 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management
6581 services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate
6582 Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.",
6583             "maximum": 255,
6584             "minimum": 0,
6585             "type": "integer"
6586         },
6587         "dos": {
6588             "description": "Device on-boarding state\nDevice operation state machine.",
6589             "properties": {
6590                 "p": {
6591                     "default": true,
6592                     "description": "'p' is TRUE when the 's' state is pending until all necessary changes
6593 to Device Resources are complete.",
6594                     "readOnly": true,
6595                     "type": "boolean"
6596                 },
6597                 "s": {
6598                     "description": "The current or pending operational state.",
6599                     "x-detail-desc": [
6600                         "0 - RESET - Device reset state.",
6601                         "1 - RFOTM - Ready for Device owner transfer method state.",
6602                         "2 - RFPRO - Ready for Device provisioning state.",
6603                         "3 - RFNOP - Ready for Device normal operation state.",
6604                         "4 - SRESET - The Device is in a soft reset state."
6605                     ],
6606                     "maximum": 4,
6607                     "minimum": 0,
6608                     "type": "integer"
6609                 }
6610             },
6611             "required": [
6612                 "s"
6613             ],
6614             "type": "object"
6615         }
6616     },
6617     "type" : "object"
6618 }
6619 }

```

6620 }  
6621

### 6622 C.6.5 Property definition

6623 Table C-9 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.pstat" Resource Type.

6624 **Table C-9 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.pstat".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
om	integer	Yes	Read Write	Current operational mode Device provisioning operation may be server directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.
cm	integer	Yes	Read Only	Current Device provisioning mode Device provisioning mode maintains a bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management services16 -

				Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
isop	boolean	Yes	Read Only	true indicates Device is operational.
tm	integer	Yes	Read Write	Target Device provisioning mode Device provisioning mode maintains a bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.
sm	integer	Yes	Read Only	Supported operational modes Device provisioning operation may be server directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed

				provisioning8 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.
dos	object: see schema	Yes	Read Write	Device on-boarding state Device operation state machine.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
rowneruuid	string	No	Read Write	The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
om	integer	No	Read Write	Current operational mode Device provisioning operation may be server directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.
tm	integer	No	Read Write	Target Device provisioning mode Device provisioning mode maintains a bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management

				services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.
dos	object: see schema	No	Read Write	Device on-boarding state Device operation state machine.

6625 **C.6.6 CRUDN behaviour**

6626 Table C-10 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.pstat" Resource Type.

6627 **Table C-10 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.pstat".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

6628 **C.7 Asserted Roles**

6629 **C.7.1 Introduction**

6630 This Resource specifies roles that have been asserted.

6631

6632 **C.7.2 Well-known URI**

6633 /oic/sec/roles

6634 **C.7.3 Resource type**

6635 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.roles".

6636 **C.7.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition**

```
6637 {
6638   "swagger": "2.0",
6639   "info": {
6640     "title": "Asserted Roles",
6641     "version": "2017-03-23",
6642     "license": {
6643       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
6644       "url":
6645         "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
6646         CENSE.md",
6647       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
6648         reserved."
6649     },
6650     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
6651   },
6652   "schemes": ["http"],
6653   "consumes": ["application/json"],
6654   "produces": ["application/json"],
6655   "paths": {
6656     "/oic/sec/roles" : {
6657       "get": {
6658         "description": "This Resource specifies roles that have been asserted.\n",
6659         "parameters": [
6660           {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
6661         ],
6662         "responses": {
6663           "200": {
```

```

6664     "description" : "",
6665     "x-example":
6666     {
6667         "roles" :[
6668             {
6669                 "credid":1,
6670                 "credtype":8,
6671                 "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
6672                 "publicdata":
6673                 {
6674                     "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6675                     "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
6676                 },
6677                 "optionaldata":
6678                 {
6679                     "revstat": false,
6680                     "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6681                     "data":"PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
6682                 }
6683             },
6684             {
6685                 "credid":2,
6686                 "credtype":8,
6687                 "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
6688                 "publicdata":
6689                 {
6690                     "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6691                     "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
6692                 },
6693                 "optionaldata":
6694                 {
6695                     "revstat": false,
6696                     "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6697                     "data":"PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
6698                 }
6699             }
6700         ],
6701         "rt":["oic.r.roles"],
6702         "if":["oic.if.rw"]
6703     }
6704     ,
6705     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Roles" }
6706 },
6707 "400": {
6708     "description" : "The request is invalid."
6709 }
6710 },
6711 },
6712 "post": {
6713     "description": "Update the roles Resource, i.e., assert new roles to this server.\n\nNew
6714 role certificates that match an existing certificate (i.e., publicdata\nand optionaldata are the
6715 same) are not added to the Resource (and 204 is\nreturned).\n\nThe provided credid values are
6716 ignored, the Resource assigns its own.\n",
6717     "parameters": [
6718         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
6719         {
6720             "name": "body",
6721             "in": "body",
6722             "required": true,
6723             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Roles-update" },
6724             "x-example":
6725             {
6726                 "roles" :[
6727                     {
6728                         "credid":1,
6729                         "credtype":8,
6730                         "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
6731                         "publicdata":
6732                         {
6733                             "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6734                             "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
6735                         },

```

```

6736         "optionaldata":
6737         {
6738             "revstat": false,
6739             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6740             "data": "PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
6741         }
6742     },
6743     {
6744         "credid": 2,
6745         "credtype": 8,
6746         "subjectuuid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
6747         "publicdata":
6748         {
6749             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6750             "data": "PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
6751         },
6752         "optionaldata":
6753         {
6754             "revstat": false,
6755             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6756             "data": "PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
6757         }
6758     }
6759 ]
6760 }
6761 ],
6762 ],
6763 "responses": {
6764     "400": {
6765         "description": "The request is invalid."
6766     },
6767     "204": {
6768         "description": "The roles entry is updated."
6769     }
6770 },
6771 },
6772 "delete": {
6773     "description": "Deletes roles Resource entries.\nWhen DELETE is used without query
6774 parameters, all the roles entries are deleted.\nWhen DELETE is used with a query parameter, only the
6775 entries matching\nthe query parameter are deleted.\n",
6776     "parameters": [
6777         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
6778         { "$ref": "#/parameters/roles-filtered" }
6779     ],
6780     "responses": {
6781         "200": {
6782             "description": "The specified or all roles Resource entries have been successfully
6783 deleted."
6784         },
6785         "400": {
6786             "description": "The request is invalid."
6787         }
6788     }
6789 }
6790 },
6791 },
6792 "parameters": {
6793     "interface": {
6794         "in": "query",
6795         "name": "if",
6796         "type": "string",
6797         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
6798     },
6799     "roles-filtered": {
6800         "in": "query",
6801         "name": "credid",
6802         "required": false,
6803         "type": "integer",
6804         "description": "Only applies to the credential with the specified credid.",
6805         "x-example": 2112
6806     }
6807 },

```

```

6808 "definitions": {
6809   "Roles" : {
6810     "properties": {
6811       "rt": {
6812         "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
6813         "items": {
6814           "maxLength": 64,
6815           "type": "string",
6816           "enum": ["oic.r.roles"]
6817         },
6818         "minItems": 1,
6819         "readOnly": true,
6820         "type": "array"
6821       },
6822       "n": {
6823         "$ref":
6824         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6825         schema.json#/definitions/n"
6826       },
6827       "id": {
6828         "$ref":
6829         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6830         schema.json#/definitions/id"
6831       },
6832       "roles": {
6833         "description": "List of role certificates.",
6834         "items": {
6835           "properties": {
6836             "credid": {
6837               "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
6838               "type": "integer"
6839             },
6840             "credtype": {
6841               "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCredential Types - Cred
6842               type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
6843               Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate16 - PIN or
6844               password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
6845               "maximum": 63,
6846               "minimum": 0,
6847               "type": "integer"
6848             },
6849             "credusage": {
6850               "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
6851               type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
6852               Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolecert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
6853               Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
6854               "enum": [
6855                 "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
6856                 "oic.sec.cred.cert",
6857                 "oic.sec.cred.rolecert",
6858                 "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
6859                 "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
6860               ],
6861               "type": "string"
6862             },
6863             "crms": {
6864               "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
6865               "items": {
6866                 "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
6867                 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
6868                 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
6869                 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
6870                 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
6871                 "enum": [
6872                   "oic.sec.crm.pro",
6873                   "oic.sec.crm.psk",
6874                   "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
6875                   "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
6876                   "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
6877                 ],
6878                 "type": "string"
6879               },

```

```

6880         "type": "array"
6881     },
6882     "optionaldata": {
6883         "description": "Credential revocation status information\nOptional credential
6884 contents describes revocation status for this credential.",
6885         "properties": {
6886             "data": {
6887                 "description": "This is the encoded structure.",
6888                 "type": "string"
6889             },
6890             "encoding": {
6891                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6892 the optdata.",
6893                 "x-detail-desc": [
6894                     "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6895                     "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6896                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6897                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
6898                     "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
6899                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6900                 ],
6901                 "enum": [
6902                     "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6903                     "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6904                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6905                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6906                     "oic.sec.encoding.der",
6907                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6908                 ],
6909                 "type": "string"
6910             },
6911             "revstat": {
6912                 "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
6913                 "type": "boolean"
6914             }
6915         },
6916         "required": [
6917             "revstat"
6918         ],
6919         "type": "object"
6920     },
6921     "period": {
6922         "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
6923         "type": "string"
6924     },
6925     "privatedata": {
6926         "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
6927 contents.",
6928         "properties": {
6929             "data": {
6930                 "description": "The encoded value.",
6931                 "maxLength": 3072,
6932                 "type": "string"
6933             },
6934             "encoding": {
6935                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6936 the privdata.",
6937                 "x-detail-desc": [
6938                     "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6939                     "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6940                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6941                     "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
6942                     "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
6943 referenced using a handle.",
6944                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6945                 ],
6946                 "enum": [
6947                     "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6948                     "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6949                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6950                     "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
6951                     "oic.sec.encoding.handle",

```

```

6952         "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6953     ],
6954     "type": "string"
6955 },
6956     "handle": {
6957         "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
6958         "type": "integer"
6959     }
6960 },
6961     "required": [
6962         "encoding"
6963     ],
6964     "type": "object"
6965 },
6966     "publicdata": {
6967         "description": "Public credential information.",
6968         "properties": {
6969             "data": {
6970                 "description": "This is the encoded value.",
6971                 "maxLength": 3072,
6972                 "type": "string"
6973             },
6974             "encoding": {
6975                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6976 the pubdata.",
6977                 "x-detail-desc": [
6978                     "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6979                     "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6980                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6981                     "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
6982                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
6983                     "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
6984                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6985                 ],
6986                 "enum": [
6987                     "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6988                     "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6989                     "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6990                     "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
6991                     "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6992                     "oic.sec.encoding.der",
6993                     "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6994                 ],
6995                 "type": "string"
6996             }
6997         },
6998         "type": "object"
6999     },
7000     "roleid": {
7001         "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
7002 <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
7003         "properties": {
7004             "authority": {
7005                 "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
7006 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
7007                 "type": "string"
7008             },
7009             "role": {
7010                 "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
7011                 "type": "string"
7012             }
7013         },
7014         "required": [
7015             "role"
7016         ],
7017         "type": "object"
7018     },
7019     "subjectuuid": {
7020         "anyOf": [
7021             {
7022                 "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\
7023 for wildcard identity.",

```

```

7024         "pattern": "^\\*$",
7025         "type": "string"
7026     },
7027     {
7028         "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
7029         "pattern": "[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
7030 F0-9]{12}$",
7031         "type": "string"
7032     }
7033 ]
7034 }
7035 },
7036 "type": "object"
7037 },
7038 "type": "array"
7039 },
7040 "if": {
7041     "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
7042     "items": {
7043         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
7044         "type": "string"
7045     },
7046     "minItems": 1,
7047     "readOnly": true,
7048     "type": "array"
7049 }
7050 },
7051 "type": "object",
7052 "required": [ "roles" ]
7053 },
7054 "Roles-update" : {
7055     "properties": {
7056         "roles": {
7057             "description": "List of role certificates.",
7058             "items": {
7059                 "properties": {
7060                     "credid": {
7061                         "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
7062                         "type": "integer"
7063                     },
7064                     "credtype": {
7065                         "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCredential Types - Cred
7066 type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
7067 Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate16 - PIN or
7068 password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
7069                         "maximum": 63,
7070                         "minimum": 0,
7071                         "type": "integer"
7072                     },
7073                     "credusage": {
7074                         "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
7075 type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
7076 Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolcert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
7077 Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
7078                         "enum": [
7079                             "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
7080                             "oic.sec.cred.cert",
7081                             "oic.sec.cred.rolcert",
7082                             "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
7083                             "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
7084                         ],
7085                         "type": "string"
7086                     },
7087                     "crms": {
7088                         "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
7089                         "items": {
7090                             "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
7091 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
7092 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
7093 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
7094 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
7095                             "enum": [

```

```

7096         "oic.sec.crm.pro",
7097         "oic.sec.crm.psk",
7098         "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
7099         "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
7100         "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
7101     ],
7102     "type": "string"
7103 },
7104 "type": "array"
7105 },
7106 "optionaldata": {
7107     "description": "Credential revocation status information\nOptional credential
7108 contents describes revocation status for this credential.",
7109     "properties": {
7110         "data": {
7111             "description": "This is the encoded structure.",
7112             "type": "string"
7113         },
7114         "encoding": {
7115             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
7116 the optdata.",
7117             "x-detail-desc": [
7118                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
7119                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
7120                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
7121                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
7122                 "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
7123                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
7124             ],
7125             "enum": [
7126                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
7127                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
7128                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
7129                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
7130                 "oic.sec.encoding.der",
7131                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
7132             ],
7133             "type": "string"
7134         },
7135         "revstat": {
7136             "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
7137             "type": "boolean"
7138         }
7139     },
7140     "required": [
7141         "revstat"
7142     ],
7143     "type": "object"
7144 },
7145 "period": {
7146     "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
7147     "type": "string"
7148 },
7149 "privatedata": {
7150     "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
7151 contents.",
7152     "properties": {
7153         "data": {
7154             "description": "The encoded value.",
7155             "maxLength": 3072,
7156             "type": "string"
7157         },
7158         "encoding": {
7159             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
7160 the privdata.",
7161             "x-detail-desc": [
7162                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
7163                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
7164                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
7165                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
7166                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
7167 referenced using a handle.",

```

```

7168         "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
7169     ],
7170     "enum": [
7171         "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
7172         "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
7173         "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
7174         "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
7175         "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
7176         "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
7177     ],
7178     "type": "string"
7179 },
7180 "handle": {
7181     "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
7182     "type": "integer"
7183 }
7184 },
7185 "required": [
7186     "encoding"
7187 ],
7188 "type": "object"
7189 },
7190 "publicdata": {
7191     "description": "Public credential information.",
7192     "properties": {
7193         "data": {
7194             "description": "The encoded value.",
7195             "maxLength": 3072,
7196             "type": "string"
7197         },
7198         "encoding": {
7199             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
7200 the pubdata.",
7201             "x-detail-desc": [
7202                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
7203                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
7204                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
7205                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
7206                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
7207                 "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
7208                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
7209             ],
7210             "enum": [
7211                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
7212                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
7213                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
7214                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
7215                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
7216                 "oic.sec.encoding.der",
7217                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
7218             ],
7219             "type": "string"
7220         }
7221     },
7222     "type": "object"
7223 },
7224 "roleid": {
7225     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
7226 <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
7227     "properties": {
7228         "authority": {
7229             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
7230 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
7231             "type": "string"
7232         },
7233         "role": {
7234             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
7235             "type": "string"
7236         }
7237     },
7238     "required": [
7239         "role"

```

```

7240         ],
7241         "type": "object"
7242     },
7243     "subjectuuid": {
7244         "anyOf": [
7245             {
7246                 "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\
7247 for wildcard identity.",
7248                 "pattern": "^\\*$",
7249                 "type": "string"
7250             },
7251             {
7252                 "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
7253                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
7254 F0-9]{12}$",
7255                 "type": "string"
7256             }
7257         ]
7258     },
7259     },
7260     "type": "object"
7261 },
7262 "type": "array"
7263 }
7264 },
7265 "type" : "object",
7266 "required": ["roles"]
7267 }
7268 }
7269 }
7270

```

### 7271 C.7.5 Property definition

7272 Table C-11 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.roles" Resource Type.

7273 **Table C-11 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.roles".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
roles	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	List of role certificates.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
roles	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	List of role certificates.

### 7274 C.7.6 CRUDN behaviour

7275 Table C-12 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.roles" Resource Type.

7276 **Table C-12 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.roles".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post	delete	observe

## 7277 C.8 Security Profile

### 7278 C.8.1 Introduction

7279 Resource specifying supported and active security profile(s).

7280

### 7281 C.8.2 Well-known URI

7282 /oic/sec/sp

### 7283 C.8.3 Resource type

7284 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.sp".

### 7285 C.8.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
7286 {
7287   "swagger": "2.0",
7288   "info": {
7289     "title": "Security Profile",
7290     "version": "2019-02-08",
7291     "license": {
7292       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
7293       "url":
7294         "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
7295         CENSE.md",
7296       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
7297         reserved."
7298     },
7299     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
7300   },
7301   "schemes": ["http"],
7302   "consumes": ["application/json"],
7303   "produces": ["application/json"],
7304   "paths": {
7305     "/oic/sec/sp" : {
7306       "get": {
7307         "description": "Resource specifying supported and active security profile(s).\n",
7308         "parameters": [
7309           {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
7310         ],
7311         "responses": {
7312           "200": {
7313             "description": "",
7314             "x-example":
7315               {
7316                 "rt": ["oic.r.sp"],
7317                 "supportedprofiles" : ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", " 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"],
7318                 "currentprofile" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
7319               },
7320             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/SP" }
7321           },
7322           "400": {
7323             "description": "The request is invalid."
7324           }
7325         }
7326       },
7327       "post": {
7328         "description": "Sets or updates Device provisioning status data.\n",
7329         "parameters": [
7330           {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
7331           {
7332             "name": "body",
7333             "in": "body",
7334             "required": true,
7335             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/SP-Update" },
7336             "x-example":
7337               {
7338                 "supportedprofiles" : ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", " 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"],
7339                 "currentprofile" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
7340               }
7341           }
7342         ]
7343       }
7344     }
7345   }
7346 }
```

```

7340     }
7341   },
7342 ],
7343 "responses": {
7344   "200": {
7345     "description": "",
7346     "x-example":
7347       {
7348         "rt": ["oic.r.sp"],
7349         "supportedprofiles" : ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", " 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"],
7350         "currentprofile" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
7351       },
7352     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/SP" }
7353   },
7354   "400": {
7355     "description": "The request is invalid."
7356   }
7357 }
7358 }
7359 },
7360 },
7361 "parameters": {
7362   "interface" : {
7363     "in" : "query",
7364     "name" : "if",
7365     "type" : "string",
7366     "enum" : [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
7367   }
7368 },
7369 "definitions": {
7370   "SP" : {
7371     "properties": {
7372       "rt": {
7373         "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
7374         "items": {
7375           "maxLength": 64,
7376           "type": "string",
7377           "enum": ["oic.r.sp"]
7378         },
7379         "minItems": 1,
7380         "readOnly": true,
7381         "type": "array"
7382       },
7383       "n": {
7384         "$ref":
7385 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7386 schema.json#/definitions/n"
7387       },
7388       "id": {
7389         "$ref":
7390 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7391 schema.json#/definitions/id"
7392       },
7393       "currentprofile": {
7394         "description": "Security Profile currently active.",
7395         "type": "string"
7396       },
7397       "supportedprofiles": {
7398         "description": "Array of supported Security Profiles.",
7399         "items": {
7400           "type": "string"
7401         },
7402         "type": "array"
7403       },
7404       "if": {
7405         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
7406         "items": {
7407           "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
7408           "type": "string"
7409         },
7410         "minItems": 1,
7411         "readOnly": true,

```

```

7412         "type": "array"
7413     },
7414 },
7415 "type" : "object",
7416 "required": ["supportedprofiles", "currentprofile"]
7417 },
7418 "SP-Update" : {
7419     "properties": {
7420         "currentprofile": {
7421             "description": "Security Profile currently active.",
7422             "type": "string"
7423         },
7424         "supportedprofiles": {
7425             "description": "Array of supported Security Profiles.",
7426             "items": {
7427                 "type": "string"
7428             },
7429             "type": "array"
7430         }
7431     },
7432     "type" : "object"
7433 }
7434 }
7435 }
7436

```

### 7437 C.8.5 Property definition

7438 Table C-13 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.sp" Resource Type.

7439 **Table C-13 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.sp".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
currentprofile	string	Yes	Read Write	Security Profile currently active.
supportedprofiles	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	Array of supported Security Profiles.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
currentprofile	string		Read Write	Security Profile currently active.
supportedprofiles	array: see schema		Read Write	Array of supported Security Profiles.

### 7440 C.8.6 CRUDN behaviour

7441 Table C-14 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.sp" Resource Type.

7442 **Table C-14 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.sp".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

## 7443 C.9 Auditable Event List

### 7444 C.9.1 Introduction

7445 This Resource contains the Auditable Events that have been logged on the Device.

### 7446 C.9.2 Well-known URI

7447 /oic/sec/ael

### 7448 C.9.3 Resource type

7449 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.ael".

### 7450 C.9.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
7451 {
7452     "swagger": "2.0",
7453     "info": {
7454         "title": "Auditable Event List",
7455         "version": "2019-10-03",
7456         "license": {
7457             "name": "OCF Data Model License",
7458             "url":
7459 "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
7460 CENSE.md",
7461             "x-copyright": "Copyright 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
7462 reserved."
7463         },
7464         "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
7465     },
7466     "schemes": ["http"],
7467     "consumes": ["application/json"],
7468     "produces": ["application/json"],
7469     "paths": {
7470         "/AelResURI": {
7471             "get": {
7472                 "description": "This Resource contains the Auditable Events that have
7473 been logged on the Device.",
7474                 "parameters": [{" $ref": "#/parameters/interface"}],
7475                 "responses": {
7476                     "200": {
7477                         "description": "Example response payload. In this
7478 example, 'oic.d.light' Device has logged 2 Auditable Event Entries: Update attempt against
7479 '/room1/led1' Resource was denied, and Delete attempt against '/room1/led1' Resource was denied.
7480 Both Auditable Event Entries belong to 'AccessControl (0x01)' category and 'WARN' priority (2).",
7481                         "x-example": {
7482                             "rt": [ "oic.r.ael" ],
7483                             "events": [
7484                                 {
7485                                     "aeid": "AC-1",
7486                                     "category": 1,
7487                                     "priority": 2,
7488                                     "timestamp": "2018-11-
7489 13T20:22:39+00:00",
7490                                     "message": "Access Denied",
7491                                     "auxiliaryinfo":
7492 [ "[2001::1]:1234", "0f33887b-f7d6-4fdb-9125-dd4b60d5aaaa", "/room1/led1", "UPDATE", "RFNOP", "No
7493 roles asserted" ]
7494                                 },
7495                                 {
7496                                     "aeid": "AC-1",
7497                                     "category": 1,
7498                                     "priority": 2,
7499                                     "timestamp": "2018-11-
7500 13T20:20:00+00:00",
7501                                     "message": "Access Denied",
7502                                     "auxiliaryinfo":
7503 [ "[2001::1]:1234", "0f33887b-f7d6-4fdb-9125-dd4b60d5aaaa", "/room1/led1", "DELETE", "RFNOP", "No
7504 roles asserted" ]
7505                                 }
7506                             ]
7507                         }
7508                     }
7509                 }
7510             }
7511         }
7512     }
7513 }
```

```

7506         ],
7507         "usedspace": 2,
7508         "maxspace": 5,
7509         "categoryfilter": 3,
7510         "priorityfilter": 1
7511     },
7512     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Ael" }
7513 }
7514 }
7515 },
7516 "post": {
7517     "description": "An UPDATE operation may set the 'categoryfilter'
7518 and/or 'priorityfilter' Properties.",
7519     "parameters": [
7520         {
7521             "$ref": "#/parameters/interface"
7522         },
7523         {
7524             "in": "body",
7525             "name": "body",
7526             "required": true,
7527             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Ael-Update" },
7528             "x-example": {
7529                 "categoryfilter": 3,
7530                 "priorityfilter": 1
7531             }
7532         }
7533     ],
7534     "responses": {
7535         "204": {
7536             "description": "The new categoryfilter and
7537 priorityfilter were set."
7538         }
7539     }
7540 }
7541 },
7542 "parameters": {
7543     "interface": {
7544         "in": "query",
7545         "name": "if",
7546         "type": "string",
7547         "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
7548     }
7549 },
7550 "definitions": {
7551     "Aee": {
7552         "description": "Auditable Event Entry logged by a Device",
7553         "type": "object",
7554         "properties": {
7555             "aeid": {
7556                 "description": "Identity of the logged event",
7557                 "type": "string",
7558                 "readOnly": true
7559             },
7560             "category" : {
7561                 "description": "Category of this Auditable Event: 0x01
7562 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification),
7563 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved)",
7564                 "type": "integer",
7565                 "enum": [
7566                     1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128
7567                 ],
7568                 "readOnly": true
7569             },
7570             "priority": {
7571                 "description": "Priority of this Auditable Event: 0 (CRIT), 1
7572 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG)",
7573                 "type": "integer",
7574                 "enum": [
7575                     0, 1, 2, 3, 4
7576                 ],
7577             }

```

```

7578         "readOnly": true
7579     },
7580     "timestamp": {
7581         "description": "Time when this Auditable Event occurred",
7582         "type": "string",
7583         "format": "date-time",
7584         "readOnly": true
7585     },
7586     "message": {
7587         "description": "Description for this Auditable Event",
7588         "type": "string",
7589         "readOnly": true
7590     },
7591     "auxiliaryinfo": {
7592         "description": "Supplementary info for Auditable Event
7593 message. (e.g. URI of specific Resource in ACE2 for 'Access Denied' message)",
7594         "type": "array",
7595         "minItems": 0,
7596         "items": {
7597             "type": "string"
7598         },
7599         "readOnly": true
7600     }
7601 },
7602 "required": [
7603     "aeid", "message", "auxiliaryinfo", "category", "priority",
7604 "timestamp"
7605 ]
7606 },
7607
7608 "Ael": {
7609     "description": "Resource for storing Auditable Events List",
7610     "type": "object",
7611     "properties": {
7612         "rt": {
7613             "description": "Resource Type",
7614             "type": "array",
7615             "minItems": 1,
7616             "uniqueItems": true,
7617             "items": {
7618                 "maxLength": 64,
7619                 "type": "string",
7620                 "enum": [ "oic.r.ael" ]
7621             },
7622             "readOnly": true
7623         },
7624         "n": {
7625             "$ref":
7626 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7627 schema.json#/definitions/n"
7628         },
7629         "id": {
7630             "$ref":
7631 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7632 schema.json#/definitions/id"
7633         },
7634         "if": {
7635             "description": "The OCF Interface set supported by this
7636 Resource",
7637             "type": "array",
7638             "minItems": 2,
7639             "uniqueItems": true,
7640             "items": {
7641                 "type": "string",
7642                 "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
7643             },
7644             "readOnly": true
7645         },
7646         "events": {
7647             "description": "This list stores AEEs whose 'category'
7648 Property value is filtered by 'categoryfilter' Property and 'priority' Property value is equal or
7649 less than the value of 'priorityfilter' Property.",

```

```

7650         "type": "array",
7651         "uniqueItems": true,
7652         "items": {
7653             "$ref": "#/definitions/Aee"
7654         }
7655     },
7656     "usedspace": {
7657         "description": "Current used space for logged AEEs. The
7658 Device updates this Property whenever new AEEs are logged.",
7659         "type": "integer",
7660         "default": 0,
7661         "readOnly": true
7662     },
7663     "maxspace": {
7664         "description": "This means the maximum allowable storage size
7665 for AEEs that can be stored in 'events' list. The Manufacturer chooses this value.",
7666         "type": "integer",
7667         "readOnly": true
7668     },
7669     "unit": {
7670         "description": "The unit for 'usedspace' and 'maxspace'
7671 Properties. The Manufacturer chooses this value.",
7672         "type": "string",
7673         "enum": [
7674             "Kbyte",
7675             "Byte"
7676         ],
7677         "default": "Byte",
7678         "readOnly": true
7679     },
7680     "categoryfilter": {
7681         "description": "This value decides what categories of AEEs
7682 are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08
7683 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved).
7684 e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03:
7685 log all events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories ",
7686         "type": "integer",
7687         "default": 255
7688     },
7689     "priorityfilter": {
7690         "description": "The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to
7691 or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each
7692 value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG
7693 (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs
7694 will be logged ",
7695         "type": "integer",
7696         "default": 4,
7697         "enum": [
7698             0, 1, 2, 3, 4
7699         ]
7700     }
7701 },
7702 "required": [
7703     "events", "usedspace", "maxspace", "categoryfilter", "priorityfilter"
7704 ]
7705 },
7706 "Ael-Update": {
7707     "type": "object",
7708     "properties": {
7709         "categoryfilter": {
7710             "description": "This value decides what categories of AEEs
7711 are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08
7712 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication). e.g.) if
7713 categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03: log all
7714 events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories ",
7715             "type": "integer",
7716             "default": 255
7717         },
7718         "priorityfilter": {
7719             "description": "The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to
7720 or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each
7721 value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG

```

```

7722 (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs
7723 will be logged ",
7724         "type": "integer",
7725         "default": 4,
7726         "enum": [
7727             0, 1, 2, 3, 4
7728         ]
7729     },
7730 },
7731 "required": [
7732     "categoryfilter", "priorityfilter"
7733 ]
7734 }
7735 }
7736 }
7737 }
7738 }

```

7739 **C.9.5 Property definition**

7740 Table C-15 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.ael" Resource Type.

7741 **Table C-15 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.ael".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
aid	string	Yes	Read Only	Identity of the logged event
category	integer	Yes	Read Only	Category of this Auditable Event: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved)
priority	integer	Yes	Read Only	
timestamp	string	Yes	Read Only	Time when this Auditable Event occurred
message	string	Yes	Read Only	Description for this Auditable Event
auxiliaryinfo	array: see schema	Yes	Read Only	Supplementary info for Auditable Event message. (e.g. URI of specific Resource in ACE2 for 'Access Denied' message)
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The OCF Interface set supported by this Resource
events	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	This list stores AEEs whose 'category' Property value is filtered by

				'categoryfilter' Property and 'priority' Property value is equal or less than the value of 'priorityfilter' Property.
usedspace	integer	Yes	Read Only	Current used space for logged AEEs. The Device updates this Property whenever new AEEs are logged.
maxspace	integer	Yes	Read Only	This means the maximum allowable storage size for AEEs that can be stored in 'events' list. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
unit	string	No	Read Only	The unit for 'usedspace' and 'maxspace' Properties. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
categoryfilter	integer	Yes	Read Write	This value decides what categories of AEEs are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved). e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03: log all events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories
priorityfilter	integer	Yes	Read Write	The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and

				ERR (==1) AEEs will be logged
categoryfilter	integer	Yes	Read Write	This value decides what categories of AEEs are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication). e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03: log all events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories
priorityfilter	integer	Yes	Read Write	The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs will be logged

7742 **C.9.6 CRUDN behaviour**

7743 Table C-16 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.ael" Resource Type.

7744 **Table C-16 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.ael".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

7745 **C.10 Security Domain Information**

7746 **C.10.1 Introduction**

7747 This Resource contains the information that identifies the OCF Security Domain to which the  
7748 device belongs.  
7749

7750 **C.10.2 Well-known URI**

7751 /oic/sec/sdi

7752 **C.10.3 Resource type**

7753 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.sdi".

7754 **C.10.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition**

```
7755 {
7756   "swagger": "2.0",
7757   "info": {
7758     "title": "Security Domain Information",
7759     "version": "2019-10-01",
7760     "license": {
7761       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
7762       "url":
7763 "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
7764 CENSE.md",
7765       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
7766 reserved."
7767     },
7768     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
7769   },
7770   "schemes": ["http"],
7771   "consumes": ["application/json"],
7772   "produces": ["application/json"],
7773   "paths": {
7774     "/oic/sec/sdi" : {
7775       "get": {
7776         "description": "This Resource contains the information that identifies the OCF Security
7777 Domain to which the device belongs.\n",
7778         "parameters": [
7779           { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" }
7780         ],
7781         "responses": {
7782           "200": {
7783             "description": "Success",
7784             "x-example":
7785             {
7786               "rt": ["oic.r.sdi"],
7787               "uuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
7788               "name": "Home",
7789               "priv": true
7790             },
7791             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Sdi" }
7792           },
7793           "400": {
7794             "description": "The request is invalid."
7795           }
7796         }
7797       },
7798       "post": {
7799         "description": "Provision the OCF Security Domain information.\n",
7800         "parameters": [
7801           { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
7802           {
7803             "name": "body",
7804             "in": "body",
7805             "required": true,
7806             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Sdi-Update" },
7807             "x-example": {
7808               "uuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
7809               "name": "Home",
7810               "priv": false
7811             }
7812           }
7813         ],
7814         "responses": {
7815           "400": {
7816             "description": "The request is invalid."
7817           },
7818           "204": {
7819             "description": "The SDI is updated.",
7820             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Sdi-Update" },
```

```

7821         "x-example": {
7822             "uuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
7823             "name": "Home",
7824             "priv": false
7825         }
7826     }
7827 }
7828 }
7829 },
7830 },
7831 "parameters": {
7832     "interface" : {
7833         "in" : "query",
7834         "name" : "if",
7835         "type" : "string",
7836         "enum" : [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ]
7837     }
7838 },
7839 "definitions": {
7840     "sdi" : {
7841         "properties": {
7842             "uuid": {
7843                 "$ref": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.types-
7844 schema.json#/definitions/uuid"
7845             },
7846             "name": {
7847                 "description": "Human-friendly name for the Security Domain, set by DOTS during
7848 onboarding.",
7849                 "type": "string"
7850             },
7851             "rt": {
7852                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
7853                 "items": {
7854                     "maxLength": 64,
7855                     "type": "string",
7856                     "enum": ["oic.r.sdi"]
7857                 },
7858                 "minItems": 1,
7859                 "readOnly": true,
7860                 "type": "array"
7861             },
7862             "n": {
7863                 "$ref":
7864 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7865 schema.json#/definitions/n"
7866             },
7867             "id": {
7868                 "$ref":
7869 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7870 schema.json#/definitions/id"
7871             },
7872             "priv": {
7873                 "description": "Flag to indicate whether the Security Domain Information is copied to
7874 "/oic/res", and thus, whether it is publicly visible or private.",
7875                 "type": "boolean"
7876             },
7877             "if" : {
7878                 "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
7879                 "items": {
7880                     "enum": [ "oic.if.rw", "oic.if.baseline" ],
7881                     "type": "string"
7882                 },
7883                 "minItems": 1,
7884                 "readOnly": true,
7885                 "type": "array"
7886             }
7887         },
7888         "type" : "object",
7889         "required": [ "uuid", "name", "priv" ]
7890     },
7891     "Sdi-Update" : {

```

```

7893     "properties": {
7894         "uuid": {
7895             "$ref": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.types-
7896 schema.json#/definitions/uuid"
7897         },
7898         "name": {
7899             "description": "Human-friendly name for the Security Domain, set by DOTS during
7900 onboarding.",
7901             "type": "string"
7902         },
7903         "priv": {
7904             "description": "Flag to indicate whether the Security Domain Information is copied to
7905 \"/oic/res", and thus, whether it is publicly visible or private.",
7906             "type": "boolean"
7907         }
7908     },
7909     "type" : "object",
7910     "required": [ "name", "priv" ]
7911 }
7912 }
7913 }
7914 }

```

7915 **C.10.5 Property definition**

7916 Table C-17 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.sdi" Resource Type.

7917 **Table C-17 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.sdi".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
uuid	multiple types: see schema	Yes	Read Write	
name	string	Yes	Read Write	Human-friendly name for the Security Domain, set by DOTS during onboarding.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
priv	boolean	Yes	Read Write	Flag to indicate whether the Security Domain Information is copied to "/oic/res", and thus, whether it is publicly visible or private.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
uuid	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
name	string	Yes	Read Write	Human-friendly name for the Security Domain, set by DOTS during onboarding.
priv	boolean	Yes	Read Write	Flag to indicate whether the Security Domain Information is copied to

				"/oic/res", and thus, whether it is publicly visible or private.
--	--	--	--	--

7918 **C.10.6 CRUDN behaviour**

7919 Table C-18 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.sdi" Resource Type.

7920 **Table C-18 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.sdi".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

7921  
7922

7923  
7924  
7925  
7926

## Annex D (informative)

### OID definitions

7927 This annex captures the OIDs defined throughout the document. The OIDs listed are intended to  
7928 be used within the context of an X.509 v3 certificate. MAX is an upper bound for SEQUENCES of  
7929 UTF8Strings and OBJECT IDENTIFIERS and should not exceed 255.

```
7930 id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
7931     private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
7932
7933 -- OCF Security specific OIDs
7934
7935 id-ocfSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 0 }
7936 id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
7937
7938 -- OCF Security Categories
7939
7940 id-ocfSecurityProfile ::= { id-ocfSecurity 0 }
7941 id-ocfCertificatePolicy ::= { id-ocfSecurity 1 }
7942
7943 -- OCF Security Profiles
7944
7945 sp-undefined ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 0 }
7946 sp-baseline ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 1 }
7947 sp-black ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 2 }
7948 sp-blue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 3 }
7949 sp-purple ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 4 }
7950
7951 sp-undefined-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID (id-sp-undefined 0)
7952 sp-baseline-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-baseline 0}
7953 sp-black-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-black 0}
7954 sp-blue-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-blue 0}
7955 sp-purple-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-purple 0}
7956
7957 ocfSecurityProfileOID ::= UTF8String
7958
7959 -- OCF Security Certificate Policies
7960
7961 ocfCertificatePolicy-v1 ::= { id-ocfCertificatePolicy 2}
7962
7963 -- OCF X.509v3 Extensions
7964
7965 id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
7966 id-ocfCompliance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 0 }
7967 id-ocfSecurityClaims OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 1 }
7968 id-ocfCPLAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 2 }
7969
7970 ocfVersion ::= SEQUENCE {
7971     major    INTEGER,
7972     minor    INTEGER,
7973     build    INTEGER}
7974
7975 ocfCompliance ::= SEQUENCE {
7976     version        ocfVersion,
7977     securityProfile SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ocfSecurityProfileOID,
7978     deviceName     UTF8String,
7979     deviceManufacturer UTF8String}
7980
7981 claim-secure-boot ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 0 }
7982 claim-hw-backed-cred-storage ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 1 }
```

```
7983
7984 ocfSecurityClaimsOID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
7985
7986 ocfSecurityClaims ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) of ocfSecurityClaimsOID
7987
7988 cpl-at-IANAPen ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 0 }
7989 cpl-at-model ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 1 }
7990 cpl-at-version ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 2 }
7991
7992 ocfCPLAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
7993     cpl-at-IANAPen UTF8String,
7994     cpl-at-model UTF8String,
7995     cpl-at-version UTF8String}
```

Annex E  
(informative)

**Security considerations specific to Bridged Protocols**

7996  
7997  
7998  
7999

8000 The text in this Annex is provided for information only. This Annex has no normative impact. This  
8001 information is applicable at the time of initial publication and may become out of date.

8002 **E.1 Security Considerations specific to the AllJoyn Protocol**

8003 This clause intentionally left empty.

8004 **E.2 Security Considerations specific to the Bluetooth LE Protocol**


8005 BLE GAP supports two security modes, security mode 1 and security mode 2. Each security mode  
8006 has several security levels (see Table E.1)

8007 Security mode 1 and Security level 2 or higher would typically be considered secure from an OCF  
8008 perspective. The appropriate selection of security mode and level is left to the vendor.

8009 **Table E.1 GAP security mode**

GAP security mode	security level
Security mode 1	1 (no security)
	2 (Unauthenticated pairing with encryption)
	3 (Authenticated pairing with encryption)
	4 (Authenticated LE Secure Connections pairing with encryption)
Security mode 2	1 (Unauthenticated pairing with data signing)
	2 (Authenticated pairing with data signing)

8010 Figure E-1 shows how communications in both ecosystems of OCF-BLE Bridge Platform are  
8011 secured by their own security.



8012

8013 **Figure E-1 Security Considerations for BLE Bridge**

8014 **E.3 Security Considerations specific to the oneM2M Protocol**

8015 This clause intentionally left empty.

8016 **E.4 Security Considerations specific to the U+ Protocol**

8017 A U+ server supports one of the TLS 1.2 cipher suites as in Table E.2 defined in IETF RFC 5246.

**Table E.2 TLS 1.2 Cipher Suites used by U+**


Cipher Suite
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8

8019 The security of the Haier U+ Protocol is proprietary, and further details are presently unavailable.

8020 **E.5 Security Considerations specific to the Z-Wave Protocol**

8021 Z-Wave currently supports two kinds of security class which are S0 Security Class and S2 Security  
 8022 Class, as shown in Table E.3. Bridged Z-wave Servers using S2 Security Class for communication  
 8023 with a Virtual Bridged Client would typically be considered secure from an OCF perspective. The  
 8024 appropriate selection for S2 Security Class and Class Name is left to the vendor.

8025 Figure E-2 presents how OCF Client and Bridged Z-Wave Server communicate based upon their  
 8026 own security.



8027

8028

**Figure E-2 Security Considerations for Z-Wave Bridge**

8029 All 3 types of S2 Security Class such as S2 Access Control, S2 Authenticated and S2  
8030 Unauthenticated provides the following advantages from the security perspective;

- 8031 – The unique device specific key for every secure device enables validation of device identity and  
8032 prevents man-in-the-middle compromises to security
- 8033 – The Secure cryptographic key exchange methods during inclusion achieves high level of  
8034 security between the Virtual Z-Wave Client and the Bridged Z-Wave Server.
- 8035 – Out of band key exchange for product authentication which is combined with device specific  
8036 key prevents eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attack vectors.

8037 See Table E.3 for a summary of Z-Wave Security Classes.

8038 **Table E.3 Z-Wave Security Class**

Security Class	Class Name	Validation of device identity	Key Exchange	Message Encapsulation
S2	S2 Access Control	Device Specific key	Out-of-band inclusion	Encrypted command transmission
	S2 Authenticated	Device Specific key	Out-of-band inclusion	Encrypted command transmission
	S2 Unauthenticated	Device Specific key	Z-wave RF band used for inclusion	Encrypted command transmission
S0	S0 Authenticated	N/A	Z-wave RF band used for inclusion	Encrypted command transmission

8039 On the other hand, S0 Security Class has the vulnerability of security during inclusion by  
8040 exchanging of temporary 'well-known key' (e.g. 1234). As a result of that, it could lead the  
8041 disclosure of the network key if the log of key exchange methods is captured, so Z-Wave devices  
8042 might be no longer secure in that case.

## 8043 E.6 Security Considerations specific to the Zigbee Protocol

8044 The Zigbee 3.0 stack supports multiple security levels. A security level is supported by both the  
8045 network (NWK) layer and application support (APS) layer. A security attribute in the Zigbee 3.0  
8046 stack, "nwkSecurityLevel", represents the security level of a device.

8047 The security level nwkSecurityLevel > 0x04 provides message integrity code (MIC) and/or AES128-  
8048 CCM encryption (ENC). Zigbee Servers using nwkSecurityLevel > 0x04 would typically be  
8049 considered secure from an OCF perspective. The appropriate selection for nwkSecurityLevel is left  
8050 to the vendor.


8051 See Table E.4 for a summary of the Zigbee Security Levels.

8052 **Table E.4 Zigbee 3.0 Security Levels to the Network, and Application Support layers**

Security Level Identifier	Security Level Sub-Field	Security Attributes	Data Encryption	Frame Integrity (Length of M of MIC, in Number of Octets)
0x00	'000'	None	OFF	NO (M=0)
0x01	'001'	MIC-32	OFF	YES(M=4)
0x02	'010'	MIC-64	OFF	YES(M=8)
0x03	'011'	MIC-128	OFF	YES(M=16)

0x04	'100'	ENC	ON	NO(M=0)
0x05	'101'	ENC-MIC-32	ON	YES(M=4)
0x06	'110'	ENC-MIC-64	ON	YES(M=8)
0x07	'111'	ENC-MIC-128	ON	YES(M=16)

8053 Figure E-3 shows how communications in both ecosystems of OCF-Zigbee Bridge Platform are  
8054 secured by their own security.



8055

8056

**Figure E-3 Security Considerations for Zigbee Bridge**

### 8057 E.7 Security Considerations specific to the the EnOcean Radio Protocol

8058 The EnOcean Radio Protocol supports four different security levels. The security level depends on  
8059 which security mechanisms are used. Table E.5 defines them


8060

**Table E.5 EnOcean Radio Protocol security levels**

Level	Features	Replay Attack Vulnerability	Eavesdropping Vulnerability
0	No Features (Unsecure)	Yes	Yes
1	With Encryption only	Yes	No
2	Without Encryption but with RLC and CMAC	No	Yes
3	With Encryption, RLC and CMAC	No	No

8061 The security levels 1 and 2 have been declared deprecated and shall not longer be used. Security  
8062 level 3 uses Variable AES Encryption, Rolling Code (RLC) and a cipher-based message  
8063 authentication code (CMAC) with private keys and public vectors. Technically each feature can be  
8064 combined with every other feature, even if it is obsolete or unreasonable.

8065 Figure E-4 shows how communications in both ecosystems of OCF- EnOcean Bridge Platform are  
8066 secured by their own security



8067

8068

8069

**Figure E-4 Security Considerations for EnOcean Bridge**